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The purpose of the study was to examine the role of Bolivian 
elites in the revolutionary process which began in Bolivia in 
1952. The primary focus of the study was on decision makers 
and policy. The actual decision-making process in translating 
the goals of the revolutionary program into law is examined. 
The approach of the study combined elite and decision-making 
analysis to enable the author to trace the impact of decisions 
made during the Revolution which formed a pattern of policy. 
The stages of policy formation considered included origins 
of the decisions, the formal decisions, application and the 
consequences which flow from the decisions. 
The scope of the study is from the Chaco War (1932-1936) to the 
end of the rule by the revolutionary party, the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), in 1964. The primary focus 
of the paper is on the twelve years of MNR rule, from 1952 to 
1954. 
It may be concluded that the MNR elites were primarily 
responsible for the revolution, and for the failure of the 
party to institutionalize itself. The Revolution was a 
hesitant one, moderated by intense pressure from both the left 
and the right in Bolivia. In the decisions to nationalize the 
mines, reform the agrarian system, and to initiate universal 
suffrage the MNR eliminated a powerful traditional elite and re­
volutionized Bolivian society. However, by failing to control 
the new forces the revolution unleashed, the government was soon 
in a critical condition. Lacking the legitimate monopoly of the 
use of force, the government resorted to demand satisfaction to 
achieve political stability. The army overthrew the MNR govern­
ment in 1964, and returned Bolivia to a right-wing government. 
However, the major effects of the Revolution could not be 
altered by a new government. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the revolution of April 1952 Bolivia expe­
rienced a total breakdown of its traditional 
political structure and underwent a profound 
social revolution far in advance of anything 
which had occurred in any other state in South 
America. This revolution destroved a land-tenure 
and rural labour system that originated in 
colonial times and nationalized the dominant 
Bolivian export industry. It saw the adoption 
of a revolutionary ideology and the effective 
introduction of the Indian masses into national 
political life on a scale hitherto unknown ex­
cept for the Mexican experience.! 
It was the purpose of this study to examine the 
role of Bolivian elites in the revolutionary process 
which began in 1952. The primary focus of the study 
was on decision-makersand policy. The actual decision­
making process in translating the goals of the revolu­
tionary program into law is examined in this paper. 
Certainly not all of the elite structures were 
committed to the goals of the revolution. Those who 
opposed the revolution were also an important component 
of the decision-making process. 
The primary thesis of this paper is that the 
Revolutionary government was overthrown in 1964 largely 
lHerbert S. Klein, Parties and Political Changes 
In Bolivia 1880-1952 (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), 
p. xi. 
1  
2 
as a result of decisions made by the government elites 
durinq the preceding twelve year period. Thus an im­
portant part of this study involved analyzing these de­
cisions and tracing the consequences which flowed from 
the decisions made by the elites. These decisions as a 
whole formed a pattern of policy which had consequences 
for the elites and for the political system as a whole. 
Questions arise to which decision-making analysis 
may provide answers. For example, did the Revolution 
produce long term political stability or the effective 
institutionalization of the Movimiento National 
Revo!ucionario (MNR) party? What effect did the Revolu­
tion have on militarism and on-the institution of the coup 
d'etat in Bolivia? Some light may be shed on these 
questions through elite and decision-making analysis. 
Other factors are, of course, important to politics 
in Bolivia. Isolation is one important factor in Bolivia. 
Traditionally the land-locked Bolivians have felt isolated 
from the outside world. Access to he sea was lost to 
Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and as a 
result . . no product or person can qet in or out of 
Bolivia except by arduous t r a v e l . " 2  
^Lewis Hanke, South America, Anvil Books (New 
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967), p. 39. 
3 
Bolivians are also in many respects isolated from 
each other. Three distinct regions tend to isolate the 
people of Bolivia within the country. The altiplano is 
the cold Andean plateau which is still the most densely 
populated part of the country. The Yungas is the second 
region and consists of the semitropical valleys on the 
eastern slopes of the mountains. The third region is in 
eastern Bolivia and occupies nearly three-quarters of the 
total Bolivian land area. Known as the Oriente, it con­
sists of lowland tropics. Located in the southern 
Oriente is the Chaco, an area plagued by drought, locusts 
and periodic floods.3 
Because of its cruel geography, Bolivia has been 
affected both physically and politically by regionalism. 
The rugged nature of the land separates the people of 
Bolivia, exacerbating problems of communication and 
transportation, both of which were causal factors on the 
genesis of the National Revolution. For example, isolation 
from other nations was in part responsible for the deci­
sion to accept massive direct aid from the United States. 
Within Bolivia the compartmentalization of the population 
in diverse regions contributed to the rise of politically 
independent worker and peasant groups. These groups, the 
3Ibid. 
4  
geography, and other factors led to the successful over­
throw of the revolutionary elites in 1965. 
The record shows that the Bolivian National Revolu­
tion ushered in extensive land reform, nationalization 
of the tin mines and the political mobilization of the 
miners and the Deasants. One critic has observed that 
"this revolution has changed but little the formal struc­
ture of government in the republic, but it has vastly 
altered the economic, social, and political bases upon 
which this structure rests."4 
Let us now turn to the problem of defining the 
concepts which will be used in this study and which are 
important in understanding the revolutionary process 
which began in April of 1952. 
Conceptual Framework 
The Political System: Definition 
Gabriel A. Almond defined the political system 
as 
. . . that system of interactions to be found 
in all indeDendent societies which performs 
the functions of integration and adaptation (both 
internally and vis-ci-vis other societies) by 
^Robert J. Alexander, "Bolivia: The National 
Revolution," in Political Systems of Latin America, ed. 
by Martin C. Needier (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Company, 1970), p. 357. 
5 
means of the employment, or threat of employment, 
of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. 
The concept of political system is important in that 
it points out the interrelated nature of activities within 
the system and directs attention to the entire scope of 
political activities within a society. Thus, the political 
system includes not only government institutions but all 
structures in their political aspects. Such a concept is 
meaningful in a study on political change, because it 
points out the interrelated nature of components of a system. 
Thus, when the properties of one component in a system 
chanqe, the other components and the system as a whole 
are affected. The process of a political system involves 
inputs into the political system (demands, supports and 
feedback), and conversion of these inputs into policy 
outputs.6 
Almond divided political systems into the input 
functions and the output functions. The input functions 
include: political socialization (process of induction 
into the political culture); political recruitment 
5Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional 
Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the ' 
Developing Areas, ed. by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. 
Coleman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), p. 7. 
^See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of 
Political Svstems," World Poli ti cs, IX (April, 1957), 
383-400; and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 
Comparative Politics A Developmental Approach (Boston: 
Li ttle, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 16-41. 
6 
(induction into specialized roles in the political system); 
interest articulation (articulating interests, claims and 
demands for political action); and interest aggregation 
(aggregating articulated interests, claims and demands--
may be accomplished by means of the formulation of general 
policies.)7 The final input function is the political 
communication function, which ". . . is the crucial 
boundary--maintenance function"8 Boundary maintenance 
is critical for political stability. 
Almond's concepts are useful in the comparison 
of one political system with another, which is one ad­
vantage in using his approach. In addition, many of his 
concepts are useful in an analysis of the Bolivian 
Revolution. For example, the problem of interest aggrega­
tion became acute in Bolivia during the period covered by 
the thesis. Almond's analysis of a dominant nonauthori-
tarian party system, while not referring directly to 
Bolivia, may shed light on factors present in Bolivia 
during the National Revolution. He writes: 
. . . the dominant party is confronted by a com-
plex problem of interest aggregation. Since 
h i g h e r  d i s s i m i l a r  q r o l l D S  ( T T r a d i  t l o n a l  i  s t ,  s e c u l a r i s t ,  
s o c i a l i s t ,  c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  a n d  s o  f o r t h )  a r e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
7Almond, "A Functional Approach," pp. 17-40. 
^Ibid. , p. 42. 
7 
adoot a policy which agqregates their interests 
effectively. The cohesion of the party is diffi­
cult to maintain. In order to avoid divisive 
issues, decisions are postponed and policy proposals 
take the form of diffuse programs selected more for 
their effective coping with demands emanating from 
the society or the various political elites. Thus 
circulation and boundary maintenance are poor in 
those systems.9 
The output or government functions are rule making 
(legislative), rule application, and rule adjudication 
(judicial). In Bolivia the judiciary is weak, and at 
times the legislature is non-functioning. The output 
functions tend to be monopolized by the executive. 
Revolution: Definition and Applicability to Bolivia 
Revolution in a broad sense may be thought of as 
any nonsystemic change in either the leadership or the 
institutions of a state or a change in both leadership 
and institutionsJ 0 While this definition is significant 
for a decision-making approach to revolutions, it fails to 
distinguish concretely between a coup d'etat and a 
revolution. 
91bi d . 
TQA1 exanderGroth, Revo!ution—aft^-E44jte—fre^es-s-i 
Some Hypotheses on Aspects of Political Change (University 
of Cal1forni a , Davi s: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 
1966), p. 2; Nonsystemic change is that which is not 
expressly or by wide agreement authorized by the consti­
tutional legal provisions where decision-making power resides 
within the state. 
8 
Samuel Huntington's definition of revolution is 
more useful in that it points out the guidelines for 
determining whether such a monument as the Bolivian 
National Revolution was indeed a genuine revolution. 
Huntington viewed revolution as a two phase process. 
He described the first phase as ". . . rapid, fundamental, 
and violent domestic change in the dominant values and 
myths of a society, in its political institutions, social 
structure, leadership, and government activity, and 
policies." Huntington argued that revolution 
. . .  i s  n o t  a  u n i v e r s a l  c a t e g o r y  b u t  r a t h e r  a n  
historically limited phenomenon . . . like other 
forms of violence and instability, it is most 
likely to occur in societies which have experienced 
some social and economic development and where the 
processes of political modernization and political 
development have lagged behind the processes of 
social and economic change. 
Manv of these requirements were present in the 
Bolivian case. There was a displacement and emigration 
of the traditional, socio-economic elite; a revolutionary 
alliance between the peasants and middle class intellectuals; 
nationalization of property and expropriation of land; 
unprecedented extension of political participation to the 
workers and peasants; and finally, the establishment of 
one-party rule. The Bolivian Revolution did lack one 
characteristic of a major revolution in Huntington's 
^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
pp. 264-65. 
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model, and that was that there was relatively little 
violence in the seizure of p o w e r . ^  
Huntington's second phase embraced the creation 
and institutionalization of a new political order. Not 
all revolutions produce this new political order and thus 
c a n n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  c o m p l e t e  r e v o l u t i o n s .  
T h e  m e a s u r e  o f  h o w  s u c c e s s f u l  a  r e v o l u t i o n  i s  i s  
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  w h i c h  i t  g i v e s  b i r t h  . . .  a  f u l l  s c a l e  r e v o l u t i o n  
t h u s  i n v o l v e s  t h e  r a p i d  a n d  v i o l e n t  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  
e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
n e w  q r o u D S  i n t o  p o l i t i c s . ,  a n d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  n e w  
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s . ^  
The Bolivian Revolution failed to complete the second 
Dhase, that of the creation of new political institutions. 
However, the Bolivian case gives every indication of 
having tone through the first phase. 
At least two prerequisites are necessarv for a 
revolution to occur. First, existing political insti­
tutions must be incapable of channeling the particiDation 
of new social forces, such as unions, middle class, and 
new elites into government. Second, the social forces 
excluded from politics must want to Darticipate in 
12 Ibid., pp. 326-27. However, as Alexander Groth 
points out ". . . revolutions in the sense of an abrupt 
and profound change from the hitherto existent political 
pattern can readily occur with little, if any violence." 
Groth, Revolution and Elite Access, p. 3. 
^Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 266. 
1 0  
politics; these forces must feel they can only achieve 
their ends by pressing their demands into the political 
arena. "Ascending or asDiring groups and rigid or in­
flexible institutions are the stuff of which revolutions 
are made."^ These prerequisites obtained in Bolivia in 
1952. A narrowly based military dictatorship which had 
shown little ability to expand its power and to provide 
channels for the participation of new groups in politics 
was overthrown by revolutionary forces in April of 1952.^ 
The Elites: Definition and Applicability to Bolivia 
The elites in general hold . . those positions 
in society which are at the summits of key social structures, 
i.e. the higher positions in the economy, government, 
military, politics, religion, mass organizations, education, 
141bid., p. 275. 
T5No attempt has been made to deal with the vast 
literature available on revolutions. Only a working con­
cept has been dealt with here, and that is Samuel Huntington's 
ideas on political change. For more in depth studies of 
revolution see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: 
Viking, 1963); Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution 
(New York: Vintage, 1965); Chalmers Johnson, 'Revolutionary 
Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); and Groth, Revolu­
tion and Elite Access. There are, in addition, disputes 
about when and where a revolution has taken place. For 
example, George Blanksten feels that only one unquestionably 
real revolution has occurred thus far in the Twentieth 
Century in Latin America and that was the Mexican 
Revolution of 1911. See George I. Blanksten, "The Politics 
of Latin America." in The Politics of the Developing Areas, 
ed. by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 497. 
1 1  
and the p r o f e s s i o n s . " ^  However, as Harold Lasswell 
pointed out, ". . . any single definition for such a key 
term as 'elite' is inadequate."^7 Lasswell defined the 
elite in most simple terms as the influential. A re­
searcher's obliqation is discharged, according to Lasswell, 
when he gives his definition in general terms and then shows 
by specific indices what is intended in concrete situa­
tions . ̂  
Distinctions may be made within the elite structures. 
For example, it is possible to distinguish between the 
governing elite, or those who more or less directly par­
ticipate in the political decisions, and the nonqoverninq 
elite, who are at the top of nonpolitical structures.^9 
Such a distinction will be made below. 
Not only is there a distinction within the elite 
structures, there is a sharp hierarchical division between 
the leaders at the top and the masses below. This is a 
situation where ". . . in most functional groupinqs the 
lack of effective interaction between leader and follower 
^Seymour Martin Ijpset and Aldo Solari, El i tes i n 
Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
p. vi i. 
l^Harold D. Lasswell, "The Study of Political Elites," 
in World Revolutionary Elites, ed. by Harold D. Lasswell and 
Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, Massachusettes: The M.I.T. Press, 
1966), p. 4. 
18 Ibid.. 
^9Lipset and Solari, Elites in Latin America, p. vii. 
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does produce a series of independent and frequently ir­
responsible elites."^® 
As political development proceeds new groups emerge 
within the political system. These new groups give rise to 
a competing elite, who, although not directly participating 
in decision-making, influence to some extent the decision 
made . ̂  
There is hierarchy among elites, and at the top 
of this hierarchy rests the power elite. "The power elite 
in common with all elites is influential; it differs in 
having severe sanctions at its disposal." Lasswell says 
that "the political elite . . . are not necessarily active 
participants at a given moment. We think of the power elite 
as the collectivity from which active decision makers are 
drawn during particular periods in the life of a body politic. 
A framework for identifying the power elite has 
been proposed by Harold Lasswell and will be used in this 
study: 
At any time we may regard as members of the power 
elite class of a body politic the following: (a) 
all individuals who occupy high office during the 
period; (b) all individuals who have occupied high 
office in previous periods and who regard themselves, 
201bi d., p. 127. 
^Further Pitfalls in the study of the elites may be 
found in Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: 
Random House, 1963), pp. 20-21. 
^ L a s s w e l l ,  "The Study of Political Elites," pp. 11-12. 
For a similar discussion of "strategic elites" see Keller, 
Beyond the Ruling Class, p. 20. 
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and are regarded by others, as continuing to be 
in harmony with the established order; (c) all 
individuals who, though holdinq no high office, 
or any office, are perceived as highly influential 
in important decisions: (d) all individuals who, 
though perceived as adherents of a counterideology, 
are recognized as exercisinq a significant influence 
over important decisions; (e) close family members." 
The above categories allow for the addition of new 
elites and allow identification of individuals who have 
elite status but refrain from playing an official role in 
decision-making. The categories allow identification of 
elites in government, political parties and interest groups; 
most importantly the cateqories allow inclusion of elites 
who are without official position.24 
Elite studies are important in transitional political 
systems such as in Bolivia. A focus on changes in elite 
impact and composition is in many ways crucial to under­
standing chanqes in the political systems. "During the 
transition from traditional politics to a more modern 
political system elites play a crucial role. Elite activi­
ties determine the speed and effectiveness with which the 
23Lasswell, "The Study of Political Elites," p. 16. 
James L. Payne has an alternative framework for Oligarchic 
groups in Latin America. While more specific, the approach 
does not lend itself to decision-analysis as well as 
Lasswell's does. See James L. Payne, "The Oligarchy 
Muddle," in Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. 
Tomasek, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1970), p. 39. 
24Lasswell, "The Study of Political Elites," 
pp. 16-17. 
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polity can move toward national integration and political 
moderni ty.1,25 
Prerevolutionary Bolivia was ruled by an elite 
consisting primarily of the directors of three tin companies, 
two hundred families and large landowners (in 1950, 10 per 
cent of the landowners owned 97 per cent of the land). 
"Here was an almost perfect two-class oligarchical society."2® 
However, with the coming of the Revolution, new elites came 
into the decision-making structure. 
The changes in elite composition and impact in 
Bolivia were sweeping after April of 1952. "Fundamentally, 
Bolivia has been transformed from a country in which only 
a small elite had any real participation in government and 
political activity into a nation in which the masses play 
a fundamental role through a variety of organizations."27 
A focus on elites only identifies the influential 
in a political system. The decision-making focus deter­
mines the process by which a policy is formulated for a nation. 
The Decision-Making Approach 
Decision-making results in the selection from a 
socially defined, limited number of problematical 
25l_ipset and Solari, Elites in Latin America, p. 117. 
26Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 325. 
27Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 371. 
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alternative projects (i.e., courses of action) 
of one project to bring about the particular future 
state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers. 8 
Public policy emerges from a broad background of 
decisions. This policy is normally made determinate and 
concrete by administrative and judicial organs of a politi­
cal system. Also, at times the participation of private 
individuals or groups may effect this process.29 In Bolivia, 
the National Revolution has been the basic domestic Question 
of public policy. 
The following questions must be answered in regard 
to decision-makers; "Who are they? What are their per­
spectives? In what arenas do they function? What base 
values may they use to their advantaae? What strategies 
do they use? How successful are they in influencing out­
comes and effects?" It is necessary then ". . .to describe 
the participants, perspectives, situations, base values, 
and strategies that lead up to the outcomes, and to follow 
through to post outcome effects."30 
28Richard C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach 
to the Study of Political Phenomena," in The Conduct of 
Political Inquiry, ed. by Louis D. Hayes and Ronald D. 
Hedlund (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1970), .p. 237. 
29Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. 1)1 am ed., Patterns 
of Government (New York: Random House. 1962), pp. 60-62. 
30Lasswell, "The Study of Political Elites," p. 12 
and p. 10. 
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An important part of the decision-making approach 
is recreating the environment in which the decisions were 
made. Much emphasis must be given to the way the decision­
makers viewed the world and the options available to them. 
Consideration must be given to the amount of pressure to 
act and to the source of that pressure. Additionally, 
consideration must be given to the purposes and values of 
the decision-makers; how the problem is interpreted and so 
on. 
Decision-making is a sequence of activities. The 
principal sequence which will be examined in this study 
is the National Revolution in Bolivia. This will primarily 
determine what is or is not relevant. 
This sequence of activities has several vital stages; 
oriqlns, the formal decision, .implementation, and conse­
quences. "The point of decision is that stage in the se­
quence at which decision-makers having the authority 
choose a specific course of action to be implemented and 
assume responsibility for it."3l 
Decisions are made in the context of the- time in­
volved under the study. This context may be referred to 
as the setting. "Setting refers to a set of categories of 
potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect 
the action of decision-makers." There are basically two 
aspects of setting. First, is the social setting, which 
3^Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach." p. 237. 
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i n c l u d e s  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  a n d  p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  r e -
s i s t e r s  t o  t h e  D o l i c y .  T h e  s e c o n d  i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t t i n g ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
q p 
rules of the game, communication and so on. u 
There are, of course, limitations within the de­
cision-making system. First, decision-makers may lack in­
formation or act on inaccurate information. Second, there 
may be a breakdown in communications; information may not 
reach all the decision-makers who need it. Third, precedent 
may make reversal of past policies difficult. Fourth, 
perception of the decision-makers may be poor. What they 
"see" is what they act on. Finally, decision-makers are 
limited in resources such as time, energy, skills, and 
money.33 
A focus on decisions is an important part of this 
study, which enables the consequences of a revolutionary 
policv to be seen. These conseauences are important in 
understanding the coup d'ltat of 1964. "Political stability 
is in part the product of historical conditions and social 
forces, but it is also in part the result of choices and 
decisions made by political leaders."34 
32Ibid., p. 239. 
331  b id . ,  p. 241. 
34Hunt ington ,  Poli t ical Order in  Changing  Soc ie t ies ,  
p. 329. 
CHAPTER II 
FROM THE CHACO WAR TO THE 
EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 
I ntroducti on 
The period from the Chaco War to the start of 
hostilities on April 9, 1952 was a critical one for the 
Bolivian Revolution. The Chaco War set in motion the 
chain of events which made the Revolution a virtual cer­
tainty; for this reason it is important to consider it in 
the context of a stimulus to the political process. 
In addition, this period saw the rise of the new 
elites who were to become the revolutionary elites after 
1952. The old political system began to change as sub­
systems changed and the traditional political foundations 
began to alter. 
As was pointed out earlier, changes in sub-systems 
of the political system may alter the entire political 
system. 
This chapter will focus then on the changes 
brought about by the Chaco War. 
The Chaco War 
The Chaco War made the Revolution of 1952 inevitable. 
The four-year conflict with Paraguay from 1932 to 
1936 disorganized the economy, discredited the Army, 
spread new ideas among the urban workers and miners, 
and sowed discontent among the intelligentsia. As 
1 8  
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a result, there began a process of social ferment 
which reached its high point on April 9, 1952.1 
Most authorities on Bolivia feel the Chaco War 
was a turning point in the history of Bolivia. The war 
was laraely responsible for starting the breakdown of the 
old, rigid caste system and the start of ideological 
ferment in Bolivia. The war appears to have been the primary 
catalyst for the 1952 Revolution. "To almost all Bolivians, 
the key to the understanding of the revolutionary process 
lies in the disastrous results of the Chaco War of 
1932-5."2 
Herbert S. Klein has given what the author be­
lieves to be an accurate picture of Bolivia just prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities: 
On the eve of the Chaco War Bolivian society was 
underdeveloped, highly stratified and in many ways 
had progressed little since the early nineteenth 
century. The great socioeconomic and political 
changes in the urban centres of the nation had 
affected only a minority of the population. Despite 
the growth of mining and light industry and the 
increase in urbanization and modern communications 
the majority of the population was still engaged 
in traditional subsistence crop agriculture. The 
rural population in the census of 1846 was estimated 
conservatively at 89 per cent, in 1932 it still 
represented close to two-thirds of the national 
population.3 
^Robert 0. Alexander, The Bolivian National 
Revolution (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Uni­
versity Press. 1958), p. 22. 
2Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. xi i. 
31bid., p. 160. 
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The Chaco is a dry 250,000 square mile parcel of 
sand, with practically no streams in the area. Tempera­
tures during the day mav climb to 110° F. Although the 
land itself is uninviting, in the 1920's rumors began to 
circulate that the Chaco contained enormous unclaimed 
deposits of oi1 
Bolivia and Paraguay could not agree on the boundaries 
of the Chaco, and by the mid-1920's each had begun a major 
program of fort construction in the area. The first armed 
conflict occurred in 1927; but it was five years before 
serious fiqhting broke out. 
. . . When a border incident developed between 
the two states in June 1932. President Salamanca 
deliberately provoked a fuil-scale Bolivian re­
prisal which inevitably led into open war between 
the two nations. 
The Bolivian government hoped for a quick victory, 
not unreasonably since Bolivia's German-trained army had 
a formidable reputation before the war. However, "... 
the leadership of the Army was shown to be inept and often 
cowardly, the tactics and strategy of its General staff 
disastrous, and the corruption of the government administra-
C 
tive machinery colassal." In addition, there was a great 
^William Carter, Bolivia A Profile (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 51. 
5Herbert S. Klein, "Prelude to the Revolution," in 
Beyond the Revolution Bolivia Since 1952, ed. bv James M. 
Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1971), p. 33. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 24. 
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deal of conflict between the civil and military officials, 
and an excessively high rate of non-battle casualties 
from disease as well as from w o u n d s . ^  
As the war dragged on, all classes of Bolivians 
either volunteered or were conscripted into the army. 
Many of the middle and upper classes in Bolivia had never 
had such extensive contact with Indians; the Indians were 
taken from their traditional homelands and their outlook 
was broadened. This disturbed the long-maintained equilib­
rium which had depended on preserving the role of Indians 
as serfs.8 
As defeat followed defeat the army and the nation 
came to believe that the war was totally unjustified and 
indefensible. By the end of 1934 the Bolivian forces had 
retreated to the foothills of the Andes. "Discontent was 
David B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. 
Buechler, Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 25. 
8Richard W. Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," in 
Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert Tomasek (Garden City, 
New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 351-52. Herbert Klein 
refutes the notion that this conscription of the Indians 
created social discontent and economic dislocation. He 
maintains the Indian peasants were easily reabsorbed into 
the feudal land system after the war; he makes the same 
point with regard to the absorption of the urban prole­
tariat. Klein maintains the war must be seen in terms of 
". . . basic changes in the political structure of national 
leadership and ideology." See Klein, Parties and Political 
Change in Bolivia, p. xii. 
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rife both in the Army and among the civilian populace as 
the war dragged to an end early in 1936."9 
Thus after three bloody years of fighting the 
Chaco War had come to an end, with Bolivia a 
defeated nation and the great Chaco Boreal firmly 
in the hands of the enemy. Bolivia's losses in 
human life were appalling. Roughly 25 per cent 
of the combatants or over 65,000 youths were either 
killed, had deserted, or died in captivity, and 
this figure does not include the wounded and 
maimed.'0 
Bolivia's defeat embittered many of the young there 
and discontent with the whole social, economic and political 
structure of Bolivia was evident in the events that followed 
the war. The end of the war marked the beginning of a 
period of great turmoil which culminated with the Revolution 
of 1 952. "Those who survived t,he Chaco experience pro­
vided the stimulus which eventually would give rise to a 
new political order in Bolivia."^ 
This new political order was brought about by the 
challenge to the legitimacy of the old political system. 
Herbert Klein has pointed out that one of the crucial 
needs of a government is the basic acceptance of its 
legitimacy by the majority of active citizens; without 
this legitimacy no political system can function. Once 
this legitimacy is successfully challenged, neither force 
nor any other factor can preserve the government or the 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 25. 
^°Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, p. 187 
11 Ibid., p. 198. 
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system. "This crisis of legitimacy is exactly what 
occurred as a result of the Chaco War . . . overnight a 
host of new names began to dominate the political s c e n e .  
The Traditional Elites 
In the light of the economic and social structure 
of pre-Revolutionary Bolivia it is not surprising 
that political power was a monopoly of a very small 
element in the population. This was reflected in 
the fact that only about 200,000 citizens, or about,-
7 percent of the population, had the right to vote. 
Bolivia maintained a rigid class structure up to 
1930. Although this pattern was to be altered somewhat 
after the Chaco War, Bolivia continued this class structure 
until the 1952 Revolution. Robert J, Alexander, a noted 
Bolivian expert, has called Bolivia's social structure 
the "two nation pattern."^ James M. Malloy has made a 
similar distinction in describing what he calls the 
"national" and the "local" systems in Bolivia.^5 
The above distinctions illustrate the elite nature 
of pre-Revolutionary Bolivia. The local, or rural nation 
consisted largely of the Indian peasants who made up 85 to 
90 per cent of the population. The great majority owned 
121bi d., pp. 202-03 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution", p. 359. 
l4Ibid., pp. 357-58. 
ISjames M. Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolu­
tion (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1 970), pp~^ 33-35. 
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no land, but were granted small plots by the landowners. 
The national system, on the other hand, consisted of 
the urban population. This group was more heterogeneous 
than the people of the countryside and consisted of agri­
cultural landlords, industrialists, merchants, bankers, 
military, and governmental officials. 
Relative to the population at large, the national 
political system was by definition an elitist 
system and was legitimized as such. The constitution 
assured that the simplest basis of political power-
citizenship-would be monopolized by the monied, 
educated, and propertied.16 
To ensure the dominance of one "nation" over the 
other, the elites excluded everyone but themselves from 
participation in national political life. The device for 
this control was an effective literacy test which denied 
the vote to all but a small elite. This elite group was 
remarkably stable and its numbers did not greatly expand 
until the Twentieth CenturyJ7 
It is now necessary to turn to a general description 
of who the elites were: 
The upper class consisted of hacendados, mine 
owners, leading merchants, bankers and the new 
industrialists, and their legal retinue, and made 
up a self-conscious oligarchy . . . which directed 
the socio-economic and political life of'the nation. 
United by close ties of marriaqe, common absentee 
^Ibid., p. 35. See also, Alexander, "The National 
Revolution," pp. 357-58. 
^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
pp. 167-68. 
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possession of estates, membership in the same 
clubs and education in the same few schools, 
these leading families dominated the leadership 
of all the major parties and controlled the key 
administrative positions in the government bureau­
cracy .' 8 
The typical traditional elite member in Bolivia 
identified himself as white and attempted to maintain a 
European pattern of living. He was generally respected 
and was identified by 
. . . the color of his skin, [but not alwavs] 
the contour of his eyes, his dress, and above 
all, his demeanor, he is constantly shielded from 
involvement in situations that might threaten his 
high status. . . . Members of the elite did not 
accumulate wealth; they Dossessed it. . . . The 
Bolivian elite system was, then, a highly ascriptive 
one.'y 
Each department (state) in Bolivia had its own 
elites and status was determined somewhat differently in 
each. For example- in Sucre lineage was the important 
factor. In La Paz and Cochambaba elite position was based 
on land and cash wealth; in Santa Cruz and the Beni elite 
status deoended on lineage and the ability to command a 
large labor force. In Oruro and Potosf wealth gained from 
1ftIbid., p. 1968. 
^Carter, Bolivia A Profile, op. 83-84. It should 
be noted that money alone was not a criterion of status. 
Simon Patino, who owned the largest tin mines and who was 
one of the wealthiest men in the world, was never accepted 
socially in Bolivia. See Richard W. Patch, "Peasantry and 
National Revolution: Bolivia," in Expectant Peoples 
Nationalism and Development, ed. by K. H. Silvert (New York: 
Random House, 1963), p. 121. 
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the mines in the area plaved a dominant role in determin­
ing elite status. And finally, in Tarija elite status was 
based on land and lineage.20 
Social status did not, of course, translate directly 
into political power. This power was dominated by a small 
number of families in Bolivia, a group which certainly 
amounted to less than five per cent of the population. 
. . . the typical elite family had extensive land 
holdings, a respected name, and perhaps, a member 
who was a lawyer for one of the three tin companies, a 
senator or cabinet minister, or even a general or 
two. Families of this sort directly dominated 
politics.21 
However, as Malloy pointed out, ". . . this elite 
hardlv constituted a self-conscious entitv of unity of 
purpose."22 He went on to describe the resulting political 
instability: 
One sort of elite 'ins' often attempts to stay 
in office while another set of elite 'outs' 
attempts to disloge (sic) them. . . . Hence, 
political instability, characterized by intra-elite 
violence and frequent coups, is common. . . . Such 
coups seldom lead to a basic change of the existing 
order. The political stvle of the qolpe de estado 
employing minimal violence in which basic power re­
lations remain intact springs from a static economic 
situation in which the chief political issue is 
intra-elite circulation of personnel. 
20Carter, Bolivia A Profile, p. 85. 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 38. 
22Ibid., p. 39. 
23Ibid., p. 47. 
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The traditional elites controlled the political 
power in pre-revolutionary Bolivia, but there was another 
important group from which the revolutionary elites were 
to arise. This was the small middle class. 
In reality the situation from 1930 to 1952 was 
one in which political power was exercised by the tradi­
tional elites and ratified by the middle class. This was 
an important pattern in Bolivia, and continued to be so 
even after the Revolution, when the revolutionary elties 
began to exercise political power. The middle class 
sought elite status through the acquisition of polticial 
and economic power, and through education and professional 1-
zation.24 Thev continued to ratify the actions of the 
revolutionary elites, along with other qroups, such as 
labor and the peasants. 
The elites then could not rule alone. The middle 
class provided a base upon which the elites depended, 
supplying votes and a literate rank and file. Included 
in the middle class were professionals, teachers, 
tradesmen, artisans, white collar workers, public employees 
and some of the military officers.Prior to 1930 the 
middle class had been subservient to the elite's interests. 
After 1930 the traditional system began to break down. 
24Carter, Bolivia A Profile, D. 82. 
25Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
pp. 168-69. 
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The middle class will be examined in more detail 
in the section on the emerging elites; now it 1s necessary 
to turn to a more specific examination of the traditional 
elites in Bolivia. 
The Landowners. 
According to Robert J. Alexander, the landed 
aristocracy, through the first century of independence, 
remained largely in control of the government and politics 
of Bolivia. However, after 1900 they began to share con­
trol with the tin interests. 
Figures certainly indicate the degree of control 
held by the large landholders. According to an agricultural 
census of 1950, 90 per cent of all private property in 
Bolivia was held by about 4.5 per cent of the total rural 
1andholders.2? 
This gross inequality in land distribution was 
but one aspect of the inefficiency of Bolivian 
agriculture . . . the greater the size of the 
property, the smaller the area of land under 
cultivation, until the extreme is reached of 0.5 
per cent utility on properties of 10,000 hectores 
or over, a fact which strongly supports the thesis 
that latifundia in Bolivia was primarily a labour 
2f>Alexander, "j^g National Revolution," p. 361. 
2^Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 34. For further infor­
mation on land distribution in Bolivia see also, Merle Kling, 
"Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in 
Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 
1956), 26; and Klein, Parties and Political Change in 
Boli vi a, pp. 359-96). 
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control device rather than a land utilization 
system.28 
The landlords controlled almost all the arable 
land of the altiplano and also had large holdings in the 
valleys and lowlands. The status and condition of the 
peasants deteriorated as the landowners strengthened 
their hold in Bolivia, largely unchallenged. The degree 
of their control is indicated by the following: 
The local judges were either relatives or 
creatures of the landlord. The local govern^ 
ment was subservient to the 1atifundista. The 
national government was a long way off, and it 
too, during most administrations, was much 
more prone to listen to the Story of the landlord 
than to that of the peasant.29 
The landowners in Bolivia did not constitute a single, 
powerful elite. Other members of the traditional elite must 
be considered. The second powerful elite group in Bolivia 
was the mining interests: 
Landed groups continued, in part, to exercise 
public power directly; but it was an exercise 
tempered by the existence of the potent tin in­
terest group which, as the all-powerful single 
interest in the country, could deflect or initiate 
policy in those areas of immediate concern to them.30 
The Mining Interests. 
The tin zone in Bolivia is located in the Andean 
highlands. The major tin mining region is located in the 
28K1ein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 395. 
29Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 18. 
30Mal loy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 36. 
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western part of the mountain ranges known collectively as 
the Eastern Cordillera. Over 46,000 tons were produced 
in 1929; output declined during the depression, increased 
again during World War II, but never again was to reach 
the peak year of 1929.3^ 
Tin is extremely important to the Bolivian economy. 
Until the Revolution in 1952, output was largely accounted 
for by three large mining interests, the Patino, Hochschild. 
and Aramayo groups. However, control by these qroups was 
not easily maintained, due to the uncertainty of the mining 
i ndustry: 
Scant supply and poor quality of labor is a serious 
problem with which the Bolivian tin mining industry 
has to contend. Since imported workers cannot be 
used because they are not adapted to physical labor 
in high altitudes, native Indians, Quechaus and 
Aymaras, and Cholos (local name for the mestizo) 
are the,mining industry's source of labor.32 
The mining elite was in many ways as exploitive 
of the Indians as were the landlords. The tin barons 
formed an imDortant part of the traditional elites: 
The growth of tin occasioned the rise of a new 
elite, often from lower and landless social origins; 
but, once merged, this new group made its peace 
with the old, adopted its values, and strove, often 
ruthlessly, to possess land and the Indians living 
off it.33 
^Phyllis R. Griess, "The Bolivian Tin Industry," 
Economic Geography, XXVII (Julv, 1951), 238. 
32Ibid., p. 243. 
33Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
pp. 189-90. 
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Ownership of the " B i n  Three" (Patiffo, Aramavo and 
Hochschild) was 1n the hands of a few Bolivian families and 
foreign investors. There was much resentment in Bolivia 
over the foreign influence in the mines and over the fact 
that much of the mining capital flowed out of the country.^ 
Even before the period of consolidation of the 
Big Three (which took Dlace in the 1920's) the tin in­
dustry was owned laraely by foreign financial interests. 
PatiTTo Mines & Enterprises Consolidated, Inc. was a Delaware 
corporation; Compagnie Aramayo de Mines en Bolivia was a 
Swiss corporation; and Mauricio Hochschild's Sociedad 
Anonoma Minera e Industrial was a Chilean corporation.^® 
Lack of investment in Bolivia was a source of bitterness for 
the Bolivians: 
.  .  .  condi t ions  o f  po l i t ica l  ins tab i l i ty ,  oner ­
ous taxes  and fore ign  exchange regula t ions ,  p lus  
the  threat  o f  u l t imate  conf iscat ion ,  a f forded so 
l i t t le  incent ive  for  investment  in  Bol iv ia  that  
the  min ing  companies  a t tempted to  wi thdraw an 
ever - increas ing  Dercentaae  o f  the i r  prof i ts  f rom 
the  country ,  and spent  the  min imum poss ib le  amount  
in  explora t ion  and deve lop ina  new sources  o f  o i l .  6  
Together the Big Three accounted for about 85 to 
90 per cent of the Bolivian exports of tin and a considera­
ble proportion of the exports of other minerals. Of the 
34See Griess, "The Bolivian Tin Industry," 249; 
and Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 359. 
35George Jackson Eder, Inflation arid Development in 
Latin America A Case History of Inflation and Stablization 
in Bolivia (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Graduate School of Business 
Admi ni strati on The University of Michigan, 1968), p. 48. 
36Ibid., p. 49. 
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three. Patiffo was the most successful, and accounted for 
almost 50 per cent of Bolivia's tin mining outputs. 
Hochschild accounted for almost 27 per cent and Aramayo 
for about 10 per cent.3? 
Since Patiffo was the dominant figure, his career 
should be examined. It is in many ways typical and sheds 
light upon the mining elite. 
Simon Patiffo was born on June 1 , 1860 in the 
Cochabamba Valley of Bolivia. In the late 1870's he 
went to the mining city of Oruro and began his career in 
mining as a clerk. From there he went in 1884 to the 
Chilean-owned mining camp of Huanchaca, where he worked 
until a new boom came in tin. 
Then, . . in 1894, Patitfo finally succeeded 
in placing himself with the purchase of a half share in 
the struggling 'La Salvadora* mine."38 By August of 
1897 Pati?fo had all the shares in the mine. To complete 
his luck, in 1900 his Indian laborers discovered a 
fabulously rich tin vein in the mine.39 
"This gave him a start, but it was World War I 
that admitted him into the power clique of international 
3?See Griess, "The Bolivian Tin Industry," 246; and 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, D. 100. 
38Herbert S. Klein, "The Creation of th£ Patino Tin 
Empire," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XIX (Autumn, 
!965), 7. : 
391bid., p. 9. 
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finance . . ."^0 in 1914 he shifted the base of his 
operations and his smelting business to England. He then 
bouqht as much stock as possible in the Chilean-owned 
Llallaqua mine, which was then the largest tin enterprise 
in Bolivia. One acquisition followed another and his 
holdings were finally incorporated in Delaware. "At the 
apex of his fortune, he controlled approximately half the 
country's mineral production and was known internationally 
as the king of tin."41 Patitto also, . . besides holding 
interests in railroading, land, and the like, became the 
country's largest single private banker as well."42 
Patitfo's Bolivian troubles beaan after the Chaco 
War. Bolivian critics claimed he established the United 
States Corporation to evade Bolivian taxes and government 
control. In addition, the richrest ores were running out 
and the exploited workers were becoming increasingly 
resti ve: 
The company assiduouslv suppressed all attempts 
to organize the workers through most of its history. 
In fact, government troops were brought in to company 
mines several times to put down strikes, and in 
1942 such an army-worker conflict led to the 
famous Catavi Massacre of that year.43 
40Carter, Bolivia A Profile, p. 59. 
41 Ibid. 
42Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 43. 
43Klein, "The Creation of the Patino Tin Empire." 18. 
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However, Bolivia became the day-to-dav concern of 
elites acting in PatiTfo's name as he grew more concerned 
with world affairs. He died in 1947. 
The Big Three tin mining companies were acutely 
interested in the politics of Bolivia and in fact ". . . 
intervened openly and frequently in the country's politi-
44 cal affairs." Robert J. Alexander has said that the Big 
Three ". . , were generally credited with the ability 
to make and unmake governments at will."45 while this is 
probably an exaggeration it indicates the political power 
of the mining elites prior to the Revolution. While they 
were more interested in the pursuit of private economic 
power, this power often translated into political power, 
especially considering the dominant place tin had in the 
Bolivian economy. 
Political power was important to the mining in­
terests : 
Since the key tin industrialists were nationals, 
or controlled companies with highly diversified 
foreign capital, they more heavily relied for pro­
tection of their privileged positions on the 
domestic political system than did foreian capi­
tal i sts.4° 
This segment of the traditional elite was important 
politically, then. They were powerful, and in concert with 
^ A l e x a n d e r ,  "The National Revolution," p. 360. 
4 5 I b i d .. p. 359. 
^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 251. 
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the landowners, represented traditional values. Their 
impact was great: 
There, is little doubt that PatiTfo, Aramayo, and 
Hochschild companies had long been active in 
politics. They had subsidized candidates for 
office, they had financed revolution, they had 
made a regular policy of 'tipping' the local 
government officials in the mining areas. They 
had contributed heavily to the funds of candidates.7 
opposed to the M.N.R. ticket in the 1951 election. 
The Bolivian Army. 
The military has always played a crucial role in 
government and politics in Bolivia. This was especially 
true In the period between 1936 and 1952. Six of the 
nine men who served as president during that period were 
army officers; and together they served eleven of the six-
teen years. In addition, during that period every admin­
istration either began or ended with a military coup d' etat. 
The military has traditionally been important in 
Bol1 via: 
Once independence from Spain had been achieved, 
the principal remaining centers of authority in 
Bolivian society were the Church and the Army. 
The conservative classes in the new Republic, the 
landowners and the merchants, looked to these two 
institutions to prevent the revolutionary movement 
from going beyond the achievement of independence 
and, thus menacing their privileged position in 
society. With the drastic limitation of the power 
of the Church which occurred during the latter half 
47Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 360. 
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of the  n ineteenth  century ,  the  re la t ive  impor tance  
of the  army became even areater  than i t  had Drev ious ly  
been.48 
There is little doubt where the army stood with 
regard to the traditional elites, "From 1825 until 1952 
the military had great political importance in Bolivia. 
It was, for the most part, a traditional, conservative 
force allied with the established oligarchy aaainst any 
type of social reform."^9 As a result, the army became a 
sort of police force which protected the reaime in power; 
or possibly overthrowing that regime and putting another 
in its place. 
The military coup d' Stat was continued with the 
Chaco War. During the war the army overthrew President 
David Salamanca and put another civilian (Jose Luis 
Teiada Sorzano) in his place. The army was to remain a 
potent oolitical force until 1952, when it was drastically 
reduced by the revolutionary government. 
Indeed, the power of the army increased during the 
pre-revolutionary years. For example, while the Chaco 
peace treaty terms reduced the army to 5,000 men, by 1952 
the army had grown to 18,000 men and officers; and by 
1938 the national budget doubled the amount devoted to 
^Operations and Policy Research, Inc., Bolivia 
Election Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the 
Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1966), p. 29. 
\ 
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the military (to 32 per cent}.50 
One final element of the traditional elites con­
sisted of the governmental elites, which must now be con­
sidered . 
The Governmental Elites. 
The government on both national and local levels 
served the interests of the dominant economic and 
social classes and groups . . . national govern­
ment policies were generally patterned to the needs 
of the agricultural landlords and the mining in­
terests .5' 
As mentioned previously, the military was intimately 
involved in the governments from the Chaco War to the 
Revolution. Military takeovers had been facilitated by the 
vacuum created by the disintegration of the traditional 
political parties. This disintegration had been caused 
by the nation's condemnation ofthe parties for leading 
Bolivia into the Chaco War.52 
For an understanding of the events after 1952 it 
is first necessary to consider the governments preceding 
50Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 274; and Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 145. 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 359. 
James M. Malloy has made the same point: ". . . effective 
state control tended to stop at urban limits. The state 
functioned mainly to facilitate the operation of the tin 
system." Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 33. 
c p 
3<:Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 32. 
38 
the Revolution, since many of the roots of the Revolution 
may be found during these years. 
Daniel Salamanca, who was described as ". . . the 
very epitome of the traditional elite . . became 
Bolivia's President on March 5, 1931. He presided over 
the Chaco War, which was to prove to be his downfall. 
During the war the army had become disgusted with his 
leadership and they overthrew him. The overthrow of 
Salamanca was the first military coup since 1900. 
Vice President Jos£ Luis Tejada Sorzano replaced Salamanca 
on November 28, 1934. 
As the Chaco War drew to a close a group of young 
officers took the lead in establishing a new political 
party known as the National Socialist Party. The party 
was headed by Colonel David Toro. 
Toro had had an outstanding military career, having 
been elevated to the rank of major at the age of 27, in 1925. 
In addition, he was one of the most politically adept officers 
in the Bolivian officer corps. 
On May 17, 1936, a young officer group ousted 
President Sorozano and proclaimed Toro President. Toro 
took control on May 22 and proclaimed Bolivia to be a 
"Socialist Republic." 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 71. 
S^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 199. 
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Although Bolivia turned out to be something less 
than a socialist republic during Toro's short time in 
office, Toro did accomplish some significant things. For 
the first time in Bolivia a Ministry of Labor was established. 
Waldo Alvarez, a leader of the topographical workers union 
of La Paz, was the first person to hold the post. 
Second, a decree established a system of govern-
ment-recognized trade unions. Partly as a result of 
official support the country's first really national labor 
organization was established; the Confederation Sindical 
de Trabajadores de Bolivia (C.S.T.B.). 
Finally, "Toro gave expression to the growing 
nationalism by creating a state oil monopoly, the Y.P.F.B. 
[Bolivian Petroleum Board] which took over ownership and 
operation of the Standard Oil properties in Bolivia."55 
Toro's modest accomplishments did not lead to 
political stability in Bolivia, however. On July 13, 
1937, Lt. Colonel German Busch, who had engineered the 
coup which put Toro into power, overthrew him. 
Busch was one of the few heroes of the Chaco War. 
Only 28 at the beginning of the war, he had led troops 
in a spirited defense of the Camiri oil fields. Unfor­
tunately, Busch seemed to lack Toro's political 
55Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution," p. 107. 
For a description of Standard Oil in Bolivia and the con­
fiscation see Herbert S. Klein, "American Oil Companies in 
Latin America: The Bolivian Experience," Inter-American 
Economic Affairs, XVIII (Autumn, 1964) , 47-72. 
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sophistication. On April 24, 1939, Busch declared an end 
of constitutional government and the formal establishment 
of a dictatorship. 
One of the important efforts of the Busch adminis­
tration was an attempt to require the tin mine owners to 
turn over to the government their foreign exchange proceeds, 
. . clearly the first step toward seizure of the mines."5® 
But despite this apparent shift, the government 
in most ways reflected the dominant traditional pattern: 
. . . the Busch government was run by the very 
same men who had helped to run all the previous 
governments in Bolivia. Thus while Busch nationalized 
the new Banco Minero and brought into its management 
such leftists as Vfctor Paz Estenssoro and Walter 
Guevara Arze, he turned over its direction to his 
old oligarchic minister of finance, Alberto Palacios. 
What was true of the Banco Minero was true of the 
central bank and all the ministries and departments 
of government.57 
Despite the above, the traditional elites were 
concerned with the developments at the national level. 
What they had seen with Toro and Busch was a forewarning 
of what was to come. 
There had been no serious attack on the economic 
power of the native oligarchy, and concessions 
continued to flow to Aramayo and Patino, but the 
Toro and Busch regimes raised serious doubts in the 
minds of the upper class. Both governments had 
given great impetus to the labour movement and 
56patch, "Peasantry and the National Revolution," 
p. 107. 
57|<lein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 319. 
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had fostered the growth of numerous moderate and 
radical leftist organizations, all of which were 
sapping the strength of the already weakened 
traditional political parties. Also, there seemed 
no way to guarantee control over the rather erratic 
Busch without the traditional opposition party in a 
reasonably vocal and independent national legisla­
ture. But the Bolivian Congress had not been 
called into session for almost three years, which 
was an extremely dangerous precedent for the tra­
ditional parties and the normal patterns of political 
life.58 
On August 23, 1939, Busch committed suicide 
according to an official story in the New York Times the 
day after his death. This act marked the end of the post­
war era of military socialism. However, many of his 
supporters felt he was murdered as a result of his campaign 
against the tin mining companies,59 In any event, his 
hesitant revolution died with him. His death remains a 
mystery. 
Whatever its cause, the death of Busch enabled the 
oligarchy to initially gain the upper hand in their 
attempt to reestablish their authority. This climate 
of uncertainty was ideal for a resurgence of the right in 
national politics. 
The new President, Carlos Quintanilla, took office 
on August 23, 1939. He established his position early, 
meeting with leading miners and landowners. His government 
58lbid., p. 275. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 
28. The Times article date is August 24, 1939. 
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increasinoly began to reflect the interests of the 
,  . .  6 0  elites. 
Purina the terms of Quintanilla and Enrique Pefiaranda 
who followed him, . .no further steps were taken in 
the direction of taxation of the tin companies, or in 
61 
other wavs disturbing the status quo." Indeed, 
penaranda attempted to roll back most of the reforms of Toro 
and Busch. Nevertheless, he is most noteworthy for the 
fact that his presidency marked the bloody beginning of the 
end the old elite system. 
Fnrinue Pefiaranda was overthrown on December 20, 
1Q43, and Rualberto Villarroel became the President of 
Bolivia. This administration is significant in that it 
nave the MNP, leaders their first experience in government, 
and also because the MNR was abTe to consolidate its posi­
tion in the labor movement during this period. Robert J. 
Alexander has pointed out the importance of this adminis­
tration: 
In December, 1943, a military coup brought to power 
a radical nationalist regime headed by Major 
Rualberto Villarroel in which younger military leaders 
and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionary (MNR) 
shared nolitical responsibility and power. 
finKlein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, p. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 28. 
^Carter, Bolivia A Profile, p. 52. 
63Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 364. 
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The Villarroel administration was essentially 
a coalition between an army group known as the Raz^n de Patria 
(Radepa) and the MNR party, although Villarroel was not a 
member of either organization. Villarroel had several 
leaders of the MNR in his cabinet and he also repressed 
the Marxist parties. The future president, vfctor Paz 
Estenssoro, became Villarroel's Minister of Finance. 
Villarroel was the first to make a move toward 
the Indians. He summoned the First Congress of Indians, 
which he attended shortly before his death. Perhaps he 
saw in the Indians a potential power source; in any event 
his summoning of the Congress of Indians indicated they 
would have a role to play in the future political affairs 
of the nation. 
Villarroel's term was short and his end a violent 
one. After having antagonized the right, his government 
was overthrown by a secret uprising in La Paz on July 14, 
1946. The revolt was led by the right and resulted in 
Villarroel being hanged from a lamp post during the bloody 
upri si ng. 
After the Villarroel administration, things returned 
to "normal" for the traditional elites: 
The regimes from 1946 to 1952 are generally re­
garded in Bolivia as governments controlled by 
what is colloquially referred to as 'the rosea,' 
an indefinable term meaning the landlord aristo- .. 
cracy and the mining companies, among other elements.®4 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 42. 
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During the six year period from 1946 to 1952 
Bolivia had five presidents: Nestor Guillen (July 21-
August 16, 1946); Tomas Monje Gutierrez (August 15, 1946-
March 10, 1947); Enrique Hertzog (March 10, 1947-May 7, 
1949); Mamerto Urriolagiotia (May 7, 1949-May 16, 1951); 
and Hugo R. Ballivian (May 16, 1951-April 9, 1952). 
During this period of conservative governments 
the economic picture deteriorated drastically. This too, 
was to have important consequences for the coming revolu­
tion: 
Given the dramatic rates of change in the price 
index . . . the conservative governments, which 
sided with the 'tin oligarchy' without seeking to 
alleviate economic causes of social stress in 
Bolivian society, inevitably lost support among 
the middle sectors, government bureaucrats, and 
workers who made up the bulk of the economically 
active sector of the country's population.65 
Conclusions. 
James M. Malloy's analysis of the position of the 
traditional elites during the period from the Chaco War 
to the Revolution is perhaps the best summary of the situa­
tion of what was and what was to come: 
Resentment between the old and new, longstanding 
regional differences, and clashes among long-and 
short-term interests all acted to divide it internally. 
The long-term result of these factors was a weakening 
of the national elite's ability to resist opponents 
65James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. 
Aid Since 1952 (Latin American Center, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1969),p. 3. 
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and an erosion of its capacity to sponsor timely 
adaptive changes.*56 
In the post war period the traditional elites began 
to rely on pressure groups to cope with the changing 
situation in Bolivia. The creation of these groups indi­
cated the doubts the traditional elties had in the old 
politics, and especially in the old political parties. 
The traditional elites felt they could no longer rely on 
the traditional political structure. They seemed, from 
1935 to 1952, to be searching for new political organi­
zations which could defend them and give them the security 
they sought. 
By 1940, the major contours of the revolutionary 
situation were defined. The status quo elite 
factions had been driven to a semblance of internal 
unity by a situation which, from their point of 
view, was getting out of hand. The formation of 
La Concordancia drew the line of battle between 
theold and new in terms of implacable and in-
cipiently violent hostility.6' 
The signing of the Concordancia pact, in which the 
traditional elites abandoned the old system and openly 
represented themselves as a class-oriented party defending 
their interests in an interclass struggle for survival, 
was truly an historic occasion for Bolivia. This marked 
the end of the traditional political system, and ". . . the 
real beginning of the class-oriented and socially disruptive 
66Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 40. 
6?Ibid., p. 108. 
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political party structure based on the socio-economic 
realities of the nation."68 
The traditional elites were rigid in their dealings 
with the post-war reformist movement. They did not co-opt 
the new groups; rather they constantly fought their entrance 
into politics. Certainly the dissatisfaction with the old 
system, added to the inability of the traditional elites to 
co-opt the new radical elements, were major forces in the 
collapse of the traditional system. This system was rapidly 
coming apart, despite the apparent control the elites 
exerci sed: 
The calm before the veritable storm reflected 
more the preoccupations and initial disorgani­
zation of the new post-war political forces than 
it did the strength of traditional patterns. So 
long as the army was engaged in concluding the war 
and carrying out the initial stages of demobilization 
and peace, and so long as the returning veterans 
and intellectuals were still groping for an ideology 
and consolidating their forces, the pre-war leaders 
would be left undisturbed with the pretence of their 
old power. Once the initial period of consolidation 
was over, however, these same politicians were 
rapidly shorn of even this pretence.69 
It is the new political forces which must now be 
examined. 
The Emerging Elites 
Signs of the changing political situation in Bolivia 
after the Chaco War were everywhere. There was a 
68Klein, Parties and Political Chanqe in Bolivia, 
p. 306. 
69Ibid., p. 199. 
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proliferation of political organizations and development 
of new pressure groups which had previously never been 
known in Bolivia. 
In addition, there was an economic boom after the 
war which caused a great demand for skilled workers. Also, 
there was a major absorption of many Indian veterans who 
did not want to return to the land. The tight labor market, 
an expanding economy, and sudden runaway inflation created 
the atmosphere for these new groups and for the major 
growth of the Bolivian labor movement.70 
Prior to the Chaco War, there was little competition 
for the minds of the lower classes. But with the multi­
plicity of ideologies and groups issuing propaganda to 
the masses, a more politically active and aware working, 
artisan and urban lower class began to arise.^ 
The working class was not the only group which 
began to question the rule of the traditional elites. 
The young Chaco veterans of the upper and middle class 
families also began to question the traditional order. 
It was the left that provided the primary intellectual 
thrust of the post-war groups. It was the left which claimed 
7QIbid., passim. 
71 Ibid.» p. 341. 
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the Chaco War had been the last resort of the oligarchy 
and that only a social revolution could bring about a 
new Bolivia. 
Tristem Marof (pen-name of Gustavo A. Navarro) 
probably best represents the early leftist thinking in 
Bolivia. His socialist revolutionary code of Tierras el 
Indio, Minas A1 Estado (Land to the Indian, Mines to the 
State) was a rallying cry for future leftist leaders. 
In Klein's opinion, Marof 
. . . was unquestionably the dominating figure 
as the greatest revolutionary of the pre-war 
world and for a short time he became the key 
transition figure between the pre-and post-war 
leftist generations.72 
The post-war elements of' the counter-movement were, 
then, the youth of the civilian upper and middle classes, 
the junior officer corps of the army, the urban middle 
class, and the artisan-laborers. Unfortunately, prior 
to the Revolution, ". . . the counter-groups spent as much 
time in distinguishing and defining differences among them­
selves as in mounting challenges to the old order."73 
These groups must now be examined. 
The Emerging Parties. 
In a transitional situation where there is no 
general political consensus, political parties 
72Ibid., p. 195. 
73Mal loy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted 'Revolution, p. 85. 
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or movements cannot function as neutral, brokerage 
intermediaries between the various elites. Instead, 
such parties represent the particularisitic interests 
of the traditional elites or serve as vehicles for 
badly fragmented and competitive emerging interests 
and their elite leaders.74 
This was certainly the case in Bolivia from 1936 to 
1952, as the various parties competed for power and in­
fluence, and in most cases, for survival. The Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), which was to be the force 
behind the Revolution, was one of the parties struggling 
to survive. 
The party was founded in 1940 and organized under 
the leadership of vfctor Paz Estenssoro in January of 1941. 
Paz Estenssoro had been a professor of economics at the 
University of San Andres in La Paz, and an economic 
adviser to President Busch. Other intellectuals joined 
with Paz Estenssoro to organize the party: Hernan Siles 
(another economist and son of a former president); and 
Luis Perfaloza (also an economist and a one-time follower 
of Trist&n Marof).75 
The party's first program of principles did not 
appear until June of 1942. The MNR was primarily a nationalist 
party with a socialist tendency. Early programs were critical 
of the Big Three and called for control of them. 
^^Lipset and Solari, Elites in Latin America, p. 120. 
75See Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 397; and Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution^ 
p. 30. 
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In an interview on August 21, 1956, Vfctor Paz 
Estenssoro described the MNR in its early years as a 
nationalist party with socialist leanings which attempted 
to be a faithful reflection of the situation in Bolivia 
without any doctrinal rigidity.76 
This lack of doctrinal rigidity may in part be 
explained by the nature of the MNR. It emerged as a loose 
coalition of groups with many diverse political views. 
A doctrine was forming for the party, however. 
The first strains of the political thought of the MNR may 
be picked up at the 1938 Constitutional Convention, in 
which many of the future leaders of the party participated. 
The convention was also critical to Bolivian politics, as 
Herbert Klein points out: 
. . . the constitutional convention of 1938 was to 
prove a vital turning point in Bolivian history. 
The convention finally repealed both the oldest 
functioning constitution in Bolivian history, the 
1880 charter, and also entirely rewrote the basic 
concepts of constitutional government. It adopted 
what Latin American scholars have come to label 
'social constitutionalism.''7 
This was a departure from the nineteenth century 
concepts of limited government and protection of property 
as an inalienable right. The new doctrine stressed the 
responsibility of the state for the social and economic 
welfare of all its citizens. 
^ A l e x a n d e r ,  The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 33. 
7^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 278. The following account of the convention is taken 
LJ - L^.^1, 1 *7 O AC 
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The leftist thinkers, led by Paz Estenssoro and 
Walter Guevara Arze, among others, were very much in evi­
dence at the convention. However, they were fragmented 
by differing views and the potent traditional politics. 
Still, the left proposed some radical reforms. 
That these ideas were even-voiced and seriously 
debated in a national Bolivian Congress was in­
dicative of the major changes in the political 
atmosphere which had occurred as a result of 
the Chaco War, and most specifically of the 
general currency now enjoyed by the radical 
ideology of the pre-war left.'° 
Many of the controversial issues were raised by 
Paz Estenssoro. The controversy was especially strong 
over the Big Three. This is indicated in the following 
statement by fez Estenssoro at the convention concerning 
the Big Three: 
'As it has a power greater than that of the state 
itself, the mining superstate is capable of creating 
great difficulties and preventing the moderately 
socialist constitution that we are voting from being 
sanctioned and promulgated.'79 
The debate led to an attack on the entire mining 
industry; labor conditions in the mines and the loss of 
capital to foreign investors were criticized. 
But the left was rebuffed on many of their revolu­
tionary proposals. However, they 
781bid., p. 284. -
79lbid. , pp. 285-86. 
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. . . succeeded in having written into the con­
stitution, for the first time in Bolivian history, 
the general socialist principle that the state 
should assume direct control over the economy of 
the nation so as to insure the human dignity of 
its citizens.80 
At the time of the convention, Paz Estenssoro, 
Augusto C^spedes, and Guevara Arze were members of the 
Partido Socialista Independienta (PSI), which was the 
direct precursor of the MNR. 
President Busch began to fear the radical nature 
of the convention and threatened it with forced adjourn­
ment. Under intense pressure from the government the 
convention members hastily completed the constitution 
in October of 1938. They had done more than write a con­
stitution, however. 
. . . the convention had set the tone and provided 
the guidelines for the future generations of the 
nation. It had finally and definitively destroyed 
the traditional constitutional charter of economic 
liberalism and limited constitutional government, 
and openly proclaimed the positive role the govern­
ment must take in providing for the welfare of its 
people. This was unquestionably the basic idea 
which emerged in the national consciousness in the 
post-war period, and it was this desire which the 
convention delegates succeeded in writing into 
the fundamental charter of the union.8' 
If the Convention of 1938 provided the MNR with an 
ideological base, the Catavi Massacre of 1942 provided the 
party with a rallying point. 
8QIbid., p. 286. 
Sllbid., p. 291. 
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A miners union, led by the MNR, had staged a strike 
at the Catavi mine which was operated by the PatiTfo tin 
interests. The Patitfo company used World War II anti-
sabotage laws to get the government to send troops into the 
mines, and the result was a massacre of the workers. 
The Massacre in the mining camp of Catavi in 
December of 1942 resulted in 40 dead and 83 wounded, in­
cluding miners and army personnel. It was the Massacre 
which gave the MNR its first opportunity to try for major 
influence in Bolivian politics.82 
After the conflict, the Secretary General of the 
miners* union went to Paz Estenssoro's house and gave 
the workers' version of what had happened at Catavi. Paz 
Estenssoro then led the MNR deputies in Congress in inter­
rogating the government of General Peflaranda concerning 
the causes for its troops shooting at unarmed men, women, 
and children. Robert J. Alexander has maintained that the 
influence of the MNR among the miners dates from this 
inci dent.83 
It was during the two and a half years of the 
Villarroel regime (1943 to 1946) that the MNR got its 
first real experience in government. During that time 
it consolidated its hold on the miners' unions. Paz 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 33. 
83ibid., p. 34. 
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Esterissoro took over the Ministry of Finance and Carlos 
Montenegro and Augusto Cespedes also served in 
Villarroel's cabinet. 
The members of the MNR were forced from their 
ministries in March of 1944. There was speculation that 
this was due to pressure from the United States because 
of the leftist nature of the MNR. However, the tradi­
tional elites in Bolivia may have exerted sufficient pres­
sure to remove the MNR. In any event, the pressure 
lessened, and by December of 1944 the MNR members were able 
to reenter the government. 
In April of 1946, elections were held in which the 
MNR gained a majority position in the Congress, controlling 
60 per cent of the seats.84 But after this election the 
fortunes of the MNR turned, due'to increasing pressure 
from the traditional elites in Bolivia. After the over­
throw of Villarroel the MNR was declared illegal and Paz 
Estenssoro went into exile in Argentina, where he was to 
remain the symbol of the Revolution and what it hoped to 
accompli sh.85 
From July 21, 1946, until April 9, 1952, the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario was in 
the opposition. Its leaders were severely 
S^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 381 . 
85Richard W. Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," in 
Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. Tomasek (Garden 
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 353. 
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persecuted . . . virtually all the top leaders of 
the M.N.R. spent these six years in exile. . . . 
At one time there were some five thousand exiles 
belonging to the M.N.R. and its allies in Argentina 
alone, and there were thousands who were jailed 
in Bolivia, though many of them were released after 
short periods. 
Nevertheless, the MNR was still active during the 
six year period (known in Bolivia as the Sexenio). It 
backed various groups in national elections, attempted 
several times to overthrow the regimes, and gained ground 
in the organized labor movement. Also during this period 
the MNR led its first serious revolutionary attempt. 
Frustrated by the government, and convinced the only road 
to power lay in open rebellion, the MNR opened the fighting 
on August 26, 1949. Bolivia was in a state of open civil 
war, but the rebels failed to take La Paz (a lesson they 
did not forget) and were defeated in the end. 
The Sexenio was very important to Bolivia and the 
MNR. For during this period members of the MNR became 
committed to land reform, nationalization of the Big 
Three and to altering the political, economic and social 
structure of Bolivia. 
The Sexenio was important to the MNR in other ways. 
For example, the MNR record of opposition to the governments 
of Presidents Hertzog, Urriolagoitia, and Ballivian gained 
the party much support in Bolivia among the workers and 
middle class. 
^ A l e x a n d e r ,  The Bolivian National Revolution, 
d. 38. 
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In addition, the alliance between the labor move­
ment and the MNR was strengthened, although the MNR 
never gained control of the key labor groups. This 
failure was to have serious consequences for the Revolu­
tion. But it is certain that the alliance with labor 
had a great effect on the ideology, organization and the 
course the MNR took during the Revolution. 
Finally, it could be argued that the opposition 
of the government, and the attempts to crush the party, 
actually served to bring it together. This may have provided 
the bond which enabled the MNR to unite to replace the 
government. 
The MNR was not the only party of consequence in 
pre-revolutionary Bolivia; another was the pro-Stalinist 
Partido de la Izquirda Revo!ucionaria (PIR, or Revolu­
tionary Party of Left). 
Games Malloy had described the PIR as ". . . the 
first major counter-elite group to act directly on the 
artisan-labor movement in an attempt to radicalize and 
politicize it."8? The PIR also explored the possibility 
of the formation of an agrarian political movement. 
87Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 99. 
/ 
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"The PIR was the first new, truly modern party 
to emerge from the ferment begun in the late 192Q's and 
88 accelerated by the depression and the war." The party 
was established in 1940 ". . . as the result of a congress 
which brought together a number of small left-wing political 
groups of general Marxist orientation."^9 
The PIR had its complement of the country's 
leading intellectuals. Foremost among them was the 
eminent sociologist, Jos£ Antonio Arze. Others included 
the writers Fernando Sinani and Richardo Anaya and 
Bolivia's leading novelist, Jesds Lara. Arze was the 
party's candidate for president in 1940. 
The impact of the PIR was quickly felt in the labor 
movement. "By 1943, it had full control of the nation's 
principal central labor organization, the Confederacion 
Sindical de Trabajadores Bolivianos. Its particular 
bulwark was the Railroad Workers confederation."90 
The PIR platform called for full scale agrarian 
reform, complete nationalization of the mining industry 
and the petroleum and transportation network. 
The 1947 elections were the beginning of the end 
of the PIR's influence due to its support cf the government. 
*^Ibid., p. 98. 
89Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 29. 
90Ibid. 
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Enrique Hertzog, compromise candidate for President, 
was victorious, and he organized a coalition govern­
ment in which the PIR participated. Members of the PIR 
served in Hertzog's cabinet, and Jose Antonio Arze was 
President of the Chamber of Deputies in 1947. "In 
general, the line of the PIR was one of support of the 
91 government, and violent opposition to the M.N.R." 
The collaboration of the PIR with the conservative 
governments served to discredit the party almost completely 
among the workers. Although the party withdrew from the 
government in 1950, its reputation had by then been largely 
destroyed, ". . . and this once-potent counter-elite group 
was eliminated as a serious contender for power."92 
Another of the counter-elite groups which, prior 
to the Revolution, had a strong'foothold in the tin mines 
and in various industrial unions, was the Trotskyite 
Partido Obrero Revo!utionario (POR). This party had been 
in alliance with the MNR during the Villarroel regime. 
The POR may be traced to an exile group in Argentina 
during the Chaco War. The party was organized in Bolivia 
in 1940 under the leadership of Tristan Marof. He had 
originally founded the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Boliviano (PSOB) which became the POR. 
Ibid., p. 40. 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 132. 
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The parties of the left were not the only important 
ones during the pre-and post-Revolutionary situation. 
For example, the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) re­
mained small until the Revolution, and then it became the 
principal group around which the right wing opposition 
to the Revolution gathered. 
The FSB was established in 1937 among a group of 
exiles in Chile. It was patterned after the fascist party 
in Spain (Franco's Falange), and took its name from that 
organization. The FSB's organization reflected its pre­
dominantly military makeup; it was to be a force on the 
Bolivian scene for years to come. 
There was yet another party to the right of the 
political spectrum. In the 1940's, the leaders of the 
MNR had been joined by a group calling itself the 
Vanguardia of the MNR. The origins of this group were 
close to that of the Razon de Patria (RADEPA), an 
organization of young officer veterans of the Chaco War, 
who were bitter over Bolivia's defeat. This group was 
more conservative than the MNR leaders, and it was a 
strange alliance. "The alliance was based on the fact 
the MNR needed the RADEPA's military power, and the 
officers wanted the aura of civil legitimacy and support 
that the MNR could give a military regime. 
93Ibid., p. 120. 
60 
The divisions between the MNR, PIR and POR pre­
served the traditional government for another ten years, 
despite the weakened traditional system and the divisions 
in the army between the radical and conservative elements.94 
The Labor Elites. 
Insofar as the labor movement was concerned, the 
Chaco War was of major significance because the 
discontent aroused within the ranks of the younger 
officers who had participated in the conflict re­
sulted in bringing to power for the first time 
governments that were sympathetic to organized labor.95 
The labor movement had, of course, organized prior 
to the aid of the Busch administration. The Confederaci^n 
Sindical de Trabajadores Bolivianos (CSTB) had been formed 
in 1936, largely independent of the national intra-elite 
struggle. This had later important consequences for the 
course of the Revolution, since the labor movement de­
veloped over the years with its own organizations, 
orientations and leaders.96 
The Busch administration continued to foster the 
labor movement. His administration issued Bolivia's first 
Labor Code, and encouraged the first serious attempts to 
form trade unions among the tin miners. These attempts had 
been previously bitterly fought by the government and the 
94K1 ein, "Prelude to the Revolution," p. 37. 
95Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin 
America (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 102. 
96Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 106. 
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tin mining companies. By the end of the Busch regime, a 
Federation of Miners was established.9? 
This Federation had been organized by the followers 
of Tristan Marof and was called the Federaci^n Sindical de 
Trabajadores Mineros (FSTM). But the Busch administration 
also played an active role. The first national labor code 
became law on May 24, 1939 (the Codigo del Trabajo); in 
addition, the regime established a Ministry of Mines and 
Petroleum with Dionisio Foianini as the first Minister. 
The Villarroel government also strongly encouraged 
the growth of the trade-union movement. 
Perhaps the most important single action of the 
Villarroel regime was its sponsorship of the 
establishment of a strong trade union movement in 
the mining areas. The M.N.R. had built up con­
siderable support among the miners even before the 
Villarroel regime came to power, and its capitalized 
upon this support to organize unions in all. the 
important mines, and to establish securely the 
Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros as the 
central organization of all the mining unions.98 
One of the real forces behind the FSTM was a man 
named Juan Lechfn. Son of a Lebanese merchant and a 
Bolivian mother, he had been a clerical employee in the mine. 
But he was popular with the workers, and in 1945, when the 
FSTM held its first Congress, Lech'n emerged as Executive 
Secretary of the organization. 
Lechin at that time relied heavily on the 
Trotskyites of the POR for preparing public documents 
9?A1exander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 27. 
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that supposedly set forth the ideological position of the 
FSTM. This was later to have important consequences for 
the course of the Revolution. "Juan Lechfn has yet to 
live down the reputation for being an extreme leftist 
which these early Miners' Federation pronouncements 
earned him."99 
It is evident the labor movement had a great effect 
on the MNR: 
Thus the FSTMB, under the steady hand of Juan 
Lechfn, who remained its unquestioned leader for 
the next twenty years, introduced an extremely 
powerful and entirely new element into the ranks 
of the previously middle-class-oriented MNR. 
Though not totally controlled by the MNR, since 
Trotskyite elements always remained an important 
minority group within the movement, the steady 
support of the miners proved of crucial political 
value to the party, and even more importantly, 
helped to clarify the party's ideological programme 
and position.100 
Sexenio was a hard period for labor. The regimes 
of those years dealt harsh blows to labor, as it was pre­
senting some challenge to the traditional elite? ". . . 
by April 9, 1952, the trade union movement was in probably 
"Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 364. 
100Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 376. James M. Malloy has also made this important 
point; "The pre-1952 entrismo [infiltration] and the rising 
political significance of the labor public resulted in a 
definite shift of internal power in the general MNR move­
ment toward the labor-left fraction. It became increasingly 
difficult to ignore the more and more commanding figure 
of Lechfn." Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 161. 
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the weakest position it had held since the end of the 
Chaco War."l°T 
The labor movement was largely disorganized during 
the 1946-1952 period. As the result of attempted 
revolutionary movements and political general 
strikes, and the close association of the unions 
with the M.N.R. and other political groups opposed 
to the governments of that period, the trade unions 
were weak at the time of the 1952 Revolution J02 
The Peasant Elites. 
The peasants were a potential political force of 
considerable proportions in Bolivia. The rural Aymara 
and Quechua Indians accounted for two-thirds of the total 
Bolivian population of about 3,000,000 in 1 950.I*53 
The story of the organization of one of the peasant 
syndicates indicates the growth of these peasant unions 
prior to the Revolution. The peasants of the province of 
Cliza, department of Cochabamba under Jos£ Rojas, had 
established an agrarian syndicate to free themselves 
from their feudal obligations to the landlords. 
A large number of the landowners banded together 
to destroy the syndicate. In 1939, the land was taken from 
the peasants and those peasants who didn't submit were 
driven from the land. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 43. 
102Ibid., p. 357. 
^03John M. Hickman and Jack Brown, "Adaptation of 
Aymara and Quechua to the Bicultural Social Context of 
Bolivian Mines." Human Organization, XXX (Winter, 1971), 
p. 361. 
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Suppressed for several years, the syndicate re-
emerged in 1947 when a PIR (Party of the Revolu­
tionary Left) member was elected deputy for the 
province of Cliza, and a young man, Jos£ Roias, 
t o o k  o v e r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  s y n d i c a t e . ^ " 4  
Rojas was a native of Ucureffa, who in the 1940's 
worked as a laborer while he assisted in organizing the 
peasants; he soon became their leader. 
In 1949 members of the MNR began a campaign in the 
rural areas to win the support of the peasants against the 
traditional elites. "They assumed correctly that, if they 
could win broad support among the campesinos [peasants], 
no government could resist their right to rule."^5 
However, Rojas chose to hold the syndicate at 
arm's length from the MNR, and the syndicate took no part 
in the 1952 Revolution. 
The MNR was not the only group making overtures 
to the peasants. The Villarroel administration called the 
first National Indian Congress on May 10, 1945, which he 
personally attended. In addition, his government officially 
abolished the compulsory personal service (pongaje) which 
Indians had traditionally owed to their masters. The 
measure did not, however, become effective until the 
Revolution, since it was largely window dressing, designed 
to placate the Indians and the left. 
^^Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 356. 
1 0 5 I b i d . ,  p .  3 5 7 .  
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It is evident from looking at these emerging 
groups that the traditional political system was dis­
integrating, and that the social and economic tensions 
in Bolivia were increasing. Certainly important in the 
discontent was the economic stagnation and severe infla­
tion which Bolivia was suffering. The traditional elites 
were unable to deal with the situation and were losing 
support among the middle class: 
. . . the younger officers and the civilians, the 
professionals and the university students, the 
intellectuals and the middle class elements, all 
rejected the old forms and the old leadership, and 
engaged in a confused but determined search for 
new patterns to follow.®® 
At the same time the moderates discovered that a 
mild program would never succeed because the moderate 
measures were usually defeated by the traditional elites. 
More arid more the moderates began to listen to the radical 
proposals of the left. 
. . . the growth of the left was unchecked through­
out the post-war years, especially among the middle 
class. . . . These were the very groups which 
previously had formed the hard core of the old 
political party system, and hence the political 
base of the nation. It was these numerically 
small, but politically important groups, who had 
been most disillusioned by the Chaco War and 
shocked by the horror and chaos of the disaster. 
They refused to return to the pre-war days, and it 
was this rejection of upper-class leadership and 
refusal to continue to align their interests any 
^06Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 202. 
66 
longer with the interests of the oligarchy, which 
led to the destruction of the traditional party 
system.1 
From the Election of 1951 to 
the Eve of the Revolution 
As President Urriolagoitia1s term was drawing to a 
close in 1951, elections were scheduled for May of that 
year. The government was expected to control the outcome 
of the election by legal means, since the franchise was 
restricted to literate males, largely urban dwellers, 
who, it was thought, would split their vote among several 
competing candidates. Under the constitution, if no 
candidate received an absolute majority, the Congress 
would choose the President from among the three candidates 
receiving the most votes. Since the government party 
dominated the Congress, it would presumably choose the 
government's candidate, Gabriel Gosalvez,^0® 
Gos&lvez had been the regime's ambassador in Buenos 
Aires and had been President Busch's Minister of the 
Interior. He was backed by the Partido Uni^n Republicana 
Socialista (PURS) which had been the principal party 
supporting the governments between 1946 and 1951. He 
also was supported by the Partido Social Democratico (PSD). 
1Q7Ibid. , p. 321 . 
^08Patch, "The Bolivian National Revolution," p. 353. 
The franchise was certainly restricted. In this election, 
less than 200,000 of Bolivia's 3,500,000 people voted. 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 58. 
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The Falange nominated General Bernardino Bilbao 
Rioja, and the Accion cfvica Boliviana (ACB)nominated 
Guillermo Gutierrez Vea-Murguia. Vea-Murguia was the editor 
of the newspaper La Raz^rt, which was owned by tin magnate 
Carlos Aramayo. 
The Liberal Party nominated Tom£s Manuel de Elio 
and the PIR nominated Jos£ Antonia Arze. 
At the MNR's fifth National Convention in February 
of 1951, the party nominated Victor Paz Estenssoro for 
president and Herncfn Siles for Vice-president. Paz 
Estenssoro was in exile at the time, as were several of 
the principal leaders of the party. The MNR received the 
backing of the Trotskyite POR and the newly formed Parti do 
Communista de Bolivia (PCB) during the election. 
"Virtually all Bolivians were surprised when--still 
in exile--he [Paz Estenssoro] gained a plurality in the 
presidential election of 1951. . . .""'09 Paz Estenssoro 
received 54,000 votes (45%); Gosalvez got 39,000; 13,000 
for the FSB; 6,500 for the Aramayo-sponsored slate; 
6,400 for the Liberals and 5,100 for the PIrJ10 "If we 
109Dwight B. Heath, "New Patrons for Old: Changing 
Patron-Client Relationships in the Bolivian Yungas," 
Ethnology, XII (January, 1973), 77. 
^°Klein, Parties and Political Chanqe in Bolivia, 
p. 400. 
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remember that the vote reflected only the sentiment of the 
upper and middle bourgeoisie, artisans, and a few workers, 
the results take on a profound significance."^ The 
MNR also won six of nine Senate seats and ten of 55 seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies. 
The middle class, which represented less than 20 
per cent of the population, but accounted for close to 
90 per cent of the voting population, had broken with the 
old order: 
In election after election in the years from 
1935 to 1951 the middle classes expressed their 
increased self-consciousness by abandoning 
the traditional political leadership in ever 
larger numbers until by 1951 they literally voted 
the traditional system out of office and supported 
an openly revolutionary candidate.''2 
But the MNR had not received a majority of the vote,, 
and the procedure should have been to submit the final 
decision to the Congress which had been elected at the same 
time. Rather than do this, Urriolagoitia chose to, or was 
forced to, resign. He turned the government over to a 
military junta headed by General Ballivian. 
It is likely he was forced to resign, as James 
Malloy has indicated: 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 153. 
^2Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 208. 
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Having failed in this last attempt to defend itself 
by the legal rules of the game, the elites and 
interests associated with the old order turned 
to the military . . . the military, supported by 
the tin companies, the Liberals, and sectors of 
the PURS, forced Urriolagoitia to turn over the 
government to a military junta.^3 
Ballivian's junta was to last from May of 1951 to 
April of 1952. He promised to hold new elections but took 
few actual steps in that direction. 
Meanwhile, the junta suffered from internal discord 
and the economy continued to deteriorate, with inflation, 
unemployment and scarcities immediate problems. By early 
in the Spring of 1952 the question wasn't whether the junta 
would fall, but when. 
Summary 
The Chaco War was the catalyst which made the 
Revolution of 1952 inevitable. The government's conduct 
of the war brought dissent to the surface in Bolivia. In 
addition, the War weakened the traditional structure. 
The enforcer of the traditional order, the army, was 
greatly weakened by internal dissention as a result of the 
War. New ideas began to surface rapidly as new groups 
sought power in the changing climate in Bolivia. 
113Ma1 Toy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 154. 
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The traditional elites, including the landowners, 
the mining interests, and the army sought to maintain 
control of the situation in post-war Bolivia, But the 
emerging elites were challenging the traditional elites. 
The new parties, the labor elites and the peasants all 
waited for their chance to gain power. As the traditional 
order deteriorated in Bolivia, it became evident a new 
situation was arriving where new elites would exercise 
power. 
CHAPTER III 
THE REVOLUTION AND THE ELITES 
Introducti on 
The coup d' etat of April, 1952 started with the 
power situation in a state of flux among the emerging 
elites. Certainly no one was assured of his position 
and how the government would be ruled was in doubt. 
No consensus of leaders emerged due to the short 
period of time involved in the takeover. In three days the 
fighting was over and a new, revolutionary government was 
in power. 
It is to the events of April, 1952, the new leaders 
of the revolution, and to counter elites, which this thesis 
now turns. 
The Revolution: Events of April, 1952 
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 opened with a 
burst of rifle and machine-gun fire at daybreak 
on the Wednesday of Easter Week. The firing ceased 
on the afternoon of Good Friday, and a new govern­
ment was in possession of the capital city of La 
Paz J 
The Revolution was not unexpected. In February 
of 1952 there had been a hunger march in La Paz protesting 
^Carter Goodrich, "Bolivia in Time of Revolution," 
in Beyond the Revolution Bolivia Since 1952, ed. by James 
M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), p. 3. For an eye-witness description of what 
it was like to be in La Paz at the start of the Revolution 
see pp. 3-24. 
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the policies of the government. By the end of that month 
internal dissension within the Ballivian junta had reached 
disastrous proportions. The situation had deteriorated 
so seriously that a minister of government, General Seleme, 
had openly pledged his support to the coming MNR revolt. 
Seleme was the head of the carabineros, the Bolivian armed 
civilian police force, -and was dissatisfied with his 
position in the junta. 
It was certain that the MNR would lead the revolt, 
due to the popularity of the party, as evidenced by the 
previous election. The party, ". . . on the eve of the 
insurection . . . was a multicephalic melange of conflicting 
elements held together by tactical realities."2 There 
were, at this time, three leadership groups in the MNR. 
First, there was the right wing;• second, the labor-left; 
and third, the "middle" of Paz Estenssoro and some of the 
older leaders.3 Despite the differences in leadership, it 
was evident that the coming revolt ". . . was directed not 
only against a previous government but against the insti­
tutions that had made that government possible and even 
i nevi tab!e. 
2james M. Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," In 
Beyond The Revolution Bolivia Since 1952, ed. by James M. 
Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1971), p. 117. 
3 l b i d .  
4Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 345. 
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On April 9, 1952, the Revolution finally began 
when Seleme was dismissed from the junta on charges of 
plotting a revolt (which was, of course, exactly what he 
was doing). 
The revolt began in La Paz and quickly spread to the 
mining camps. 
. . . the uprising was being carried on by the 
combined forces of armed civilians of the MNR under 
the leadership of Hernan Siles and the carabineros 
under the command of Gen. Antonio Seleme, the 
minister of the interior, who had just turned 
against his colleagues in the ruling military junta.5 
In addition, it was hoped that General Torres Ortiz 
would deliver elements of the regular military. The 
presence of the military indicates the type of government 
the coup was to produce: 
The coup was to result in a government similar 
to that headed by Gualberto'Vi11arroel between 
1 943 and 1946, that is, a civi1-mi 1itary alliance 
aimed not at revolution motorized from below but 
at structural reforms imposed from above.6 
In the previous decade, weapons had been seized 
from police and soldiers; there were hidden by the elements 
of the MNR and workers and were used by the revolutionaries 
on April 9. 
Goodrich, "Bolivia in Time of Revolution," p. 4. 
) 
^Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 111. Malloy 
has also indicated a much smaller role was envisioned for 
labor: . . there are good reasons to believe that the 
in-country MNR elite was aiming at establishing a 
Vi11arroel-type reformist regime in which labor could have 
a secondary role, at best." Malloy, Bolivia: The 
Uncompleted Revolution, p. 158. 
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The plans of the rebel leaders seemed immediately 
to go awry. Torres Ortiz, after some indecision, rallied 
the army behind the ruling military junta. Just as the 
army seemed to be gaining control of the city of La Paz, 
armed miners arrived and blocked access to the city. At 
the close of the first day, nonetheless, matters looked 
bleak for the Revolutionaries. 
On the second day, it appeared as if the revolt were 
going to be suppressed, and General Seleme and many of his 
followers took what they considered to be an appropriate 
step under the circumstances: 
General Seleme took refuge in the Chilean Embassy, 
and when he left the Embassy again on the following 
day, things having taken a turn for the better from 
his point of view, he was told that he was no longer 
in charge, and that the revolution was now completely 
in the hands of the M.N.R. 
Seleme's lack of faith in victory may have cost 
him the presidency; in any event it propelled the MNR into 
leadership of the Revolution. Leadership of the Revolution 
passed to Hern&n Siles and Juan Lechfn. 
By the third day, the army was fighting a losing 
battle in La Paz. Meanwhile, miners under MNR direction 
were capturing other principal towns and cities. By 
nightfall on April 11 the revolutionary forces had all 
but completed the victory,8 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 44. 
Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 366. 
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The army had begun to collapse around the country. 
Garrison commanders either joined the revolt or abandoned 
their posts to the rebels. Certainly one of the most 
important factors in the success of the Revolution was the 
disarray and the ideological division in the army officer 
corps. 
This division enabled the rebels to turn back the 
army troops. The victor was sealed when batteries mounted 
on the plateau above La Paz were dismantled by cadets from 
the Police Academy, and when armed miners arrived from 
mining camps near Oruro.® 
The army surrendered late on April 11th. "The 
extent of the rebels' victory came as a surprise to every­
one, including the MNR."10 
The original coup was narrow in scope and intent. 
Its success would have meant a minimum destruction 
of existing structures and institutions, particularly 
the army. The unanticipated generalization of the 
action and the dramatically critical role that 
armed workers played in its success led to a wider 
and more profound defeat of the status quo elites.1' 
After three days of fighting it was mostly over. 
Estimates of the cost in lives vary considerably and there 
appears to be no reliable estimate. The estimates range 
Q 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 44. 
l°Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 167. 
111bid., p. 183. 
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1  ?  from a low of 600 deaths to a high of 5,000. The most 
responsible estimates range from 600 to 2,000. In any event, 
in comparison to the Russian and Mexican Revolutions this 
is quite low. Robert J. Alexander has maintained that the 
reason for the relatively small amount of violence is the 
presence of a wel1-organized and well-discipiined political 
party which knew what it wanted to achieve and how to 
achieve it.^ 
As the situation stabilized, HernSn Siles and Juan 
Lechfn openly took charge of events. Siles was proclaimed 
vice-president in conformity with the 1951 election results. 
The new government announced that Vi'ctor Paz Estenssoro, 
who was in exile in Buenos Aires, would return to head the 
government as constitutional president.^ 
Meanwhile, Siles was busy staffing a cabinet which 
included all sectors of the party. A critical precedent for 
the government was established when Siles appointedthree 
Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) members as workers ministers: 
Juan Lechfn as minister of mines and petroleum, German 
Butron as minister of labor, and tfuflo Chavez as minister 
T2jhe estimate of 600 is in Klein, Parties and 
Political Change in Bolivia, p. 401. For the high estimate 
of 5000 and a very uncomplimentary version of the National 
Revolution see William S. Stokes, "The 'Revolucion National' 
and the MNR in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 
XII (Spring, 1959), 28-53. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 
273 .  
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 366. 
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of peasant affairs.15 
Paz Estenssoro returned on April 17, 1952, and 
formalized the interim cabinet of Hern^n Siles. But it 
was evident that Paz Estenssoro was not entirely a free 
agent since the COB made it clear that its price for 
continued support was a major overhaul of Bolivian 
society. It would not be satisfied with peasant re­
form.16 
The Power Elites in Revolutionary Bolivia 
The revolution caused political power to pass from 
the hands of a small traditional elite ... to a 
new revolutionary elite which was probably more 
broadly representative of peasants, workers and 
sectors of the middle class.^7 
Such a transition was a sweeping change for Bolivia; 
the change in the elites indicates the impact of the Revolu­
tion on Bolivia. Eldon Lanning observes that: 
15Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 118. 
16Ibid., p. 112. 
17Cole Blassier, "The United States and the 
Revolution," in Beyond the Revolution Bolivia Since 1952, 
ed. by James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 105. That this was a new 
elite seems evident; none of the revolutionaries may be 
found in the 1940 edition of Who's Who. See Percy Alvin 
Martin, Who's Who in Latin America (Stanford University 
Press, 1940). There also seems to be little question as 
to whether elites controlled the Revolution. For example, 
the miners, who were so critical to the Revolution, con­
stitute one per cent of the population; and their leaders 
are a small number within the mining group. 
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In general, the sources of power of the old elite 
were eliminated. The key mine owners lost their 
mines, the large landowners lost their land, and 
the hyper-inflation wiped out much of the rest 
of the accumulated wealth. Most of these people 
just left the country. . . . The difficulties for 
the party [MNR] were not in eliminating the old 
elites but in gaining control of the two new sources 
of power: the workers and the peasants.'8 
In addition, the MNR elites drastically reduced the 
power of the army. High officers were forced into retire­
ment and replaced by officers sympathetic to the MNR 
cause. The officers' academy at La Paz was closed down, 
and the number of enlisted men was drastically reduced. 
The army was distributed around the country and put to 
work on public works projects. The power of the army was 
effectively reduced. 
With the elimination of the traditional elites new 
inter-elite struggles developed. In addition to the above, 
there developed two different levels of elite struggle. 
The first level was national, where the MNR vied with 
labor and the peasants for power. The second level was 
local, where regional struggles developed between local 
elites. This fragmentation of power, it could be argued, 
was a consequence of the rapid displacement of the tradi­
tional elite. 
Two segments of the population which have usually 
played a significant part in Latin American politics were 
^8Eldon Lanning, "Governmental Capabilities in a 
Revolutionary Situation: The MNR in Bolivia," Inter-
American Economic Affairs, XXIII (Autumn, 1969), 10. 
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largely absent as power contenders in Bolivia during the 
Revolution. Students played a less significant role in the 
Revolution than one would suspect. And the Catholic 
Church has been of ". . . distinctly secondary importance 
in recent Bolivian history."^9 The Church generally did 
not quarrel with the Revolutionary government; nor did the 
government quarrel with the Church. The Church is not with­
out significance in Bolivia. Carter notes that 
Although the institutional Church in Bolivia today 
is weak and torn into conflicting camps, the 
country cannot escape its Catholic past. The 
hierarchy of its social fabric has been historically 
reinforced by an institution that puts priest 
above people, bishop above priest, and Pope above 
all.20 
High Office Holders. 
. . . the government was no longer the simple 
structure of Congress, the Presidency, and the 
Judiciary, envisaged in the Constitution, but a 
government in which power was in theory equally 
divided between the Constitutional authorities and 
the COB (the Bolivian Workers Confederation) .... 
Certain ministers (e.g., mines and petroleum, and 
labor) were appointed by and owed their allegiance 
to the Miners' Federation under Lechin and not to 
the President; others (e.g., Agriculture and rural 
affairs) were appointed and controlled by the 
peasants union under ftuflo Chavez.2' 
High office in Bolivia after the Revolution was 
dominated by the elites of the MNR and labor organizations. 
It was not until later that the peasant elites joined the 
19Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 381. 
2QCarter,Bolivia A. Profile, pp. 123-24. 
•'21'Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. 33. 
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other dominant elites. The peasant's rise to power was 
symbolized by the election in July of 1956 of Jose Rojas 
to the Senate and Ruflo Chavez to the vice presidency. 
During the early years of the Revolution the 
government was a coalition or co-government of the MNR 
and the COB. The arrangement did not end formally until 
the split between Paz Estenssoro and Juan Lechin preceding 
the 1964 election. The split occurred because of Paz 
Estenssoro's decision to seek another term. 
Co-government was based on two concessions by the 
government: a guaranteed number of labor ministers in 
the national cabinet and granting of control in the mines 
to the workers. 
In the decision-making process the MNR assumed 
the formal responsibilities of government while labor 
retained the right of initiative and veto; labor had 
governing power but no responsibility. 
All major decisions of the government, such as 
the nationalization of the mines, the agrarian 
reform decree, and the reorganization of educa­
tion, were considered by the Central Obrera Boliviana 
before being promulgated by the government. 2 
The government did not have the initiative in 
filling the four ministerial posts that the trade unions 
controlled. In addition to the four (Mines and Petroleum, 
Peasant Affairs, Labor, Transportation), occasionally one 
22Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
pp. 124-25. 
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or two other positions were also filled by labor men. 
Robert J. Alexander has described the procedure used 
in filling the posts: 
Upon the resignation of a labor minister, the 
procedure was for the union in whose province 
that ministry was considered to be to send to the 
Central Obrera Boliviana a list of three choices 
for the vacancy. The C.O.B. then passed this 
list on to the President, and he selected whichever 
of the three he preferred. It became a tradition 
that the Minister of Mines and Petroleum was selected 
by the Miners Federation, the Minister of Peasant 
Affairs by the peasant unions, the Minister of 
Labor by the factory workers' organizations, and the 
Minister of Transport by the Confederaci6n Sindical 
de Trabajadares Ferroviarios,23 
Under these circumstances, the leadership of the 
MNR may be more appreciated. The top man in the party 
was, of course, Vi'ctor Paz Estenssoro, who was twice presi­
dent (1952-1956 and 1960-1964). Hernan Siles, was vice-
president from 1952-1956 and president from 1956-1960. 
The MNR produced other prominent leaders, such as Luis 
Peffaloza, who served, among other posts, as president of 
the Central Bank. 
But more important than the original leadership 
were the younger men who rose to leadership positions 
during the Revolution to take the vacated positions of 
the older men. "One secret of the strength of the MNR 
has been its ability to bring bright young men into 
important and sometimes top positions."24 Some of these 
23 Ibid-» P- 125-
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new leaders included Alfredo Franco Guachalla, who was 
Minister of Labor in the second Paz Estenssoro adminis­
tration; Mario Guzman Galarza, Minister of Education 
during the same period; Guillermo Bedregal, President 
(after 1961} of the Corporacion Minera de Bolivia; and Jose 
Fellman Velarde, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Paz 
Estenssoro.25 
The "left-wing" faction of the MNR was made up 
primarily of the trade union leaders of the party. They 
established an organization which they called the Vanguardi a 
Obrera Movimientista (VOM). Juan Lechfn, Nuflo Chavez and 
German Butron were the principal leaders of VOM and the 
left wing. 
The "right-wing" of the party consisted primarily 
of professionals and intellectuals who were opposed to 
the preponderant influence they felt the labor movement 
was assuming in the MNR government. The leaders of this 
group were Walter Guevara Arze (Foreign Minister); Luis 
Peffaloza; and Jorge Rfos Gamarra, who was the Mayor of 
La Paz. These individuals organized a group known as the 
Accion de Defense del MNR. 
25Ibid. It should be noted that there is no consensus 
on the worth of the MNR elites. For example, it has been 
said of Paz Estenssoro: "In his demagogy, his political 
purges, and his concentration camps, he was an intellectual 
descendent of the nineteenth-century cuadillos." See 
Carter, Bolivia A Profi1e, p. 56. 
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The MNR moderates, or center, differed with the 
right, but their real problems were with the left. 
Essentially, the problem of MNR center amounted to using 
the power of the left within a framework of national 
development led by the MNR.26 This task proved to be 
difficult and was in the end an impossible one. 
The influence of the labor movement on the govern­
ment was pervasive: 
Organized labor has had a dominant position in 
the Bolivian National Revolution. The government 
of the Movimiento Nactionalista Revo!ucionario has 
depended for its political support on the labor 
movement, and the union leaders have been well 
aware of this. Since the beginning of the Revolu­
tion the labor leaders have been, after vfctor Paz 
Estenssoro and Herncin Siles, the country's most 
important politicians. They have sat in the 
Cabinet since April 9, 1952; they have consistently 
made up a large part of the National Executive Com­
mittee of the M.N.R. 
The chief vehicle of this political control was 
the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). It was established 
in April, 1952, when representatives of virtually all the 
country's trade union groups met to create a new national 
central labor body. Under the leadership of Juan Lechfn, 
a national council was set up, the COB. 
Thereafter, organized labor grew with tremendous 
rapidity: 
26Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 129. 
27Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 121. 
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Virtually all miners, facto«y workers, railroad 
workers, and construction laborers were brought 
into the national unions affiliated with the COB. 
At the same time most white-collar workers and 
bank clerks were organized, and national unions 
of these groups were established, and_became 
part of the Central Obrera Boliviana. 
Influential Non-Office Holders. 
Although there were influential labor leaders 
who did not hold high office, the majority of the in­
fluential elites in the labor movement served either in 
the government, or in the COB. 
This was not the case with the peasant leaders. 
Very few held high office; but their influence on the MNR, 
and hence the government was great. They possessed a 
voting and military power which was to prove a force in 
the course of the Revolution. The Revolutionary elites 
were to lose the backing they had among the urban middle 
class, but they maintained strong ties with the country­
side. As a result of this shifting support, the revolu­
tionary elites came to rely more and more on the peasants. 
Consequently, the influence of the peasants grew at the 
expense of the urban workers and their leaders.29 
This situation operated to the disadvantage of the 
MNR. The peasant organizations had been created inde­
pendent of the party and they maintained substantial 
28Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 
pp. 106-07. 
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autonomy during the twelve years of the MNR rule. In 
addition, peasant leaders had organized an armed militia, 
which gave them the power to defend their rights. 
The most powerful syndicate was in the province of 
Ucureflfa. The syndicate was able to mobilize 500,000 armed 
men on short notice. This power had been used (with and 
without the advice of government) to put down uprisings in 
30 Santa Cruz and to break miners' strikes. 
An original objective of the MNR was to arouse the 
interest of the peasants in political affairs. One of the 
first moves of the Revolutionary government therefore had 
been to initiate universal suffrage. In addition, the 
MNR, through local organizations, brought large numbers of 
Indians into the party and local branches were organized 
to extend the party line. The net result was the political 
mobilization of the Indians with few mechanisms for 
government control over this powerful group. Despite 
the growing power of the peasants, ". . . it would be 
some time before there would be Indians qualified to 
become important figures on a national scale."31 
Despite the fact that the Indians lacked national 
leaders, some of their local leaders were very powerful. 
While the MNR was busy with the Revolution these local 
3®Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution," p. 121. 
O *1 
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elites were left alone. James M. Malloy has indicated 
what this local autonomy meant to these leaders: 
These men controlled the local economies, maintained 
personal armies, made laws, and dispensed justice. 
. . . They were strong enough to exercise initiative 
and veto power over policy of interest to themselves 
and their regions.32 
Another group which lacked high office but maintained 
some influence was the political parties. The fortunes 
of the parties differed, however. 
The Partido Izquirda Revolucionario (PIR) went into 
eclipse with the advent of the Revolution. Many members 
joined the MNR and the PIR youth movement split with the 
party and formed the Partido Communista de Bolivia. Thus, 
the influence of the PIR was weakened with the government. 
The Partido Obrera Revolucionario (POR) on the other 
hand had achieved some political'importance at the start 
of the Revolution. They had been allied with the labor 
wing of the MNR between 1946 and 1952 and had gained 
considerable influence with the labor movement, par­
ticularly among the miners and the factory workers. 
"However, the national leadership of the Trotskyites 
q O 
[POR] was exceedingly sectarian and doctrinaire." The 
POR elites tended to regard the Paz Estenssoro government 
as playing the role of Bolivia's Kerensky, who would 
32Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 251. 
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inevitably be overthrown by the Bolivian Bolsheviks or­
ganized by the POR."*4 
As it turned out, the POR leaders proved to be 
victims of their own slavish belief in historical 
parallelism. Their position of 'critical support1 
for the Paz Estenssoro regime tended to become in­
creasingly critical and to offer the new government 
less and less support. Under their editorship, 
the periodical of the COB became increasingly 
critical and even disparaging toward the MNR 
government. b 
Not surprisingly, their attitude alienated the MNR 
leadership and Juan Lechfn. It also divided the intellec­
tual leaders of the POR and their followers in the labor 
movement. In 1954 most of the POR trade-union leaders 
joined the MNR and thereafter the POR split into two 
factions.36 
Influential Holders of a Counterideology 
Those resistant to the Revolution consisted 
primarily of right wing parties, opposed to the Revolution 
and all that it did; and the left wing parties, which 
opposed not so much the goals of the Revolution as their 
implementation. The right was opposed because of the 
threat to property and the leftist philosophy; the left 
because the reforms were not quick enough or radical 
enough. 
q A 
° Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, p. 105. 
3^Ibi d., p. 106. 
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The parties on the left which were against the 
Revolution were the Partido Communista de Bolivia and later 
the PIR and the POR. The latter two had passed into 
opposition after an initial period of cooperation with 
the MNR government. "Their opposition might have been 
more effective, had not both these groups been deserted 
by the overwhelming majority of their trade union leaders 
early in the M.N.R. administration."-^ 
The opposition on the right centered around the 
Falange Socialista Boliviana, which had been the only 
opposition group able to elect members to Congress in the 
1956 election. 
There were also two right wing parties of Catholic 
orientation in opposition. One was the Partido Social 
Democr&tico (PSD), which was headed by Luis Siles, half 
brother of Hernan Siles. The PSD worked closely with 
the Falange. The other party was the Partido Democrcttico 
Cristiano, which was established in a break with the PSD. 
It also was in alliance with the Falange during the MNR 
reg imes. 
Starting with the 1960 election the Falange had 
a serious rival on the right in the Partido Revolucionario 
Autintico (PRA), headed by ex-MNR leader Walter Guevara 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 49. 
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Arze. "Walter Guevara Arze , . . was one of the most 
talented members of the MNR and a thorn in the flesh of the 
party, repeatedly saying things that everyone knew to be 
3 8 
true but that no one else dared say." Arze was a man 
the MNR could ill afford to lose. He was a leader of the 
right-wing in the party, had been foreign minister under 
Paz Estenssoro, and Minister of Government under Siles. 
However, he had come into frequent conflict with Lechfn, 
and when he failed to get the nomination for president 
in 1960, he bolted the party. 
It goes without saying that the traditional elites 
were opposed to the MNR regime: 
The members of the landowning and merchant elite 
of La Paz reacted with shock to the events of the 
1950's. Their political sympathies lay with the 
Falange, and they worked feverishly for its rise 
to power. 
It is indicative of the sweeping nature of the 
Revolution that the traditional elites had to turn to 
a political party for influence, for 
. . . with the disappearance of the Big Three 
mining companies and of the large private land­
owners, the remaining upper-class economic groups 
had relatively little weight in the country1s.oower 
system, so long as the MNR remained in power. 
38Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. 522. 
•^Carter, Bolivia A Profile, p. 118. 
4°Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 381. 
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"As a group, the industrialists remain violent 
41 opponents of the Revolutionary regime." At the time of 
the Revolution manufacturing was of relatively minor im­
portance due to Bolivia's small markets and unsettled 
political condition. The unions had the upper hand in 
relations between the factory owners and the workers, 
which was the major cause of the industrialists opposi­
tion.^2 
Summary 
The Bolivian Revolution opened with gunfire on 
the morning of April 9, 1952, and the hostilities ended 
three days later. The quick ending was a surprise to 
many: the MNR leaders quickly moved to establish control 
but at the same time established governmental positions 
that were outside of the control of the government. 
The most important positions of influence in the 
Revolution then were not only held by high office holders 
but also by influential non-office holders. In addition, 
the opposition to the Revolution settled into two camps: 
the left and the right. 
42 Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, pp. 
185-89. The MNR took drastic action against the opposi-
tion. For example, La RazSn of La Paz, a newspaper owned 
by the Aramayo mining interests, was taken over by Ouan 
Lechfn's Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. The government 
also closed the newspaper Los Tiempos of Cochabamba; the 
"crime": opposition to the MNR government. Ibid., pp. 232 
CHAPTER IV 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE NATIONAL 
REVOLUTION: 1952-1964 
The Paz Estenssoro Administration: 
1 9 5 2 _ 1 9 5 6  
Paz Estenssoro and Silesbased their right to 
govern on the 1947 constitution under which they had 
been elected. 
It was during this first period of constitutional 
rule (1952-1956) that most of the decrees were issued 
which created the new political, economic and social struc­
ture of Bolivia. Working without a Congress during the 
first four years, the government structured the Revolution 
while acting on problems of famine, economic stress and 
political chaos which gripped Bolivia. 
To understand the decision-making setting during 
this first four years it is necessary to remember two 
things. First, the core of the MNR elite was basically 
moderate in its approach to the Revolution. "At best, the 
MNR core was a reluctant bank of revolutionaries."^ The 
following statement by Paz Estenssoro, made in June of 
1953, hardly stands out as a classic of revolutionary 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 171. 
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rhetoric: "The fundamental objectives of my Government are 
the nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, democra­
tization of political life and a general raising of the 
2 
standard of living of the great masses of the people." 
Second, during this four year period, a left-
oriented labor elite was gaining major influence in defining 
the role of the Revolution. This factor combined with the 
moderate core elite of the MNR, supplied a decision-making 
setting perhpas unique in a Revolutionary situation. This 
setting was best described by James M. Malloy: 
Paz made speeches cast in generalities dealing 
with national unity, economic independence, and 
justice. But the labor-left demanded specific 
action in the rapid completion of 1951 electoral 
promises. Through various propaganda organs, the 
left cranked out leaflets putting forth demands 
and attitudes that jarred with official MNR style. 
In reaction, the MNR right wing put out its own 
propaganda, attacking the left in tones previously 
reserved for La Rosea. ... It soon became im­
possible for the government to delay taking decisive 
reform action any longer. 
The Decision to Nationalize the Mines. 
The economic and political preponderance of Patiffo, 
Hochschild, and Aramayo, kept Bolivia in a long 
and painful state of agony. . . . Without eliminating 
the omnipresent power of Patiffo, Hochschild, and 
Aramayo, it was impossible to carry out the other 
fundamental objectives of the Revolution. 
^U.S. News and World Report, June 5, 1953, p. 68. 
3Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 172. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 98. 
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The above statement was made by Paz Estenssoro in 
a 1956 speech; he was giving voice to the realities of the 
Bolivian situation. Tin is the symbol of national wealth 
in Bolivia, and the Big Three had for years proved a funda­
mental fact about Latin American politics: "A decisive 
correlation exists between the control of the economic 
bases of power and the real exercise of political power in 
Latin America."5 
It was evident that the MNR, to remain in power, 
had to remove this base of power from the Big Three. Cer­
tainly there was concern within the MNR that the Big Three 
had become a state within a state, which was controlled 
from outside the country; a state within a state with 
". . . a life-and death grip on the country's economy, 
and particularly upon its foreign trade."6 
There were two other factors of importance in the 
decision. First, the MNR had campaigned in 1951 under the 
promise that if they won, they would nationalize the Big 
Three. The large vote cast for the MNR in 1951 showed how 
strongly the Bolivians felt about nationalization; national-
7 ization was to be a test of the good faith of the MNR. 
5KL1 ing, "Power and Political Instability in Latin 
America," p. 34. 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 97. 
7See Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 364; and 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 95. 
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The deciding factor was the COB. Its members were 
adamant about it. 
When the continual pressure of the COB was com­
bined with the feeling in some party circles 
that the political power of the tin barons 
definitely had to be destroyed, the decision. 
to nationalize the mines was pushed through. 
Nationalization was not as desirable as it would at 
first appear, however. The Keenleyside Report, issued 
in 1951, was a study by fourteen experts from outside 
Bolivia on the economic and social picture in Bolivia. 
It was commissioned by the UN, and had this to say about 
nationali zati on: 
. . . the report declared that nationalization 
of the mining industry, 'even if . . . theoretically 
desirable . . . would be wholly impossible in 
Bolivia in present conditions. The government 
has neither the financial resources nor the technical 
and administrative competence to undertake any such 
task.9 
In addition, the tin industry in Bolivia was ailing. 
The industry was almost wholly dependent on worldwide 
economic factors, and on March 6, 1951 the U.S. General 
Services Administration had announced that it would not pay 
the price Bolivia was demanding for its tin, and suspended 
purchases. On May 31 of that year the U.S. Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation contract for Bolivian tin expired and 
^Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 120. 
9Goodrich, "Bolivia in Time of Revolution," p. 8. 
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was not renewed. Additionally, the quality of Bolivian tin 
concentrate had been declining, as the higher-grade deposits 
were exhaused. Finally, the number of tin miners, protected 
by Juan Lechfn, had expanded beyond all need.^0 
The decision to nationalize, the government's first 
major decision, must be seen as occurring in two parts. 
The first occurred on May 13, 1952, when President Paz 
Estenssoro established a commission, composed of lawyers, 
engineers and economists, to study the problems involved in 
nati onali zati on. 
This would normally have constituted the formal 
decision. However, there is evidence that the government 
had no intention of nationalizing private property. On 
July 2, 1952, the MNR government established by decree, a 
state monopoly on the export and- sale of all minerals, and 
delegated this function to the Banco Minero. 
If the decree had stood alone, its effect would 
have been to guarantee dollars to the state while 
leaving the principle of private property inviolate. 
There is strong reason to believe that a significant 
number of the MNR core wished to restrict its puni­
tive action toward the 'Big Three' to this extent. 
At the time, the rumor was that Paz was lukewarm 
at best toward nationalization and that he leaned 
^°Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 364. 
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toward the.restricted view expressed in the July 
2 decree. 
That the MNR core elite considered private property 
inviolate, is clear from a statement of one of their 
officials, the Ambassador to the United States, on December 
14, 1952: 
The nationalization of the properties of the Patiffo, 
Aramayo, and Hochschild group represented a special 
case. Nationalization of private property is not 
the policy of Bolivia. . . . Nationalization of the 
tin mines did not mean confiscation of the property. 
We intend to pay the former owners of the properties 
every cent that is due them.'2 
The conflict between the labor-left and the MNR 
was perhaps inevitable. The labor-left made it clear they 
would tolerate nothing less than nationalization. 
An intense debate took place behind the scenes 
on the issue of policy toward the mining sector. 
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1952, 
the labor left, now formally organized into the 
Central Obrera Boliviana (GOB) under the leader-
ship of Lechfn, sponsored a steady stream of 
parades and mass demonstrations in which the 
demand for nationalization was repeated with 
increasing vigor. ... By the fall of 1952, the 
movement toward nationalization was irreversible.13 
Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 
173. This was indicated in a statement by Paz Estenssoro, 
"Our policy of nationalization applies only to he big 
companies. . . . There was, then, no other solution; the 
country already felt that way about it." U.S. News and 
World Report, June 5, 1953, p. 69. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 103. 
13Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, pp. 
174-75. 
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The return of the government commission on national­
ization touched off another crisis for the MNR government. 
Shortly after the report was issued, the leadership of the 
COB issued an open letter to Paz Estenssoro, calling for 
nationalization of the tin mines without compensation and 
also demanding that the nationalized mines be put under the 
control of the mine workers. The COB was at that time con­
trolled by the Trotskyites.^ 
The showdown between the MNR and the Trotskyite 
Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) occurred in October of 
1952, with the issuance of the nationalization decree. 
The Trotskyites pushed through a resolution denouncing the 
government action at the next meeting of the COB governing 
body. 
This, as it proved, was the beginning of the end 
of Trotskyite influence in Bolivian organized 
labor. . . . The MNR labor leaders immediately 
went into action. In the provinces where the MNR 
controlled most of the unions, they secured the 
deposition of Trotskyite delegates to the COB 
governing body, and their replacement by people 
belonging to the MNR. In La Paz they made sure that 
all unions controlled by the MNR sent MNR delegates 
to the COB.'5 
As a result of the action of the MNR, the governing 
body of the COB reversed the decision to condemn the govern­
ment at their next meeting. 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, pp. 
100-27. 
^ A l e x a n d e r ,  O r g a n i z e d  L a b o r  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  p .  1 0 6 .  
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On October 2, 1952, the Corporation Minera de 
Bolivia (COMIBOL) was established to take charge of and 
operate the mines. The mines were nationalized on October 
7 and on October 31 the nationalization decree was issued 
1n the mining camp of Maria Berzola at Catavi. The decree 
affected only the mines and other properties belonging to 
Patiffo, Aramayo and Hochschild. Hundreds of smaller mining 
16 enterprises continued to operate under private ownership. 
Problems in implementation immediately began to 
ari se: 
The need of theCOMIBOL to obtain foreign exchange, 
for its current operations as well as for renewing 
the mines equipment and expanding the country's 
mining operations, was complicated by the fact 
that five years after the National Revolution, no 
decision had as yet been made concerning compensation 
of the expropriated companies. For several months 
after expropriation, there was no agreement of any 
kind on this subject. However, in the latter half 
of 1953 an accord was reached which did not set any 
final figure for compensation but did provide a 
procedure, by which COMIBOL was to pay certain sums 
on account, pending a final agreement as to how much 
it owed the old owners. ... By the middle of 1958 
a final agreement was still being negotiated between 
COMIBOL and the ex-owners of the mines. Until this 
agreement was reached it would be impossible for the 
COMIBOL to obtain loans abroad which would permit it 
to expand and modernize its operations.1' 
^Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 116. 
171bid., pp. 106-07. 
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Another serious problem facing COMIBOL was the 
scarcity of engineers and technicians for the mines. Many 
had left after the Revolution, as the major responsibility 
for operation and technical management had been held by 
foreigners. 
An additional problem was that the sale of Bolivian 
tin was primarily to the United States and England. But 
these governments were reluctant to enter into a contract 
with the Bolivian government until a settlement was made 
18 
with the expropriated companies. 
A final problem concerned captial investment. The 
Big Three had reacted to the unstable political situation 
in Bolivia by curtailing investment sharply. So when the 
government obtained the mines in 1952 . . it discovered 
that it had inherited worn out, obsolete equipment and 
depleted mineral deposits."^ In addition, the Big Three 
had withdrawn their funds and the mines were left without 
operating capital. The government responded by printing 
paper money, an act which caused considerable inflationary 
pressure; problems that this paper will deal with later. 
The consequences of the decision centered on two 
factors: the economy and the miners. The labor factor 
1 o 
The provisional agreement that was reached provided 
the following compensation (in millions of dollars): Patiffo, 
$2.28; Hochschild, $2.16; Aramayo $1.32. Blasier, "The 
United States and the Revolution," p. 72. 
^9Carter, Bolivia A Profile, p. 60. 
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acted on the economic factor, but was not the only reason 
for declining production. 
Two of the principal reasons for declining pro­
duction were the fall in the metal content of the ore and 
the outdated equipment used to mine the ore. That produc­
tion declined is not in doubt; in 1945 Bolivia produced 50 
per cent of the world's tin; by 1960 Bolivia produced only 
10 per cent.20 
But labor conditions in the mines also contributed 
to the low productivity and high cost there. The mines 
were considerably overstaffed. All workers who had been 
dismissed between 1946 and 1952 for political or trade-
union reasons were reinstated in their jobs while no other 
workers were dismissed to make room for them. Cole 
Blasier has stated the problem graphically: 
Employment in the Big Three tin mines rose from 
24,000 miners in 1951 to 36,500 in 1965 and dropped 
to 27,000 in 1961, but some 26,000 workers produced 
34,600 tons of tin in 1949 as compared to 27.000 
workers producing only 15,000 tons in 1961.22 
Overemployment in the mines was not the only problem 
there. Another was that 
The workers have felt themselves masters in the 
mines, and they have tended frequently to abuse 
2QIbid., p. 63. 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 369. 
22Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 84, 
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their position. . . . There is little doubt that 
discipline tended to break down and that the 
productivity per worker declined in the mines 
after expropriation." 
The indirect labor costs also increased after nation­
alization. A liberal social welfare program for the miners 
was initiated and large sums were spent on improving the 
living conditions of the miners.24 Commissary stores 
provided food and other items below market prices. Theft 
was common in the mines, but measures to correct these 
practices faced opposition from the tin miners, ". . . the 
very group which had been a major element in the insurrection 
which brought the MNR to power and was perhaps the largest 
homogeneous group behind the MNR."25' 
But the MNR had another large client group to con­
sider, the Indians. It was to this group that the MNR 
directed Its next major decision. 
Universal Adult Suffrage. 
In the Universal Suffrage Act, the MNR . . placed 
? fi its political future in the hands of the campesino majority." 
The decree was issued on July 21, 1953, apparently with the 
sincere conviction that all adults ought to be allowed to 
vote. 
23Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 104. 
24Ibid., p. 105. 
25Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p .  8 4 .  
•  ^ A l e x a n d e r ,  T h e  B o l i v i a n  N a t i o n a l  R e v o l u t i o n ,  p .  4 2 ,  
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Article I of the decree provided that all Bolivians, 
men and women over twenty-one years of age, if they 
are unmarried, or eighteen years if married, regard­
less of their level of instruction, occupation, or 
income, were to be able to vote.2' 
According to the Census of 1950 approximately 70 
per cent of Bolivia's population was illiterate.28 To 
make the decree meaningful an overhaul of the educational 
system was undertaken to educate the Indians. Another 
decree was issued on June 30, 1953, creating a commission 
to study the Integral Reform of Public Education, which 
led to reform of the educational system. 
What were the consequences of this act? The first 
chance the Indians had to exercise their franchise came 
in the presidential and congressional elections of 1956. 
Approximately 85 per cent of the total number of registered 
voters cast ballots, and in the rural areas of the country 
support for the MNR was overwhelming.^ 
It is evident the decree expanded the base of the 
MNR. In the T956 election, out of a population of 3,279,000, 
there were 958,016 votes cast, or 29.2 per cent of the 
^Ibid., p. 82. There were no hidden qualifiers. 
Article 2 provided the exceptions: deaf-mutes unable to 
write, those legally declared vagrants, traitors, false 
witnesses or violators of election laws. 
281bid. , p . 83. 
^Ibid. 
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population. By the 1964 presidential and congressional 
election, out of a population of 3,653,000, 1,297,319 
voted, or 35.5 per cent of the population. 
Since the landowners in Bolivia controlled the vote 
there, universal suffrage would have been of little con­
sequence standing alone. "Hence, the real significance 
of universal suffrage came with the agrarian reform which 
broke 1ihe existing patterns of control in the agrarian 
systemii "31 
But before turning to agrarian reform, one must 
return to C0MIB0L to understand Bolivia's Increasing 
economic woes. 
The Decision to Create COMIBOl. 
As we have seen, the creation of COMIBOL was involved 
in the decision to nationalize the Big Three. Officially, 
COMIBOh was a state mining corporation ". . . formed and 
given ^.he task of exploiting, commercializing, and ad-
32 ministrating state owned mines." Unofficially, it was 
a majoi* concession to the labor-left. 
" 
3QBolivia Election Factbook, p. 14. 
3^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 169u 
32Ibid., p. 175. 
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At every level of the administration, worker-
designated representatives were to participate 
in decision-making with the right to veto decisions 
deemed inimical to the interests of the mines 
and the miners. The effect of this decree was 
to create ... an independent locus of power under 
the control of the union organizations.33 
What this amounted to was an organization without 
responsibility; an organization controlled by a group 
which would have lost its privileges by making the organi­
zation more efficient. 
But to characterize COMIBOL only as a worker failure 
is to ignore all the facts. Richard S. Thorn has listed 
eight factors in the problems of COMIBOL: 
1. Insufficient fixed and working capital. 
2. The exhaustion of mineral reserves. 
3. Technical and administrative incapacity re­
sulting from the appointment of officials primarily 
on the basis of their party•mi 1itancy without 
regard for their competence. 
4. Lack of labor discipline in the working force, 
many members of which owed their loyalty to political 
officials rather than COMIBOL. 
5. Excessive employment of workers who, in many 
cases, did not perform productive functions. 
6. Lack of a well-thought-out plan of exploitation 
of the mines. 
7. Excessive centralization of decision-making 
and authority in La Paz and no delegation of re-
sponsi bi1i ty. 
33Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 121. 
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8. The intervention of the control obreros in 
matters beyond their jurisdiction and competence.34 
Thorn concludes by saying ". . . the failure of the 
MNR to create an effecient management for COMIBOL and to 
enlist the cooperation of the miners and their leaders was 
one of the major failures of the revolution."^5 
The MNR failed to mobilize the support of the miners. 
However, the party was much more successful in the mobili­
zation of the peasants, accomplished by the following re­
form. 
Agrarian Reform. 
Land reform problems, it may be predicted, are 
likely to be most critical in those . . . countries 
. . . which combine high inequalities of land 
ownership with substantial agricultural labor 
forces. In 1950 Bolivia had what was probably 
the highest Gini index of inequality in land owner­
ship in the world and also substantial tenancy; 
in 1952 Bolivia had its agrarian revolution. 
The large landholders controlled the land and ob­
tained free labor; they had no need to invest capital in 
their land. This was due to the supply of free labor and 
34 Richard S. Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," 
in Beyond the Revolution Bolivia Since 1952, ed. by James 
M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), pp. 175-76. 
351b1d., p. 164. 
3  f i  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 383. 
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a guaranteed market. The result of the land system was 
stagnation in Bolivian agriculture. In the period 1925-
1929, food imports represented 10 per cent of total imports 
into the country. By the period 1950-1952, they had risen 
to 18.5 per cent of total import figures.Clearly, a 
change in the system was called for. 
The victory of the MNR during April 9-11, 1952, 
provided the final catalyst for agrarian reform. 
Preoccupied with the problems of the consolidation 
of power and with the economically and psychologi­
cally critical nationalization of the major tin 
mines, the government moved slowly inlaying the 
groundwork for land reform, however. 
The first step the government took was to create 
a new ministry of Indian and Peasant Affairs. Signifi­
cantly, ftuflo Chavez was placed in charge of the Ministry. 
He had been a long-time advocate of land reform. "Under 
the leadership of Chavez, a semi-official campaign to 
organize the peasants into sindicatos was was put in 
o q 
operation." A program was also initiated to extend 
education to the Indians. 
The significance of the Ministry must be seen 
in the organizations of the Indians. People who spoke the 
^^Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 
p. 396. 
38Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 42. 
39Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 203. 
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native languages were sent into the villages, telling of 
the premise of agrarian reform and establishing peasant 
unions^ At the same time support was mobilized for the 
MNR.40 
The Ministry gained the confidence of the Indians 
and th&y began to lobby it with complaints. The political 
mobiliiation of the peasants was well under way. 
But in the meantime there was a serious internal 
dispuffe under way in the MNR. "By all accounts the question 
of 1 aritifil reform was the most divisive issue to be raised 
in thd loosely knit revolutionary family."41 It was an 
emotitfhal issue concerning property rights, distribution 
of povi>er, values and race.42 
A split occurred between the left and the right in 
the MNR. The right and center a'rgued for a minimal reform 
which would maintain the integrity of the traditional 
haciedda lands. They also argued that any dispossessions 
should be compensated. The drive for wide ranging reform 
came from the C0B-dom1nated left. They argued for complete 
expropriation without indemnification.43 
•  i  
40Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
pp. 6#-61. 
41Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 124. 
42Ibid., p. 125. 
43Mal Toy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
pp. lfH-205. 
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Paz Estenssoro arid Siles were basically moderates. 
In their political ideology, they apparently conceived of 
agrarian reform as a gradual turning over of inefficiently 
cultivated large landholdings to landless Indians.44 
But the situation in the countryside was such that 
a gradual approach may not have been possible. "The policy­
makers, city-dwellers to a man, still thought of the 
campesinos, as unorganized, leaderless, and susceptible to 
coercion. But this was no longer everywhere the case."45 
The Sindicato Campesino de Ucurefia del Valle was 
the largest and most successful of the syndicates. The 
syndicate organized task forces of Indians and MNR members 
and dispatched themto the farthest reaches of Bolivia. 
Often it was these teams which brought the news of the 
Revolution to Indian villages on remote valleys and 
plateaus. 
After an unfortunate statement by Attorney General 
Rafael Gomez Reyes, where he said the government too busy 
with the problem of the tin mines to worry about the Indians, 
the Syndicate at Ucurefia united. And it united behind 
Rojas. 
44Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 355. 
45ibid. 
46Ibid., p. 357. 
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In November of 1952 the syndicate of Ucurefla called 
for a general uprising in the provinces of Cliza, Punata 
and Tarata. After this uprising the syndicate members came 
to realize their strength and acts of violence became more 
47 and more frequent. 
In addition to their power in the countryside, 
the syndicates had a direct channel to the national leaders 
of the MNR in La Paz through Nuflo Chavez. 
[Chavez] . . . was acutely aware of the govern­
ment's dependence on the good will of the village 
population, and was in close contact with Jose 
Rojas and other Campesino leaders. Nuflo Chavez 
became an early and insistent advocate of an extreme 
type of agrarian reform.48 
Given the power of the syndicates the question of 
the origin of the reform in Bolivia may be raised. Was it 
caused by a spontaneous movement from below or controlled 
from above? Paz Estenssoro ". . . said categorically, 'the 
t  
agrarian reform was imposed from above,' and almost every 
49 high MNR official vigorously supported this view." 
However, critics of the MNR have pointed out . . that 
many of the party's pronouncements on agrarian reform have 
been post facto. 
4 7 l b i d ., p. 358. 
48Ibid. 
49Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 37. 
5 0 1b id . ,  p .  40 .  
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There has been a lively scholarly debate on the 
issue. Proponents of either side may be found. For 
example, Heath, Erasmus and Buechler took the following 
vi ew: 
. . . the idea of Bolivia's land reform as having 
been the product of grass roots action on the part 
of the illiterate Indian majority is not supported, 
but claims by the MNR that they instituted it as 
part of a deliberate program of social revolution g, 
must be honored in the light of historical evidence. 
On the other hand, James M. Malloy has said that 
"when the agrarian reform was promulgated ... it amounted 
52 to little more than the ratification of a fait accompli." 
He is supported by Samuel P. Huntington: 
Although its leaders had been moderates on agrarian 
issues, the peasants in 1952 formed their own 
organizations and began to seize the land for 
themselves. Confronted with this upheaval from 
below, the MNR leaders . . . took the only possible 
revolutionary course and legalized the peasant 
acti on.53 
It would appear that the truth is somewhere between 
the two positions. For it is true that Paz Estenssoro did 
put his government at the head of the reform movement, an 
act that had important consequences for some areas of 
Bolivia: 
51 Ibid., pp. 371-72. 
52Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 126. 
53Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 326. 
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Areas of sparse population, such as La Paz north 
of Lake Titicaca, Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz, 
hardly knew the demand for agrarian reform until 
it was instilled from above.54 
But it is also true thatthe MNR was under con­
siderable pressure to act as . . the syndicates rapidly 
took over the most accessible latifundia or haciendas, 
divided up the land among their members, and expropriated 
the vehicles, machinery, and house of the former patrones." 
In sum, while assessing the sources of the re­
form 1n Bolivia one cannot ignore the promulgation 
of a fairly detailed proposal for agrarian reform 
... by the MNR. Nevertheless, the peasant 
upheavals in Cochabamba and northern Potosi un­
doubtedly prompted the government to move more 
swiftly on the issue, to reckon more earnestly 
with the countryside, and to recognize that the MNR 
would be bound by its promises.5° 
The groundwork had been layed by the MNR during the 
Villarroel administration; it was fluflo Chavez, who wanted 
to divide all the land in areas of predominantly Indian 
population into small parcels, who radicalized the MNR 
philosophy. But his plan had a serious drawback: "A 
reform of this type would have converted the country's en­
tire system of agriculture to subsistence farming, leaving 
little or no marketable surplus to feed the cities."57 
5^Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 47. 
55Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 359. 
56Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, pp. 48-49. 
5?patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 359. 
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It was a moderate who finally solidified the 
thinking of the MNR: 
The position which steadily gained ascendance was 
that put forth by Urquidi Morales and the final 
decree bears considerable resemblance to his plan 
. . . The aim of the reform was first and foremost 
to provide a rational basis for agrarian economic 
development. Secondly, the reform was to aim at 
making the peasant a 'motor' force and protector 
of the revolution. The first aim would be achieved 
by bringing capitalist forms of production to the 
campo; the second, by meeting the peasants' demand 
for land and by organizing them into unions and 
militias attached to the revolutionary party.58 
The government took the first step toward reform 
with the creation of an Agrarian Reform Commission; this 
represented the formal decision for agrarian reform. 
The Commission, created by decree on January 20, 
1953, was given 120 days to study the problems involved 
in agrarian reform. They were then to draft an appropriate 
land redistribution law. The members of the Commission, 
named on March 20, 1953, were charged with studying 
. . . 'the agrarian and campesino problem in its 
economic, social, juridicial, technical, and 
educational aspects,' in order to 'propose to the 
Government those means appropriate to an adequate 
solution in the national i n t e r e s t . ' 5 9  
Membership in the Commission reflected a general 
leftward shift in the configuration of power. This is 
58 Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 205. 
59Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 49. 
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evident in the membership of the Commission. Although the 
Commission was headed by vice-president Siles, the left was 
well represented. For example, members included Edwardo 
Arze Loureiro, a former associate of TristSn Marof; Hugo 
LSpez Avila, a former member of the POR and representing 
the COB; Arturo Urquidi Morales, a former leader of the PIR; 
and Ernesto Ayala Mercedes also formerly of the POR.60 
Just as important as composition was leadership. 
The choice here by Paz Estenssoro was also significant: 
While Paz Estenssoro assigned responsibility for 
carrying out the decree jointly to the ministers 
of campesi no affairs, agriculture, and finance, 
the primary responsibility, significantly enough, 
was assigned to the minister of campesino affairs, 
Nuflo Chavez, an intimate of the Indian leader, 
Jos§ Rojas. rather than to the minister of agricul­
ture, German Vera Tapia, one of the stronger leaders 
of the MNR's Vanguardia wing.6' 
The Commission delivered its report on July 28, 
1953, which touched off a period of debate concerning the 
details of the new law. This debate involved the cabinet, 
political parties, and the press. 
6 n 
Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 204; 
and Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 62. 
Additional members included: Alcibiades Velarde Cronembold, 
Raimundo Grigoriu, Jos£ Flores Moncayo, Federico Alvarez 
Plata, Zenon Barrientos Mamani, Oscar Alborta Velasco, 
Julio Alberto d'Avis, Mario Rol6n Anaya and U. N. advisors 
Carter F. Goodrich and Edmundo Flores. Heath, Erasmus, and 
Buechler, Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia, 
pp. 49-50. 
61Patch, "The National Revolution," p. 361. 
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Dr. Hugo Lopez Avila, speaking for the government, 
outlined a proposal. "It provided for taking over all land 
defined as belonging to 1atifundists. It called for 
compensation in the form of 25-year government bonds."62 
tfuflo Chavez then presented a document . . which called 
for the nationalization of the land, compensation of the 
landowners, provision of agricultural credit, and technical 
assistance."63 
The debate continued outside of government, in the 
COB, Communist Party Secretary General Sergio Almaras 
called for outright confiscation of the land and distribu­
tion to the peasants. Edwin Moller, in the name of the POR, 
advocated confiscation without compensation, with the peasants 
occupying the land and dividing it themselves.6^ 
After a long debate, the COB endorsed the govern­
ment's Agrarian Reform Program.6*5 The way was cleared for 
an agrarian reform law. 
In Supreme Decree No. 3464, Paz Estenssoro signed 
agrarian reform into law before his full Cabinet and some 
500,000 Indians gathered at the village of Ucuretfa, in the 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 62. 
631b i d. 
64Ibid., p. 63. 
65Ibid., p. 64. 
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fifi Cochabamba valley. Edwardo Arze Loureiro was named 
President of the Agrarian Reform Council. 
. . .  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  l a w  r e p r e s e n t e d  
a number of compromises — between economic feasibility 
and political expediency; among the various interests 
and conditions in Bolivia's enormously diverse 
regions; among conflicting partisan ideologies 
within the loose coalition which constituted the 
MNR; and so forth. Nevertheless, this, like any 
other law, was conceived and shaped at the top 
of the political hierarchy rather than at the 
bottom.57 
Despite the compromise nature of the bill it was 
still ". . . one of the most comprehensive agrarian reform 
68 laws in world history." 
The Decree covered 30 pages. For the six funda­
mental objectives of the reform (from the Preamble) see 
Appendix A. Appendix B may be consulted for a Summary of 
the Decree.®9 
Briefly, the objectives of the Decree were to 
redistribute the land, abolish unpaid labor, promote 
Indian communities, stimulate agriculture, preserve natural 
resources, and promote internal migration to the less 
populated eastern regions. 
®6Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 361; and Patch, 
"Peasantry and National Revolution," p. 111. 
67Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 49. 
68Ibid., p. 30. 
®9For an English paraphrase of the Decree see Ibid., 
pp. 401-36. 
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The Decree was aimed primarily at what it called 
latifundio. Article 12 of the Decree defined Tatifundio: 
The State does not recognize latifundio, which is 
rural property of size varying with the geographical 
situation, which remains unexploited or insufficiently 
exploited by an extensive system, with antiquated 
methods and implements, which give rise to the 
waste of human effort ... in such a way that the 
return depends fundamentally on the surplus value 
which the peasants produce in their condition as 
serfs and which is appropriated by the landlord in 
the form of labor service, thus establishing a regime 
of feudal oppression, which brings with it agricul­
tural backwardness and a low standard ofliving and 
of cultivation for the peasant population.70 
Having defined what latifundio was, the Decree went 
on in Article 35 to define what it wasn't: 
Property will not be considered latifundio . . . 
on which the proprietor has invested capital in 
machinery and modern methods of cultivation, and 
which is cultivated permanently by him or members 
of his immediate family. In those regions in 
which the topography of the cultivable land impedes 
the employment of machinery, only the personal work 
of the proprietor and his immediate family will 
be taken into consideration.7' 
The law, then was supposed to apply principally 
to land cultivated by semifeudal methods. Small plots of 
land which the landlords had allowed the Indians to use 
became their property on the day of the law. The rest 
of the landowners' holdings were to be redistributed among 
70Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 71. 
711bi d. 
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the Indians as soon as procedures could be established to 
bring this about.7^ Another article of the decree recog­
nized the de facto occupations of land already carried out 
by the Indians. 
The ex-landowners were to be compensated for their 
lost land in government bonds; but as a result of the 
tremendous inflation during the Revolution agrarian reform 
amounted to a virtual confiscation of the land.73 
The first haciendas to be parceled out were 
'typical' fincas purposely selected in various 
parts of the country. The technical Division of 
the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria gathered 
all possible information on these fincas, concerning 
their soil, crops, the number of people on them 
and the age and sex distribution of these people, 
the income of the fi ncas and how it was distributed. 
On the basis of all this information, the Servicio 
then carried through the division of land in 
question.74 
Despite a promising start, the reform was plagued 
by slowness of execution. One of the primary reasons for 
this was the appeal system, whereby the landlord could appeal 
the decision to expropriate at four different stages. The 
landlord could first object to the work of the topographer. 
Second, he could appeal the decree of the local agrarian 
board which decided in a preliminary step how much land 
72Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 367. 
73Ibi d. 
74Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 68. 
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would be divided and in what way. Third, he could then 
appeal to the full membership of the agrarian council. 
Finally, he could appeal to the President of Bolivia. 
Most of the landlords took full advantage of the right to 
appeal; as a result many cases have lingered on for years. 
"By the end of June, 1956, only 109 haciendas had 
definitely been divided by decree of the President of 
the Republic—the last step in the land distribution pro­
cess."75 
At the end of June, 1956, the Reform Council still 
had 833 cases pending, and subordinate reform authorities 
had 9,923 cases in process. The 1950 census showed there 
were 17,755 landholdings which could be subject to agrarian 
reform; which meant that action had begun on approximately 
7  f i  
60 per cent of these landholdings. 
There have, of course, been other problems with 
agrarian reform: 
The lack of sufficient credit and technical facili­
ties is only one of the weaknesses of the Agrarian 
Reform Program. Serious, too, has been the fact 
there have been violations of the law itself by 
the peasants, and perhaps by the government 
authorities entrusted with carrying out the pro­
gram. 77 
75Ibid., p. 69. 
76Ibid., p. 70. 
7 7 I b id . ,  p .  78 .  
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Another problem has been that the reform made 
subsistence farming the dominant pattern in many regions. 
These new peasant landowners produced no more food than they 
could consume and agricultural production dropped seriously. 
"Agricultural production and marketing have not recovered 
from this drastic change. That is the root of many of 
70 
Bolivia's economic straits today.'"0 
The political effects of the reform were highly 
significant: 
It was largely responsible for the fact that the 
Indians were overwhelmingly in favor of the revolu­
tionary regime, and upon various occasions when it 
was threatened rallied to its defense. The immediate 
result was that after 1952 Bolivia enjoyed a dozen 
years of political stability such as it had not 
had for several decades. Even after the MNR 
government was ousted by a military coup in 1964, 
the successor regime made it a major point of its 
political strategy to try to obtain the widest 
possible support among the peasantry, something 
which no pre-1952 government would have considered 
necessary.™ 
The government made one final important decision 
in the first four years: to accept U.S. aid. 
The Decision to Accept U.S. Aid. 
Prospects for a cordial relationship between 
Washington and the new men in La Paz were not 
good in April, 1952. The MNR leaders were the 
very same men whom Washington had tagged as Nazis 
during World War II and whom it had forced out of 
the Villarroel government in 1944. . . . Also, their 
78Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 363. 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 368. 
120  
vaguely leftist program, including proposals for 
the Nationalization of the tin mines, disturbed 
conservative circles in Washington aroused by the 
anti-Communist campaigns of Senator Joseph McCarthy.80 
However, the MNR elites made a great effort from the 
very first to calm U.S. fears and pave the way for early 
recognition. This is indicated by the very early request 
(April 16, 1952) by Walter Guevara Arze, the new foreign 
81 minister, for U.S. recognition. 1 The formal recognition 
came on June 2, 1952. 
The origins of the decision are really quite simple: 
Bolivia needed the money. 
The lack of labor discipline and managerial inef­
ficiency in COMIBOL meant that the large mines 
. . . became ... a major economic problem and 
forced the MNR to seek capital for national de­
velopment almost entirely in the form of economic 
aid from abroad.82 
From the start the MNR had faced a drop in the price 
of tin. This had depleted the funds necessary for social 
reform and economic expansion programs. The problem was 
exacerbated by the steady decline in mineral output and 
rapid inflation. 
80Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 63. 
Ibid., p. 64. 
82Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," p. 164. 
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Agrarian reform had added to the problem of inflation 
by transforming some of the areas of Bolivia into subsistence 
farming. This transformation resulted in the inability of 
the rural areas to feed the cities. U.S. aid was re­
quired to relieve the serious food shortages. 
The formal decision to accept U.S. aid was a 
political and economic necessity: 
Without U.S. aid, the Revolutionary Government 
could not have survived, according to President 
Paz Estenssoro, referring to the economic assis­
tance agreement entered into on November 6, 1953, 
and to the $13,766,136 in cash and $37,336,857 in 
foodstuffs and other products received from the 
United States up to the end of his presidential term 
in August, 1956. 3 
Not only was the U.S. financing programs of economic 
and social development, the U.S. was also providing funds 
for the day-to-day operations of the government. From 
1953 to 1959 U.S. economic aid and techinical assistance 
to Bolivia amounted to $124 million. This total doesn't 
include Export-Import Bank loans of $11 million; authorized 
credits of $4 million from the Development Loan Fund; or 
a $15 million stabilization loan from the International 
Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury. Nor does the figure 
include assistance from the United Nations, which has one 
OA 
of its largest missions in Bolivia. 
83Eder, Inflation and Stability in Bolivia, p. 79. 
^Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a 
Revolutionary Setting," in Social Change in Latin America 
Today, Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & 
Rrntnorc n 1 HQ 
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U.S. aid jumped dramatically in 1963. This was 
prompted by action of President Paz Estenssoro, who, in 
July of 1962, resumed payment on Bolivia's bonds, which he 
had allowed to go into default almost immediately after 
assuming office in 1960. The increase in aid was also 
prompted by the Kennedy government in Washington which saw 
Bolivia as a showcase for the Alliance for Progress in 
Latin America.85 
The figures on U.S. expenditures may be found in 
Appendix C, but it should be noted here that expenditures 
jumped from $26.8 million (6.7 per cent of Bolivia's budget) 
in 1957, to $78.9 million (13.9 per cent of Bolivia's 
budget) in 1964. 
The total through 1964 amounted to $400 million; 
it would not be unfair to say that the United States 
financed the Revolution. 
It would appear that one major contributory factor 
to Bolivian political instability was the dependence 
of the Bolivian revolutionary government upon 
American assistance. That aid may have contributed 
significantly to social welfare and economic develop­
ment. But its political effects were destabilizing. 
By assisting the revolution, the United States may 
have corrupted it.86 
What were the consequences of U.S. support? The 
overriding consequence was political instability for several 
reasons. 
85Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 139. 
^Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 33 5 
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First, dependence on U.S. support caused the Bolivian 
government to pursue policies which it wouldn't have done 
in the same way if they had been solely dependent on domestic 
support. For example, the U.S. insisted in 1957 that 
President Siles inaugurate an unpopular stabilization pro­
gram; the U.S. also insisted on postponement or abandonment 
of some social welfare and development programs. On some 
social welfare legislation the government was forced into 
retrenchment. It meant the opening up of Bolivia's oil 
fields to North American companies for the first time since 
1938. The U.S. government's objective was ". . . more 
implicit than explicit, of moderating or deradicalizing 
the revolution. From the beginning U.S. influence has 
tended to check the nature and extent of revolutionary 
change."**7 
Second, the U.S. also apparently influenced the 
selection of political leaders and may have contributed 
to instability in Bolivia through their support of certain 
people. The U.S. backed Siles while he was president 
and also consistently supported Paz Estenssoro. In 1964 
the U.S. Ambassador toured the country with Paz in his 
election campaign and the U.S. apparently did all it could 
87  
Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 101. 
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to head off the military coup against Paz Estenssoro. 
In 1955 it was reported that Juan Lechfn was forced out of 
his cabinet position as minister of mines as a result of 
U.S. insistence; incidents such as that exacerbated re-
88 lations between the government and the tin miners. 
One cannot overlook the active participation and 
influence of U.S. Embassy officials during Paz's 
last years as president. Leading Bolivian and 
North Americans have testified privately and at 
length about the intimacy and importance of their 
collaboration, an interaction marked by a heavy 
flow of demands and supports from both sides. 
Third, the intervention of the United States in 
Bolivian affairs was an important contribution to the 
polarization of Bolivian politics.The U.S. played a 
significant role in ending the MNR-worker-middle class 
alliance. The effect of U.S. influence was to make the U.S. 
an ally of the MNR center and right and an enemy of the 
labor left. 
Finally, U.S. influence led to the reinstatement 
of a powerful U.S. trained and equipped army which played 
the decisive role in the overthrow of the government which 
the U.S. had supported. This decision will be treated in 
the next section. 
88Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 334. 
89Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 89. 
9^Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 334. 
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Perhaps the best way to summarize the U.S.-Bolivian 
relations is with a statement by Paz Estenssoro on those 
relations made after his fall from power in 1964: 
The importance which these relations have for 
Bolivia . . . was recognized, especially during the 
stage of the implementation of programs of economic 
development, and great attention was devoted to 
them .... Laborous negotiations were necessary 
... in order to find in the detail of each agree­
ment the means of harmonizing them or at least 
avoiding conditions which could prejudice the country, 
affecting its sovereignty or damaging Bolivian 
pride. Nevertheless, there were cases in which it 
was not possible to reach an agreement because 
of the existence of diametrically opposed positions 
. . . much to its sorrow, in many of these cases 
the government found itself obliged to assume a 
delaying tactic, or to yield . . . because the 
alternative, communicated implicitly or explicitly, 
was the interruption of financing for development 
projects, which was very serious. 
The Hernan Siles Administration 
1956_196Q -
. . . the great inflation from 1953 or 1956 theoretically 
might have caused the end of the MNR government in 
1953 or 1956. Nevertheless, since the MNR acted to 
stem mounting inflation and was able to point to imple­
mentation of revolutionary ideas in a wide variety 
of fields, Paz Estenssoro could successfully hand over 
power to his successor, HernSn Siles Zuazo.^2 
Hernan Siles was nominated for the presidency at 
the Sixth Congress of the MNR held late in 1955, ffluflo 
ChSvez was chosen as his running mate. The left was still 
9^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
pp. 89-90. 
92Wilkie, Revolution and U.S. Aid, p. 6. 
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rising in power at the time of the Congress. They dominated 
the writing of the party's program for the coming election 
and also forced the retirement of Walter Guevara Arze 
(the leading spokesman of the right) from the National 
9 3  Executive Committee of the MNR. 
Siles was elected president and inaugurated on 
August 6, 1956. The MNR had scored an important election 
victory. The party received 787,202 votes out of a total vote 
of 958,016, or 82.2 per cent. Their closestrival, the FSB, 
received 130,669, or 13.6 per cent of the vote.9^ But 
the left was the major winner in the election: 
The trade union members of the new Congress elected 
in 1956 included a majority of the Chamber of 
Deputies, and a sizable number of senators, Miners' 
leader Juan Lech'n was elected President of the 
Senate, and thus second in line to succession as 
President of the Republic.95 
Siles ". . . soon demonstrated a rare courage and 
unswerving belief in orderly processes."96 He declared 
the major goal of his government to be institutionalization 
of the revolution, but it was not to be. Runaway inflation 
and the struggle over stabilization were to dominate the 
four years of his presidency. Nevertheless, Siles did 
93Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 53. 
94Bolivian Election Factbook, pp. 34-36. 
95Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 54. 
96Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 366. 
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accomplish some significant things during this term. He 
reorganized the MNR; he dismissed some members of the National 
Exeuctive Committee and appointed his supporters to replace 
them. He also carried out a reorganization of the govern­
ment.9^ 
Monetary Stabilization. 
The roots of the inflation in Bolivia go back to 
the National Revolution and the first administration of 
Paz Estenssoro. The situation in the mining industry, 
with a serious decline in market prices and decreasing 
production, was a problem. The fall in the amount of 
agricultural products available in the cities also added 
to the problem. In addition, an increasing amount of 
spending power had been trying to buy a declining amount 
of available goods and services. 
There is little doubt that the multiple exchange 
rate which continued to characterize the Bolivian 
economy . . . also contributed to the inflationary 
pressure and the decline in the exchange value 
of the boliviano.98 
George Eder pinpointed the primary cause of the 
inflation: 
. . . the action of the government in spending 
beyond its available resources and in borrowing 
the difference from the Central Bank, resulting 
97Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 218. 
9 8 I b id . ,  p .  204 .  
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in the printing of constantly increasing supplies 
of paper money to provide the Treasury with 
funds.99 
The situation was out of hand by the end of the Paz 
Estenssoro administration. The annual increase in the cost 
of living in La Paz between 1952 and 1956 was 147.6 per 
cent, the most rapid increase in Bolivian history. In 1952 
the Boliviano was worth about 220 to the U.S. dollar. By 
the end of 1956 it was exchanging for 15,000 to the dollar.^0 
Paz Estenssoro had attempted to relieve the situation 
during his first term by undertaking a stabilization pro­
gram on May 14, 1953. He also devalued the boliviano; 
created a stabilization office; established a free market 
for the purchase and sale of foreign exchange in trans­
actions not covered at the official rate; established price 
fixing on basic foodstuffs; established rent controls; 
reduced credits to the private sector; and initiated wage 
increases to compensate for rising living costs. These 
measures had little effect on inflation for prices still 
skyrocketed and the exchange rate of the boliviano con-
tinued to fall. 
. . . the United States made it clear that either 
the Bolivian government had to put its house in 
order or U.S. assistance would be cut off. As a 
"Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. 
vii. 
^00See Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 
371; and Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 203. 
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result, the Bolivian government requested that the 
United States send a financial mission-to assist 
in the housed eani ng operation. . . .' 
The result was the arrival on June 1, 1956 of George 
Eder, who was sent to Bolivia by the U.S. International 
Cooperation Administration to study the price situation 
and suggest ways to bring the economy back to normal. 
Soon after his arrival Eder said "... I was 
hardly prepared for the utter chaos—fiseal, monetary, 
political, social, and economic—which confronted me on 
arrival in Bolivia. . . ,"102 As a result, Eder recommended 
drastic measures which were later to lead to charges of 
foreign intervention in Bolivian affairs. 
Actually, Bolivians were involved in every step 
of the decision-making process. The organizing group for 
stabilization included Paz Estenssoro; Siles, Miguel 
Gisbert Nogue (Siles1 principal advisor); Franklin Antezan 
Paz (President of the Central Bank); and Alberto Mendieta 
Alvarez (Finance Minister), Arthur Karasz advised Paz 
EstenssoroJ 
The first important meeting took place on July 19, 
1956. "The meeting was taken up entirely with the revision 
101Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 81. 
102 
Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. x. 
103 Ib id . . .  P .  88 .  
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and final approval by Paz, Siles and Chavez of the decree 
that was to establish the National Monetary Stabilization 
C o u n c i l . T h r e e  o f  t h e  f o u r  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n  
were at the meeting: Paz Estenssoro, Siles and Chavez. 
There remained only Juan LechYn-Oquendo, reputed 
to be the most powerful of all in view of his 
command of the miners' federation and the militia 
and his position as 'maximum., leader1 of the Bolivian 
Workers Confederation (COB). b 
Eder then met with Lech in and Dr. Samuel Marfn 
Pareja, a friend and legal advisor of Lechin. "Only 
after the plan had thus been cleared with Dr. Marfn did 
Lechfn consent to participate in its approval."^06 
The decree establishing the National Monetary 
Stabilization Council was issued by President Paz Estenssoro 
on August 4, 1956.^07 Two days later Siles was inaugurated. 
He had participated in the origins of the decision and he 
. . stated that he was firmly committed to the stabili­
zation program and intended to carry it through, come what 
may ... . 1,108 
decree. 
108  
1Q4Ibid., p. 137. 
105Ibid. 
1Q6Ibid., p. 138. 
107See Eder, Ibid., pp. 617-22, for a copy of the 
I b id . ,  p .  282 .  
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Another important step was taken at an October 11, 
1956, meeting, where the Fifty Step Plan for monetary 
stabilization was considered. At that meeting . . it 
had been agreed, after long debate, that stabilization was 
absolutely essential and that the program must be carried 
The only remaining obstacle was the granting of 
emergency powers by the Congress to the President to deal 
with the inflation. George Eder's statement indicates 
what was involved: 
The only ticklish problem was to obtain the 
acquiescence of Congress in the manifest atten­
uation of its own powers and the diminution of 
the pecuniary advantages that accrue with power, 
The President charged me with the task of con­
vincing the inner circles of the MNR, of 
COB and finally the Congress of the need for these 
emergency powers and, by necessity, of explaining 
to each of these groups in turn the origins of 
the preceding inflation and the steps that the council 
intended to take to stabilize the currency.110 
The Emergency Powers Act was passed by the Congress 
on November 22, 1956.^ 
The Stabilization Program, as it evolved into final 
11? form, covered eight vital areas. First, the government 
^Q9Ibid., p. 169. See this book, pp. 625-47, for a 
copy of the Fifty Step Plan. 
P* 
T^See Eder, Ibid., pp. 623-25, for a copy of the Act. 
^2The following summary of the Program is taken from 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, pp. 208-09. 
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was to adopt a balanced budget policy starting in 1957. 
This entailed a 40 per cent cutback in government expendi­
tures on import, and increased taxes on exports, imports 
and domestic goods. Second, the program was to eliminate 
the deficits of the major government agencies. This included 
the C0MIB0L, the Mining Bank, the railroads and the Petroleum 
Corporation. Third, the Program eliminated all government 
price controls. Fourth, the Program abolished all re­
strictions on private imports, exports and exchange pay­
ments, other than payment of export taxes. Fifth, strict 
controls were imposed on bank credit. Sixth, subsidies were 
discontinued on consumer goods. Seventh, a new exchange 
rate was set (7,700 bolivianos to the dollar), and com­
modities received through the U.S. aid would reflect this 
new rate. Finally, cost of living increases were provided 
for wage and salary earners to compensate for anticipated 
increases in prices following the tax increases, abandon­
ment of price controls and consumer subsidies. This was 
followed by a one year freeze on all wages. 
This program obviously was a return to a wide 
degree of free enterprise in the Bolivian economy. 
It lifted many of the controls and restrictions 
of the government on the economy, and was designed 
to let the exchange rate of the boliviano and. the 
internal prices of Bolivia seek their own levels. ''3 
1 1 3 I b i d . ,  p .  2 0 9 .  
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The drain on the foreign exchange resources of 
Bolivia was met by a fund made available to Bolivia amounting 
to $25 mi 11ion. 
Without this fund, upon which the country could 
and did draw, the program could not have succeeded, 
since those anxious to convert their bolivianos 
into dollars were now perfectly free to do so, and 
would soon have exhausted the already depleted 
dollar reserves of the nation.'14 
The first of several crises over Stabilization 
followed soon after the Emergency Powers Act. Juan Lechfn 
was apparently vacilating in his support for the Program, 
and was waiting for the outcome of the national convention 
of the COB to determine in which direction his followers 
wanted to be led.1^ 
On December 27, 1956, COB Delegates from all over 
the country met in La Paz for their convention: 
In one fiery speech after another, the leaders 
of the railway workers, miners, artisans, civil 
servants, construction workers, and communications 
employees, denounced the stabilization program 
in every way and from every angle, demandina.. the 
resignation of the labor ministers .... llb 
Siles declared a hunger strike on December 28 
(the first of several) to gain support for his cause. 
Expression of support for Siles came from all parts of 
114Ibid., p. 210. 
115Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, 
pp. 299-300. 
1 1 6 I b i  d . ,  p .  3 0 0 .  
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Bolivia and he carried the day; the COB convention did 
not disrupt the Program. But Juan Lechfn's opposition was 
to continue to grow. He was opposed to the stabilization 
because it involved closing the less productive mines, 
dismissing miners, eliminating the main social cost of the 
mines and the subsidized commissary prices.^ 
The next Stabilization crisis occurred with the 
118 Second Workers Congress which started on June 1, 1957.' 
There were four distinct factions at the Congress: delegates 
of unions controlled by elements of former POR members, and 
other groups dominated by Juan Lech'n; delegates of unions 
led by former elements of the PIR; current members of the 
POR; and current members of the PCB. 
Several issues were debated during the Congress, 
but the one of most concern dealt with the stabilization 
program. A proposal was given for a general strike against 
the program. 
Siles spoke twice before the Congress and said 
he wouldn't concede to the demands of the workers and he 
urged them not to strike. However, a resolution was 
passed for a general strike to start on July 1, 1957. 
'However, the trade union leaders assembled in the Second 
^7Hanke, South America, p. 47. 
^8The following account of the Congress is taken 
from Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, pp. 
132-36 and pp. 214-15. ' 
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Congress of Workers had not correctly read the mood of 
their followers. Pressure immediately developed among the 
rank and file against the strike move."^9 
Immediately after the Congress, unions (including 
construction workers, railroaders, factory workers, petroleum 
workers and others) began passing resolutions declaring 
they wouldn't take part in the strike. Siles went among 
the union members to appeal to them urging them not to walk 
out. Siles already possessed great popularity in the unions, 
due to his role in the actual fighting at the start of the 
Revolution and his reputation for honesty. "As a result 
of these declarations, and of energetic acting on the part 
120 of President Siles, the general strike did not occur." 
The split during the Second Workers Congress 
and the weeks succeeding it was the first major 
division in the labor movement during the National 
Revolution. Personal rivalries of leaders, long­
time political differences dating from the period 
when many union leaders were members of the P.I.R. 
and the Trotskyite P.O.R., conflicting opinions 
concerning the policies of President Hernan Siles 
were among the causes of tljf scission in the 
Central Obrera Boliviana. 
"Coinciding with the Stabilization crisis and 
virtually a part of it was the resignation of Vice-
President fiuflo Chavez."^22 Chavez had sided with those 
119Ibid., p. 214. 
l2QIbid., p. 134. 
^Ibid., p. 136. 
122Ibid., p. 217. 
1 3 6  
who opposed the S1les program, and was openly critical 
of Siles. Chavez was . . one of the two bitterest 
opponents of the President and of the stabilization pro­
gram." 123 
The crisis between Siles and Chavez came to a head 
as the result of a confidential report prepared by George 
Eder for presentation to Siles. The report contained a 
summary of the Stabilization effort. Also in the report 
were comments on the behavior of high members of the 
administration. The report was especially critical of 
Chlvez; Eder ". . . accused him of ill-advised actions 
and perhaps worse in relation to the efforts of the govern­
ment to renew payment on Bolivia's long-defaulted foreign 
debt .... 1,124 
Despite the confidential .nature of the report, it 
was published almost verbatim in a PIR newspaper in La 
Paz. This was on June 22, 1957,three days before Eder 
was scheduled to leave Bolivia. 
Ch&vez blamed Siles for letting the report get out, 
and sent a strongly worded letter of resignation to Juan 
Lechfn, his friend and President of the Senate. 
123Eder, Inf1ation'and Stabilization in Bolivia, 
p. 439. 
1 9d Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
p. 217. 
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There followed ... a series of scurrilous attacks 
on Nuflo Chavez and equally impassioned defenses, 
as the Vice-President battled for his existence 
in what turned out to be a cause C§T5bre. 
A special session of Congress was called over the 
resignation issue. 
Juan Lechfn and Minister of Mines Torres lined 
up on the side of ChSvez and brought the mine 
union leaders and the COB into the fray, while . . . 
the majority of the MNR party stalwarts basked the 
P r e s i d e n t ,  f o r  i t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  w a s  . . .  a  
fight to the death between President Siles, in 
support of the stabilization program, and Lech(n6 
and ChSvez, in support of the 'good old days.1 
As it became clear in the Congress that Siles would 
command a majority, Chavez withdrew his nomination on 
April 4. But pro-Siles Congressmen insisted on debating 
the issue. Even the intervention of Paz Estenssoro could not 
alter the outcome: on August 3, 1957, the Senate accepted 
the resignation of Chavez. Although it was a victory for 
Siles, it had adverse effects on the Program as George 
Eder indicates: 
The whole monolithic structure of the stabilization 
program which we had erected depended for its 
strength upon the concrete cohesiveness of its 
constituent parts. The strength or weakness of 
the program thus depended upon the strength or 
weakness of the Chief Executive. It was not?long 
before the cracks appeared in the concrete. 
125 
Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. 440. 
126Ibid. 
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In January of 1958, Siles again froze salaries and 
wages for another year, and the gulf between him and Lechfn 
wi dened. 
Again in March, 1958, Siles' harassment by Lech'n, 
apparently seconded by Paz Estenssoro, who was 
threatening to return to Bolivia from his ambassa­
dorship in London, was temporarily halted when Siles 
submitted his resignation and left the government 
pal ace.'2° 
Siles consented to return, of course, but the truce 
which followed was an uneasy one. In August of 1958 Siles 
thought it necessary to deliver his eighth ultimatum to 
Congress, threatening to resign if Congress did not support 
his "hold the line" policy. 
Congress voted to support Siles but the opposition 
responded by calling more strikes. A transportation 
strike called by Lechfn closed down the railroads for 
1 ?Q several weeks. 
In mid-September 1958, Siles' half brother Luis 
Adolfo Siles, representing the rightest PSD (Social 
Democratic party), signed a pact with Oscar Unzanga 
de la Vega, the leader of the Falange, the bulwark 
of the opposition, for closer cooperation between 
their parties, emphasizing their opposition to the 
stabilization and status quo policies of the Siles 
faction within the MNR.^u 
Under opposition from the right and the left, the 
Program's chances for success were slim. What consensus had 
128patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 367. 
129Ibid., p. 368. 
13QIbid., p. 369. 
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existed among the elites was breaking down. In this 
situation a compromise among competing elites or the elimina­
tion of some elites from influence were the only real 
*10 1 
alternatives. There seems to be little doubt that 
the revolutionary consensus was breaking down. 
The Stabilization crisis of June-July 1957, was 
certainly the first major threat tothe revolutionary 
regime. It brought for the first time a clear 
split in the ranks of the supporters of the M.N.R. 
government, and an open struggle for power and 
popular approval among the M.N.R.'s different 
elements.'32 
Siles did not choose the course of eliminating some 
of the elites from influence, although the option was open 
to him: 
It is probably true that at that point President 
Siles could have broken Lechfn's hold over the 
miners' federation: for a committee for the reorgan­
ization of the federation was established by anti-
Lechfn elements in the organization, and if it had 
gotten support from Siles, it could probably have 
removed Lechfn from the leadership. However, the...-
president chose not to push his victory that far. d 
But Siles instead chose to compromise, and George 
Eder has indicated why he took this course: 
. . .  h e  c o u l d  n o t  b r i n g  h i m s e l f ,  a s  h e  t i j l d  m e  
in private, to break with his comrades, Victor 
Paz-Estenssoro, Juan Lechfn-Oquendo, and Nuflo 
ChSvez-Ortiz, who had brought him to power. He 
gave Lechfn asylum until the passions of the mob 
^Groth, Revolution and Elite Access, p. 13. 
132A1exnader, The Bolivian National Revolution, 
pp. 216-17. 
^33Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 
p. 108. 
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had cooled, called for an end of partisan strife, 
and, within a fortnight. Lechin was back solidly 
in the saddle. . . . 1,34 
Siles may have also feared that in the absence of 
Lechfn the miners might have broken from the MNR. In any 
event, the outcome of the crises over stabilization was 
a weakening of the power and influence of the labor left. 
The power vacuum was filled by the campesinos: 
It was Siles who appointed the first campesino 
to national office by making JosS Rojas minister 
of peasant affairs. With this the Cochbamba unions 
took an increasingly anti-COB line, and, for the 
first time, the government threatened to use3peasant 
militias to break the unauthorized strikes. 
The Decision to Strengthen the Army. 
The April 9 Revolution had largely destroyed the 
Bolivian Army. Already weakened by the Revolution, the MNR 
moved to weaken it further. The army was reduced in size 
and status, as antagonistic elements were retired and the 
military academy was closed down. Paz Estenssoro commented 
on the attitude of the government at this time; and the 
action the government took. He said 
The first logical step was the elimination of 
those in active service, the chiefs and officers 
implicated in grave crimes against the economy of 
the nation and the lives of the citizens, crimes 
^^Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, p. 303. 
^^Malloy^ Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 240. 
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committed in the service of the feudal mining 
oligarchy. Those chiefs and officers were replaced 
by men who had supported Busch and Villarroel, 
and who were at the time of the Revolution out of 
service or relegated to posts where they commanded 
no troops. The military academy, whose members 
had fought perfidiously against the people in the 
April days, was closed.'3° 
But in the absence of a large army, some members 
of the government were concerned about the existence of, 
and the government's dependence on, the armed workers and 
peasants. This led to a controversy over the reorganization 
of the army. 
Those opposed to a stronger army feared it would 
get involved in politics; in addition, many trade union and 
peasant leaders feared that a stronger army would reduce 
their power over government. However, Paz Estenssoro sided 
with the group favoring a stronger army, and it was established 
107 
by decree on July 24, 1953. Paz Estenssoro commented on 
what was envisioned for the army: 
As for the reorganization of the army, we are making 
it, in place of an instrument of oppression at the 
service of a minority government, into an instrument 
of production which will haxe a place in our plans 
for economic development. 38 
The government adopted three means to insure that 
the army would not become a threat. First, the officer 
^36Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 147. 
^371bid., pp. 149-50. 
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corps was screened for background and political loyalty. 
Second, the military budget was kept low and a close watch 
was kept on the army by civilians. Finally, much of the 
army was kept at a safe distance from the capital.^® 
This policy was followed during the first Paz 
Estenssoro administration and during part of the Siles 
administration. Then Siles made a decision to strengthen 
and rebuild the army in ". . . an attempt to regain for the 
MNR elite-controlled state some measure of that critical 
capacity which Max Weber called 'the legitimate monopoly 
of force.' 
President Siles began rebuilding the armed 
forces after his conflict with Ouan Lechin and 
Nuflo Chavez over the stabilization program when 
the resulting strikes, demonstrations, and violent 
encounters threatened the public order. . . . 
Thereafter Siles began to conceive of the armed 
forces as a major prop for the MNR government and 
a counterpoise to the militias. 
What Siles had started Paz Estenssoro continued 
in his second term. Between 1960 and 1963 the military 
budget doubled, . . bringing into existence a new 
142 
social force with the capacity for independent action" 
^39Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 151. 
140Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 290. 
^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 94. 
1 ̂ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 331. 
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The government, under U.S. pressure and with U.S. 
aid (see Appendix C for amounts of U.S. military aid), 
strengthened the military. At the same time, the miners' 
militia was becoming increasingly alienated from the MNR 
as a result of 0peraci6n Triangular, (see the next section). 
In addition, the condition of many of the peasant militia 
143 units had been allowed to deteriorate. 
Meanwhile, the power of the military continued to 
grow. This growth in power was reflected in 1964 when 
General Rene Barrientos, was nominated for vice-president 
on the MNR ticket. The nomination was an ominous sign, 
as the leaders of the party had previously been civilians. 
Fidel Castro's rise and John F. Kennedy's death 
meant that Bolivia's armed forces were to be well 
supplied with funds from outside of the Bolivian 
budget as a result of changed U.S. policy which began 
to rely increasingly on military options to resolve 
complex problems .... These disbursements reached 
a peak in 1964, enabling the military to act as 
arbiter in presidential policy as the MNR began to 
disintegrate.144 
It is doubtful that without this U.S. assistance the 
military could have overthrown Paz Estenssoro in 1964. But 
the MNR elites had made two critical decisions: the first 
to accept massive U.S. aid with all the pressure that went 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 382. 
^44Wilkie, Revolution and U.S. Aid, p. 24. 
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with it; and the second, to rebuild and strengthen the army. 
The lesson for the MNR was as James M. Malloy saw it 
that revolution, as an extra-institutional process, tends 
to make force the major arbiter of social differences. 
This is because there is no clear conception of legality 
and justice in the society.^45 
The Paz Estenssoro Administration: 
1960-1964 
Under the constitution, Siles could not succeed 
himself. In 1959 Paz Estenssoro returned to Bolivia to 
campaign for the Presidency. The move alienated Walter 
Guevara Arze who assumed it was his turn to be President. 
Guevara bolted the party and formed the Partido Revolucionario 
Autentico (PRA). 
After the bitter struggle with Arze, Paz Estenssoro 
made an alliance with the left wing of the MNR. As a result, 
Juan Lechfn was nominated for the vice-presidency. 
The Paz Estenssoro-Lechfn ticket was elected, but 
the election was marred by violence and charges of stuffing 
and stealing ballots.^® The MNR received 735,619 votes 
(74.5 per cent), as compared with the 139,713 votes (14.1 
per cent) that its closest rival the PRA, received.^ 
^45Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 248. 
146patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," p. 369. 
^^Bolivian Election Factbook, pp. 34-36. 
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"With the elections over, about a year passed during 
which the power standoff of the Siles period persisted."^8 
It has been argued that "... when Paz reassumed power 
in 1960, his overriding commitment was to go down in 
history as the man who built a new Bolivia."^49 
Paz moved slowly to establish government control 
through two strategies. First, he sponsored pro-government 
local elites against less reliable leaders; and second, he 
began the slow but steady establishment of a national govern­
ment presence in these areas. 
During this Paz Estenssoro administration the revolu­
tionary changes were institutionalized in a new constitution, 
written in 1961. Agrarian reform, nationalization of 
the tin mines, and universal adult suffrage were all 
incorporated into the new constitution. Now, if possible, 
the MNR had to be institutionalized. 
Backed by the resources of the United States and 
surrounded by a new generation of stalwarts, Paz 
sent out to break the political and economic 
immobilization and assert the authority of the national 
center. The peasants and the military would provide 
the economic and political muscle to back the push, 
^8Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 242. 
149Ib1d., p. 290. This view was not universally shared, 
however. For an opposite and uncomplimentary picture of 
Paz Estenssoro see Ricardo Ocampo, "Bolivia's Revolution," 
At!as, IX (January, 1965), 28-32. Ocampo, a former editor 
of a leading La Paz newspaper, maintained that the Revolution 
developed into a totalitarian regime which resorted to 
fraud and corruption to stay in power. Ibid., p. 28. 
150Mal Toy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 292. 
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and the labor left would pay the political and 
economic costs.15' 
It was to this objective which Paz turned in 
Qperacion Triangular. 
Operacion Triangular. 
Early in his term he [Paz Estenssoro] tried to 
lead Bolivia out of the economic stagnation and 
showed a willingness to assume the political 
risks that a rapid economic development would entail. 
He sought the economic and social objectives for 
Bolivia which had been denied the MNR earlier, 
captializing on the new, more liberal economic 
assistance policy of the Alliance for Progress 
and the Kennedy administration.'52 
That the economy was in trouble was evident, and 
much of the blame could be traced to the mining industry. 
Several of the larger government mines were nearing exhaustion. 
In addition, the industry was seriously overstaffed, pro­
duction was falling the COMIBOL continued to lose money. 
Rehabilitation of the tin industry required a 
two-pronged approach: (1) the revitalization of 
the industry through extensive capital investments 
and (2) reforms in the organization and operation 
of the government-owned mining corporation, COMIBOL. 
But the type of reforms which foreign experts felt 
were necessary in management labor relations and labor 
practices constituted political dynamite. 
^Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 143. 
^^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 85. 
1 5 3 I b i d . ,  p .  8 3 .  
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Paz Estenssoro was determined to push ahead, how­
ever. His chance for backing came with the visit of 
Khrushchev to the UN in 1960. During that visit he offered 
Rolivia the funds for constructing its own tin smelter so 
Rolivia wouldn't have to rely on the U.S. and European 
smelers. In December of 1960 the Russians added to the offer 
a promise of credits in the amount of $150 million for 
the government-owned petroleum corporation, road building, 
railroads and other public works. Despite pressure from 
the left the government posponed a decision.^54 
Naturally the U.S. opposed the acceptance of .the 
Soviet offer. Paz Estenssoro probably felt that prospective 
U.S. assistance would be far more than Soviet assistance. 
In any event, Operacion Triangular was presented as the 
alternative to the Soviet offer, and Paz Estenssoro accepted. 
The Plan was formulated early in 1961 and implemented over 
the next four years. 
Operacion Triannular was an agreement between 
the Inter-American Bank, West German private interests, 
and the U.S. Government, and Bolivia. It provided con­
siderable financing for re-equipment, exploration, funds 
for increased recovery rates, and technical assistance, 
754Ibid., p. 85. 
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all for the mines. More than $37 million was pledged to the 
1 55 Plan. But labor had to make concessions before the foreign 
investors would come in. COMIBOL had to agree to allow 
a German firm to reorganize its administration. But there 
were other causes of concern: 
In 1961 the decree initiating the triangular 
operation focussed on labour indiscipline as a 
chief contributor to the chronic state of the 
industry. It emphasised the need to eliminate 
redundant employees, rationalise the payroll system, 
abolish wildcat strikes and improve laborer efficiency; 
it made clear the government's responsibilities to 
the whole country and not only to the 3% who are 
the miners and their families.'5® 
COMIBOL agreed to reduce its work force by 7,000, 
and the dismissed men were re-employed in a road building 
program. After initial cooperation, by July of 1963 all 
cooperation by the unions had broken down. Lechfn's supporters 
led the resistance. Lechfn, who in addition to being vice-
president was also the ambassador to Italy, was asked to re­
turn home to lead the struggle. He didn't do so, but the 
miners federation called a general strike for August of 
1963 anyway. 
. . . Paz faced a crisis and confrontation with 
the miners . . . similar to that of former President 
Siles in the stabilization controversy. He rose 
155Ibid., p. 86. 
15fi David J. Fox, The Bolivian Tin Mining Industry: 
Some Geographical and Economic Problems (Technical Con­
ference on Tin of the International Tin Council, 1967), 
p. 19. 
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to the occasion, as Siles had, meeting the strikes, 
demonstrations, and other agitation with persuasion 
and coercive countermeasures.'57 
Despite labor opposition the Plan was working. By 
the middle of 1962 the work force had been reduced in the 
mines and production had improved. In 1963 Bolivia regis­
tered a rate of economic growth of 6.5 per cent--the highest 
in Latin America.^8 .js evident that the plan of Paz 
Estenssoro's was paying off. 
By far the most important result of Operation 
Triangular was to stop COMIBOL from absorbing 
all the available financial resources of the 
government. Public finances were regularized to 
an unprecedented extent, both salaries and merchants 
were paid on time, and COMIBOL's large floating 
debt was greatly r e d u c e d . ' "  
But the political effects were not as good as the 
economic effects. The plan had alienated members of the 
miners' union, COMIBOL bureaucrats, the left wing and even 
some of the campesino leaders. The government became 
involved in armed clashes with the miners and the situation 
began to deteriorate until by October, 1964, the country 
was engulfed in a virtual civil war. 
It was against this background that Paz Estenssoro 
made his last major decision. 
^57Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 86. 
TSSu.s. n6WS and World Report, November 16, 1964, 
p. 19. 
^59Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," p. 195. 
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The Decision to Seek Re-Election. 
The worsening relations between Paz Estenssoro 
and the labor movement came to a head in 1 963. Lechi'n 
and Paz Estenssoro were both being pushed by their supporters 
to run for president. 
Pressure from the U.S. Mission to Bolivia played 
an important role in the decision of Paz to seek 
a second consecutive term. Paz realized that if 
the radical wing ;of the party succeeded him in 
the presidency, not only might the MNR fall apart, 
but the U.S. would cut off necessary financial 
assistance to t h e  R e v o l u t i o n . ^ 6 "  
It was evident that Juan Lech'n represented the 
radical wing, as far as the United States was concerned. 
Lechfn had tried to get in the good graces of the U.S. 
government. 
By 1963 it was clear that Lechi'n had not succeeded 
in his task, and was emphatically not favored 
by the North Americans for the presidency. So, 
with some justification, President Paz concluded 
that he himself was probably the only figure 4g 
the MNR capable of denying Lechi'n the office. 
The actual decision to run again was made after Paz 
Estenssoro returned to Bolivia from a visit to the United 
States in October of 1963. He held meetings with Kennedy 
1 fi 7 just prior to the American President's assassination.luc 
How much influence Kennedy had on his decision is impossible 
to say. 
^^Wilkie, Revolution and U.S. Aid, p. 8. 
^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution,", 
p. 96. 
162Ibid. 
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, In early 1964 Paz Estenssoro moved to implement 
his decision with a constitutional amendment allowing the 
immediate reelection of the president. This touched off 
a storm in Bolivia and has not set well with several 
American scholars either. For example, Robert J. Alexander 
has said of the decision: 
In the Latin American context, this is a clear 
indication that the incumbent plans on remaining 
in power indefinitely, and constitutes a breach 
of constitutional mores, even where it is legalized 
before the fact.'63 
The decision precipitated a break with Siles: 
Siles turned against Paz over the issue even 
though Paz claims that he offered Siles the 'effec­
tive presidency' in 1964; this arrangement would 
have found Paz reelected as President but acting 
in an economic capacity. Government Minister Siles 
would have been the real President,even though 
he would not have held the title. 
Other divisions were evident within the MNR. As 
expected, Paz Estenssoro was nominated as the candidate, but 
it was not expected that he would throw his weight against 
General Barrientos for the vice-presidency in favor of 
Federico Fortun Sanjines. Fortdn Sanjines was president 
of the Senate and minister of government during Paz 
Estenssoro's first administration. Barrientos withdrew 
his candidacy in anger, but did indicate he would respect 
the vote of the party for vice-president. 
^Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 384. 
IG^Wilkie, Revolution and U.S. Aid, p. 8. 
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However, Barrientos gained the nomination anyway, 
. . after a mysterious and little explained 'attempt 
on his life' at which time he was whisked away to Panama 
for treatments in a U.S. hospital."165 
In the resulting furor, Paz Estenssoro withdrew 
his candidate, Fortun Sanjines in favor of Barrientos. 
Barrientos knew, of course, that he hadn't been the choice 
of Paz Estenssoro, and he avoided close contact with him. 
Meanwhile, the break-down of the MNR continued. 
Juan Lech'n took his supporters out of the party and 
organized the Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda 
Nacionalista. In a countermove, Paz Estenssoro's followers 
in the labor movement withdrew from the COB and formed the 
Central Qbrera Boliviana Renovada. 
On the eve of the election, Siles and Lechfn jointly 
called for a boycott of the election. 
. . . the army took up strong positions around 
Oruro to prevent any possible march of the miners' 
militia on La Paz .... Despite violent demonstra­
tions at the Catavi, Machacamarca, and Colquiri 
mines in the Oruro and Potasf districts, and student 
demonstration in La Paz and elsewhere, Dr. Paz 
won without opposition, although with some 30 per 
cent abstensions . . . . 
165Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 97. 
166Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, 
p. 524. 
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On August 6, 1964, Paz Estenssoro took office for 
his third term. He was not to remain long in office, for 
he had made a fatal mistake. "Precipitant to the coup of 
1 964 was Paz's decision to seek another term."^'' 
The decision had entailed a break with Lechfn, 
who wanted the nomination for himself. It also entailed 
a break with Siles, who probably suspected Paz Estenssoro's 
motives. "This weakening of the MNR contributed to the 
disaffection and disorder that provided the atmosphere 
within which the overthrow of Paz Estenssoro took place."1®® 
In the final analysis, it is probable that the 
enemies of Paz Estenssoro had no choice but to act or go 
under: 
By seeking to continue in office, Paz pushed 
all those on the negative end of his develop­
mental program against the wall; for by the end 
of another four years, there might well have been 
no turning back to previous options. y 
Summary 
The major decree which launched the Bolivian revolu­
tion occurred during the first administration of Paz 
Estenssoro, from 1952 to 1956. This term of office saw 
167Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 310. 
168Alexander, "The National Revolution," p. 385. 
169Mal Toy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, 
p. 312. 
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the nationalization of the mines, unviersal adult suffrage, 
extended to the Indians, COMIBOL created, agrarian reform, 
and the decision to accept U.S. aid. 
The administration of Hernln Siles (1956-1960), 
was largely taken up with problem of monetary stabilization. 
This concern was to dominate the political scene and 
cause a serious split in the leadership of the MNR. 
Additionally, the decision to strengthen the army was 
made during this administration. 
The Paz Estenssoro administration (1960-1964) was 
to be the last rule of the revolutionary elites. Paz 
Estenssoro decided during that term to attempt to put 
Bolivia's economic house in order with Operaclon Triangular. 
But it was the decision to seek.reelection which brought 
Paz Estenssoro and the MNR down. 
CHAPTER V 
THE COUP D' ETAT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Coup d' £tat 
The fall of President Victor Paz Estenssoro and 
the subsequent takeover of a military junta came 
as no surprise to observers of the Bolivian politi­
cal scene. If we were to single out the decisive 
event in the collapse of the regime, we would 
point to the June re-election of Paz. 
The situation in Bolivia deteriorated rapidly 
after the June 1964 election. In August of 1964 the 
government reported that it had uncovered a plot to assas­
sinate Paz Estenssoro. A roundup began of left wing opposi 
tion, as a result of the purported plot. 
Then on September 20th, the government reported 
another plot, this time to overthrow the government, 
assassinate Paz Estenssoro and Barrientos, and set up a 
junta led by Hernan Siles. Reacting to this plot the 
government arrested and exiled 34 persons including 
Siles, who was sent to Paraguay. Security officers 
failed to catch Juan L e c h ' n . ^  
On October 28, 1964, Paz Estenssoro sent govern­
ment troops to Oruro, 143 miles south of the capital, to 
^Ocampo, "Bolivia's Revolution," p. 28. 
2The Economist, September 26, 1964, p. 1225. 
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meet an armed worker uprising which had begun there. 
The city turned into a battlefield as the army and the 
workers clashed. "Five thousand troops of the peasant 
militia were brought to La Paz from Cochabamba and joined 
with the MNR militia to back the President and the army 
against the miners' militia."3 Soon the vice-president, 
a native of Cochabamba, had joined the rising criticism 
of Paz Estenssoro. 
The spectacle of the vice-president assailing 
the government in Cochabamba and of the 
government firing on workers and students 
shattered the public image of the Paz govern­
ment. All the opposition groups exhorted the 
army to intervene. The army wavered, partly due 
to internal dissension partly because it was 
still unsure of its power. 
It is evident from the groups willing to align with 
the army, that the power of the army was growing daily. 
The army had aligned itself with the Falange, some elements 
of the middle class, and what few of the traditional elite 
that were left. Critical to the success of the coup, 
however, were labor and the armed peasants: 
Sensing Paz's vulnerability, the traditional 
political groups, whose enmity to the revolution 
had been smouldering so long, seized their 
opportunity to move against Paz in concert with his 
labor opposition within the MNR. At this point the 
q 
Eder, Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia, 
p. 525. 
^Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, p. 
3 1 2 .  
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role of the military became crucial, indeed decisive, 
when the armed peasants did not rally to Paz's 
defense. A combination of his MNR opposition, a 
resurgence of parties on the right, and the power 
and ambitions of a revivified military toppled 
Paz.b 
From October 30 to November 3, it had appeared 
as if the coup might not occur at all. Then suddenly, 
army garrisons in Cochabamba, La Paz and other major 
cities revolted. The end was near for Paz Estenssoro, 
and 
. . . late on November 3, 1964, the army chief of 
staff Gen. Alfredo Ovando Candia informed Paz 
that the military would appreciate his withdrawal 
from the country. Gauging the realities of the 
situation, Paz accompanied Oyando to the airport 
and departed for Lima, Peru. 
A week after Paz Estenssoro's departure, Vice-
President Barrientos was installed as President by the 
military junta led by General Ovando. The coup was com­
pleted. It was clear that the factor which Paz Estenssoro 
had counted so much on, the armed peasants, had failed to 
materialize to save the regime. 
Barrientos entered office maintaining he would return 
to the reform movement which had led to the founding of 
the MNR. He called this movement the Revolucion Restaurado 
(Restoring Revolution). The military claimed they wanted 
to revive the revolution by nationalizing American-owned 
5Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 95. 
^Malloy, "Revolutionary Politics," p. 144. 
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mines, furthering land reforms, removing restrictions on 
trade unions, and carrying out a plan of heavy industriali-
7 
zation. 
The Restoring Revolution was short lived, as the 
regime soon ran into problems in governing the country. 
After a short period of uneasy standoff, the miners broke 
with the regime. Soon the regime had repealed the 1961 
constitution, but had retained the principles of agrarian 
reform, nationalization of the mines and the universal 
suffrage. The situation in Bolivia soon settled into the 
following pattern: 
It is clear by now that the 'Revolution of Restoration' 
is neither revolutionary nor restorative. Their 
experience is significant, however, in suggesting 
that the social change of the MNR's thoroughgoing 
revolution of 1952 are irreversible . . . . ° 
Summary 
Prior to the 1952 revolution, Bolivia had been 
ruled by a small elite ruling in a closed system. The 
only exception to this closed system was the addition of 
the mining elites to the ruling class early in the Twentieth 
Century. 
7John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of 
Modernization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1972), p. 203. 
8Heath, Erasmus and Buechler, Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia, p. 261. 
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The traditional elites were in the ascendency from 
Bolivia's independence until the Chaco War. It was the 
Chaco War which sent Bolivia down the road to Revolution. 
The Chaco War was a disaster for Bolivia. The cost 
of the war in human suffering alone was tremendous. But 
to this cost must be added the alienation of many sectors of 
Bolivian society which had previously supported, or at least 
acquiesed to the rule of the traditional elite. In the 
end, the political effects were far greater than the mili­
tary losses or the losses in human resources. 
Disenchantment with the existing political order 
set 1n. There were tentative moves by government elites 
toward reform. Emerging elites gained experience in govern­
ment; labor began to organize; and the discontent became 
evident in the countryside. 
The traditional elites reacted to the changes 
in the political system with a search for new organiza­
tions to protect them. Concordancia was just one example 
of the changing political order in Bolivia. 
The election of 1951 pointed out to all that the 
old order was about to disappear. The MNR gained a sweeping, 
and surprising, electoral victory. Vi'ctor Paz Estenssoro, 
then in exile, and Hernan Siles were elected President and 
Vice-President, respectively. 
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The military government of Bolivia at the time of 
the election was rife with dissension. As the economic and 
political situation in Bolivia deteriorated it became in­
creasingly evident that this government could not rule. It 
also became clear that if the MNR government were not 
allowed to rule, there would be no government at all. 
The coup of 1952 started as a broad based coup with 
labor, the MNR and segments of the military participating. 
The leaders were HernSn Siles, Juan Lechfn and General 
Seleme. Leadership devolved to Siles and Lechfn when 
General Seleme sought protection in the Chilean embassy 
when he feared for the success of the coup. 
The move by Seleme left the Revolution firmly in 
the hands of the civilians. Siles and Lech-fn declared the 
results of the 1951 election to be valid and Vice-President 
Siles governed until the return of Paz Estenssoro. 
From the start of the Revolution decision-making 
was fragmented in the loosely-knit revolutionary family. 
The labor-left, the peasants, and the MNR all were involved 
in the important decisions. This fragmented nature of 
decision-making was in a sense institutionalized with the 
labor-left controlling important ministries. 
The first major decision of the new government 
was to nationalize the Big Three tin mines. This action 
was taken for two important reasons. First, the Big Three 
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represented a threat to the revolutionary government due to 
the economic base they commanded, which they were able to 
to translate into political power. Second, the MNR 
government was under intense pressure from the labor-left 
to nationalize the mines. 
The pressure from the labor-left, which was typical 
throughout the Revolution, indicates the nature of the MNR 
core elites. They were basically, moderate, reformist 
elites. But because of the pressure fromthe labor-left 
and to some extent the peasant leaders, a sweeping revolu­
tion was initiated. 
The government next issued a decree initiating 
universal adult suffrage. The real significance of this 
was not realized, however, until the government moved to 
reform the agrarian system in Bolivia. The new voters, plus 
the agrarian reform, created a force in Bolivia which not 
only supported the MNR, but would be a force in Bolivian 
politics for years to come. 
The sweeping changes in Bolivia created a desperate 
economic situation there. The Revolution would have ended 
early had not the United States stepped in with massive 
aid. 
The final eight years of the Revolution, 1956-1964, 
were dominated by economic matters. Hernan Siles from 
1956 to 1960 struggled with the problem through the Monetary 
Stabilization program as Paz Estenssoro, from 1960 to 1964, 
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would do with Operacion Triangular, But two critical 
decisions were made during the eight years. Hernan Siles 
decided to expand the army, and Paz Estenssoro decided to 
run for a third term. The first decision created the force 
which overthrew Paz Estenssoro after he decided to run 
again. 
The Revolution was, then, in many ways a hesitant 
and uncertain one. The MNR core elite proceeded uncer­
tainly, attempting to moderate the labor-left, yet attempting 
to move toward reform against the wishes of the right wing. 
Since the MNR was such a loose coalition, and since the 
MNR was unable to institutionalize a government presence 
in this country, it was perhaps inevitable that the party 
would fall. But despite the fall of the MNR, the real 
accomplishments of its rule cannot be undone. 
Cone!us ions 
It is evident from the Bolivian case that revolution 
does not necessarily lead to political stability. For 
while Bolivia had a revolution, the return to the device 
of a military coup d' etat indicates the instability in the 
Bolivian political system. 
From the situation in Bolivia we may justifiably 
conclude that for a country to achieve political stability 
it is also necessary to achieve economic stability. The 
constant search for new economic patterns alienated many 
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supporters of the MNR. Since the destruction of the 
traditional elites led to the disappearances of the 
government's legitimate monopoly of the use of force, the 
government had to resort to satisfying the demands of 
various groups to achieve political stability. But catering 
to demand satisfaction made it impossible for the govern­
ment to carry out economic programs which might have led 
to economic stability and possibly put Bolivia on the 
road to political stability. 
The loss of the legitimate monopoly of the use of 
force is indicated by the co-government political system. 
One government was the state and its institutions, the 
other the COB. Each had armed supporters at its disposal 
(peasants and workers), and the third force, the army, be­
came the decisive factor in the equation. This was hardly 
an ideal basis for political stability. 
Elite analysis has indicated the sweeping nature 
of the change in Bolivia, which changed one entire set of 
elites (the traditional elites),for another set (the emerging 
elites). But it also points out the elite nature of all 
societies. The revolutionary elite replaced the traditional 
elite, and were in turn replaced by a "new" elite, the 
army. 
The Bolivian case also sheds some light on the nature 
of the elite struggle. The elites were in great competition, 
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each trying to maximize its own power. In a situation 
like this the government must prevail or the conflict 
will go beyond the control of the parties involved. 
In a revolutionary situation, where the new 
revolutionary elite is seeking to establish its 
control over the system and to prevent its own 
ouster by dissidents from the old elite, the 
success of the new elite depends primarily on 
its internal cohesion and its ability to exercise 
control over all important groups in the society. 
Failure to accomplish these things endangers the 
elite's ability to expand the other capabilities q 
of the system and its position of dominance itself. 
The MNR elites were not able to maintain internal 
cohesion, and as a consequence fell from power. 
The MNR elites attempted to use three strategies 
toward dissident groups at one time or another. They 
attempted to bring them under their control; to eliminate 
them from power; and to counterbalance their power; and 
to counterbalance their power with the power of other groups. 
It may be concluded that had the MNR elites settled on 
one of the strategies it might have enabled them to stay 
in power. However, as the policy pattern indicated, the 
MNR elites seemed to lack an overview of the Revolution, 
and where they wanted to go with it. 
The MNR was the chief hope for political stability 
in Bolivia. There was a possibility at one time during 
9Lanning, "The MNR in Bolivia," p. 6. 
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the Revolution that the party may have filled the role of 
the PRI in Mexico; that is as "protector" of the Revolu­
tion, organizer of political recruitment, interest 
aggregation and so on. In Bolivia, the MNR could not control 
the political mobilization which it had unleashed. The 
resulting situation is indicated by the following: 
The principal institutional means for organizing 
the expansion of political participation are 
poli t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  p a r t y  s y s t e m  . . . .  
Societies where participation already exceeds 
institutionalization are, clearly, unstable.10 
The MNR had, of course, created a force to be 
reckoned with in the peasants, and the party came to depend 
on the peasants for political support. The MNR's mistake 
was to depend so much on the peasants at the expense of 
building a solid political base. Despite the strength 
of the peasants in the countryside, they proved to be 
of little use to the MNR during the 1964 coup. This was 
primarily due to the fragmented nature of power in 
Bolivia, the regional makeup there, and the power of other 
groups. 
Cole Blasier has said that "the MNR leadership is 
primarily responsible for the revolution, its achievements, 
and its fall from power.Under pressure from both the 
^Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
p. 398. 
^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," 
p. 105. . 
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right and the left, the MNR elites moved Bolivia cautiously 
down the road to revolution, avoiding violent swings to 
the right or left which would have doomed the Revolution 
from the start. 
In the decisions to nationalize the mines, reform 
the agrarian system, and to initiate universal suffrage 
the MNR eliminated a powerful traditional elite and 
revolutionized Bolivian society. 
Yet these same decisions created as many problems 
as they solved, and as the MNR elite moved to deal with 
them decisions were made which ultimately led to the 
downfall of the party. As each decision was made another 
element of the party was alienated, until by the eve of the 
1964 elections, only Paz Estenssoro, of the original big 
four of the party, was still in the party. By that time 
Siles, Guevara Arze and Lechfn had left the MNR. 
But if the MNR elite caused their downfall, they 
nonetheless had generous help from the labor-left and the 
army. 
Certainly the participation of the left at the start 
of the Revolution is what caused the Revolution. It was 
only because of intense pressure from the left that the 
sweeping changes were initiated. However, after the initial 
changes, the left seemed to lose its sense of responsibility. 
Soon the left was in such competition with the MNR that the 
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MNR resorted to military politics. It is certainly possible 
that Paz Estenssoro perceived the labor-left as representing 
the same type of threat to the government as the Big Three 
once had. 
Certainly Juan Lech'n was partly to blame for the 
political instability in Bolivia. "More than any other 
person, Lechfn had the capability to make a politically 
and economically viable arrangement with the miners thereby 
promoting the political integration that the MNR always 
12 lacked." Of course the failure of Siles is particularly 
evident here. He had a chance during the Stabilization 
crisis to weaken Lechfn and the labor-left and chose not 
to do so. Instead, he made the decision to rebuild the 
army, which eventually overthrew the MNR. 
Economics in many ways dominated the Revolution. 
A revolution is expensive, and must be financed somehow. 
Faced with what in the later years of the Revolution might 
have been an economic anachronism (the mines), the MNR 
increasingly turned to U.S. aid. Probably they paid too 
high a price for it, as the U.S. became one more group 
involved in decision-making by the government. 
It is difficult to look back and ask what the 
elites should have done. Certainly there were critical 
^21b i d., p. 102. Blasier goes on to say: . . even 
some of his closest associates would not deny a prevailing 
U.S. view that Lech'n has been personally irresponsible and 
politically unreliable." Ibid. 
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points where the MNR could have institutionalized 
itself. But it seemed that each time the elites reached this 
point they made a decision which carried them down the 
opposite path. 
For example, at the start of the Revolution the 
labor-left was given responsibility for government 
ministries rather than the government having that re­
sponsibility. COMIBOL, a government corporation, was 
chartered under the same principle. When Siles failed to 
assert the authority of the government over labor he 
missed an opportunity which would not come again. Finally, 
Paz Estenssoro, by not searching for a moderate candidate 
in 1964, which would have prevented the MNR from coming 
apart, might have averted disaster. 
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APPENDIX A. FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS 
OF AGRARIAN REFORM 
(From the Preamble)1 
1. To allot cultivable land to the peasants who do not 
have it or have very little, with the condition that 
they work it; expropriating to this end those lands 
which ineffecient landlords hold in excess, or from 
which they enjoy absolute rents not earned by their 
own personal labor in the field. 
2. To restore to the indigenous communities the lands 
which were usurped from them, and to cooperate in 
the modernization of their agriculture, respecting and 
making use of their collective traditions insofar as 
possible. 
3. To free rural laborers from their condition as serfs, 
proscribing gratuitous personal services and obligations. 
4. To stimulate greater productivity and commercialization 
of the agricultural industry, facilitating the inversion 
of new capital, respecting the small and medium farmers, 
developing agrarian cooperativism, lending technical 
aid, and opening possibilities for credit. 
5. To conserve the natural resources of the nation, adopting 
technical and scientific means which are indispensable. 
6. To promote currents of domestic migration of the rural 
population, now excessively concentrated in the inter-
andean zone, with the objective of obtaining a rational 
human distribution of strengthening national unity, 
and of integrating the eastern area of the Bolivian 
territory economically with the western. 
William E. Carter, Aymara Communities and the Bolivian 
Agrarian Reform (Gainsville, Florida: University of Florida 
Press, 1964), p. 10. 
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APPENDIX B. A SUMMARY OF THE 
AGRARIAN REFORM LAW2 
The nation maintains the original right of the nation 
over the soil, the subsoil and the waters of the territory 
of the Republic. The State recognizes and guarantees 
agrarian private property when it fulfills a useful function 
for society. The State recognizes only the following forms 
of agrarian private property: the peasant homesite, the 
small holding operated by the farmer and his family for 
subsistence purposes, the medium-sized holding operated 
with the help of hired labor or with agricultural machinery 
for the purpose of marketing most of the produce^ the Indian 
communities, the agrarian co-operative holdings, and finally, 
the agricultural enterprise. 
Specifically the state does not recognize the legality 
of the 1atifundium--the rural property of large size 
which may vary according to its geographical location, that 
remains idle or is exploited inefficiently by the extensive 
system (low capital inputs relative to other factors), with 
obsolete tools and with practices which serve to perpetuate 
the serfdom and submission of the peasant. The semi-feudal 
estates are subject to expropriation in their entirety. 
2Patch, "The Bolivian Revolution," pp. 361-362. 
Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1 962 
1963 
1964 
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APPENDIX C. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA 
1952-19643 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
U.S. Aid In billions % of central U.S. Military 
of government Assis.tance 
Bolivianos budget 
$  2 6 . 8  
2 2 . 1  
24.6 
13.9 
29.9 
38.3 
65.3 
78.9 
1 . 0  
1  . 2  
1.7 
3.3 
6.7 
17.8 
2 8 . 0  
37.9 
38.8 
50.9 
61.3 
68.3 
80.3 
23.0% 
13.7 
11.4 
1 2 . 8  
8.7 
6.7 
8 . 6  
1 0 . 6  
10.9 
1 2 . 2  
13.5 
13.5 
13.9 
$  0 . 1  
0.3 
Negligible 
0.4 
2 . 2  
2.4 
3.2 
^Blasier, "The United States and the Revolution," p. 93. 
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APPENDIX D, PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES 
IN BOLIVIA BEFORE THE DURING THE REVOLUTION 
Waldo Alverez. Leader of the topographical Workers Union, 
and Bolivia's first Labor Minister. 
Carlos Victor Aramayo. Member of Bolivia's "Big Three" 
mining elite. Tin Baron. 
Hugo Ballivian. President from May, 1951, to April, 1952, 
Assumed power when President Urriolagoitia resigned. 
Rene Barrientos Ortuno. Born 1919. Joined Bolivian Air 
Force in 1946. Commander of the Military Academy in 
1955. Promoted to General in 1959. Elected Vice-
President on Paz Estenssoro ticket May 31, 1964. Was 
President of military junta that replaced Paz in 1964. 
Died in a helicopter accident in 1969. 
German Busch. President of Bolivia 1938-1939. Colonel 
the army; led the coup that overthrew David Toro. 
Put forth first general labor law for Bolivia, extended 
legal recognition to the labor movement. Died under 
mysterious circumstances in 1939. 
ftuflo Chavez. An early advocate of agrarian reform in 
Bolivia, and an intimate friend of Indian leader Jose 
Rojas. The first Minister of. Campesino Affairs. 
Vice-President from 1956 to 1957 during the Siles 
Administration. 
Walter Guevara Arze. Born 1912. One of the original 
leaders of the MNR. Lawyer, Professor of Sociology, 
School of Economics. University of San Andres, 1950 
to 1954. Ambassador to France, 1956; to Israel, 1957. 
Minister of government, 1958. President of the PRA 
which he founded in 1959 after withdrawing MNR. Did 
not participate actively in the 1964 coup but supported 
the junta. 
Tomas Monje Gutierrez. President from 1946 to 1947. Led a 
PURS-PIR coalition. 
Enrique Hertzog Garajaibal. Born 1877. Minister of War, 
1932; Minister of Interior, 1932. Elected as Bolivia's 
president in 1947; nominated by the PURS (Partido de 
Unificacion Republicana Socialista)party. Resigned in 
1949 due to ill health and was succeeded by Vice-
President Mamerto Urriolagoitia. 
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Mauricio Hochschild. Tin Baron. Naturalized Argentine 
citizen. Member of the "Big Three" mining elite. 
Juan Lech'n Oquendo. Born 1912. Leader of the MNR 
left until expelled from the party in 1963 for criticism 
of Paz Estenssoro. Led the organization of the COB 
(Central Obrera Boliviana) in 1952. The COB was the 
new national central labor body. Minister of Mines 
and Petroleum, 1952. Senator 1956-1960; and President 
of the Senate in 1956. PRIN presidential candidate, 
1964. Cooperated in 1964 coup by organizing riots in the 
mines. Exiled in May of 1965 for activities against the 
junta. 
Tristan Marof. Real name Gustavo Navarro. Represented the 
pre-war radical philosophy with his socialist revolutionary 
slogan "Tierras al Indio, Minas al Estado" (Land to the 
Indians, Mines to the State). Had considerable influence 
during the Busch Administration. Was discredited in the 
late 1940's when he assumed important posts in the 
conservative governments of that period. 
Alfredo Ovando Candia. Bornl918. Chief of Staff 1957-1960. 
Assumed command of Bolivia's armed forces in 1961. Once 
a firm supporter of Paz Estenssoro. His last minute 
switch to rebel cause was the deciding factor in the 
success of the November 1964 coup. Was named co-President 
with Barrientos in May of 1965. 
Simon PatiPfo. Born June 1, I860, near the city of Cochabamba; 
died in 1947. Had the largest tin holdings of the 
"Big Three". Also had interests in banking, land, 
railroading, etc. 
Victor Paz Estenssoro. Born 1907. Lawyer. Professor at 
the School of Economics, University of San Andres, 
1939-1949. Minister of Economics, 1941. Minister 
of the Treasury, 1944-1946. President of Bolivia, 
1952-1956. Ambassador to England 1956-1960. President 
of Bolivia, 1960 to 1964; re-elected in May of 1964, 
but overthrown in the coup of November, 1964. Exiled 
to Peru in November of 1964. 
Luis Peffaloza. One of the original leaders of the MNR. 
President of the Central Bank during the Revolution. 
Enrique Peftaranda. President of Bolivia from 1940 to 1943. 
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Carlos Quintanilla. President of Bolivia from 1939 to 
1 940. 
Jose Rojas. A member of the PIR before the Revolution. 
Native of Ucurena; leader of the syndicate at Ucurena. 
Took no part in the Revolution of April 9, 1952, but 
later cooperated with the MNR. Named Minister of 
Campesino Affairs in 1959. 
Daniel Salamanca. President of Bolivia from 1931 to 1934. 
Presided over the Chaco War. Overthrown by Jose Luis 
Tejada Sorzano on November 28, 1934. 
Antonio Seleme. General. Commander of the Carabineros 
(national military police) prior to the Revo!ution. 
Joint leader at the start of the Revolution but with­
drew before rebel forces won. 
Herncin Siles Zuazo. Born 1914. Lawyer. Participated in 
the Chaco War, 1932-1935. Vice President of Bolivia 
1952-1956. President 1956-1960. Ambassador to 
Uruguay, 1960-1962. Ambassador to Spain, 1962 to 
1964. Exiled to Paraguay in 1965, returned to Bolivia 
May 1, 1966. 
Jose Luis Tejada Sorzano. Led coup overthrowing Salamanca. 
President from 1934-1936. 
David Toro. Colonel in the army. Led the group which over­
threw President Tejado Sorzano in May of 1936, and be­
came President. Established for the first time a 
ministry of Labor, and nationalized Standard Oil. 
Overthrown by a coup led by German Busch. 
Mamerto Urriolagoitia. Vice-President during the Hertzog 
Pre s i d e n c y .  S u c c e e d e d  h i m  b e c a u s e  H e r t z o g  w a s  t o o  ill  
to continue, in 1949. In 1951 Urriolagoitia resigned 
and turned power over to a junta headed by General 
Bol1i vi an. 
Gualberto Villarroel. Major in the army. Came to power 
in December of 1943. He gave the MNR leaders their 
first experience in government. Fostered the formation 
of a strong federation among tin miners. Summoned the 
First Congress of Indians. Overthrown by a secret 
uprising in La Paz in July, 1946, and was hanged. 
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